3. CONFLICT INDUCED DISPLACEMENTS IN KARENNI

3.1 Defining Population Movements

Throughout upland areas in Southeast Asia, ethnic groups have a long history of migration and population movements. The Karenni are no different, and like other groups the movements of ancestors have been incorporated into their mythology and group identification. These histories continue to be part of their claims to ethnic identity.

Most of the more recent civilian population movements in Karenni involve either refugee movements across an international border or involuntary movements into relocation sites and hiding villages[129] within the state. The broad extent of the movements show that settlement patterns within the state are fluid and constantly changing and a significant proportion of the state's population have experienced displacement and resettlement at least once. However, other patterns of movement are also significant. So as the events of the last four years can be put in a wider perspective, five different patterns have here been defined.

- People who have crossed an international border — both refugees and migrants
- People who are currently involuntarily settled in relocation sites and gathering villages
- People who are still involved in a cycle of displacement, relocation and transition; including the landless and those in and out of relocation sites and hiding villages
- People who have never moved from their homes, either voluntarily or involuntarily
- People who have voluntarily moved away from their homes, either temporarily or permanently, to find work or to trade

3.2 Conflict Induced Displacement

The on-going conflict between State and non-State armed groups has led to the large-scale displacement of civilians in Karenni. The causes for this include: the widespread presence of State and non-State armed groups which threatens the security of civilians; military operations undertaken by all sides, including relocation policies of the State; human rights infringements; and a prevailing climate of impunity throughout. The conflict has also influenced the way other displacements have been carried out since the State's response has been a military one in which policies are implemented without consultation, participation or even within the civil-legal frame-work.

Patterns of conflict induced displacement include:

- Displacement into State controlled areas such as relocation sites or gathering villages;

[129] The term 'hiding villages' refers to small groups of IDPs living in hiding in areas previously cleared by the *Tatmadaw*. The term 'gathering villages' refers to small relocation sites where IDPs from surrounding villages have either been ordered to relocate, or have been allowed to voluntarily relocate.

- Displacement into hills and forests surrounding the village, either to avoid threats or actual violence due to the presence of both State and non-State armies or to avoid relocation orders into State controlled areas;
- Displacement into other areas where lesser hostilities mean less harassment and generalised violence;
- Displacement into Thailand, either in refugee camps or elsewhere;
- Displacement within non-State controlled areas.

While there is very little information about conflict induced displacements prior to the 1990s, the displacement of civilians because of fighting is assumed to have taken place since the start of the war in 1947. Government displacement programs have been taking place at least since the late 1960s aimed at securing areas, cutting links between civilians and armed groups and reducing the impact of armed groups. Examples of these include:

- The destruction of 13 villages in Mawchi and the relocation of 610 people close to army garrisons following an attack on the Mawchi mines in 1969.[130]

- The displacement of an unknown number of villagers in 1995 in Pekon township in areas controlled by the KNLP. Some small villagers were ordered to move to larger ones and others were ordered to areas further north. After three years, a number of these villages returned to their original villages while others stayed in the resettlement area.

- The further displacement in 1992 of residents from an unknown number of villages in the Mawchi area who were accused of supporting insurgents and evicted. Following the evictions their houses were burnt down and destroyed.[131]

- The displacement of 57 villages in Pruso township, with an estimated population of 12,000 who were ordered to relocate to Pruso town in April 1992. The town is set in a narrow valley with limited water supplies and existing villagers were forced to finance and construct housing for the new arrivals. According to Amnesty International who documented the relocations,[132] the villagers were informed that they would be regarded as insurgents if they failed to move even though *'there appears to have been little insurgent activity in Pruso township itself.'*[133] In addition to the site at Pruso town where an estimated 8,000 people were reported to have been settled, relocation sites were set up in three villages in the township — Hoya, Delaco and Dorawkhu. Conditions at these sites were described as poor with over 40 deaths from malnutrition by July 1992. Another 1,200 fled to the Thai-Burma border and an unknown number of people disappeared into the forest or moved to other areas within Karenni.

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[130] 'Repression of Karenni,' Focus, February 1982, p51.

[131] Dossier of Karenni, A KNPP publication, Undated, p9.

[132] Amnesty International, 1992.

[133] Ibid, p24.

In the same year, an estimated 7,000 civilians from Demawso and Loikaw townships were reportedly forced to settle at a relocation site in Demawso town.[134] Situated next to an army camp, surrounded by a five-foot high wooden fence and guarded so that residents could not leave, conditions in the camp were said to be poor. Refugees who managed to leave described how people became ill after washing in and drinking water from a lake next to the camp, the only water source. In addition, one refugee told how he was separated from his family and taken away from the relocation site with about 1,000 other male civilians to work on the Loikaw-Aung Ban railway for a month in April 1992.

3.3 Displacement in 1996

In May and June of 1996, relocation notices were sent out on a scale not previously experienced in Karenni. Estimates, both from inside the state and from the border area, suggest that 25,206 people were displaced in this year alone; 11,669 of these had moved to relocation sites by the end of the year and 4,400 had registered in refugee camps in Thailand. This leaves at least 9,137 people unaccounted for. There are no estimates of the numbers of people who moved out of the state, either into Taungoo where Karenni communities are known to have migrated to in the past or to cities in other parts of Burma. Similarly, it is not clear how many people moved to Thailand yet did not enter refugee camps but sought work either locally in Mae Hong Son province or elsewhere. Local estimates of the number of Karenni in Thailand is about 2,000, but the number of Shan who have moved to Thailand from Karenni is believed to be much higher.

Table 4: Displacements in Karenni by Township

Township	Total Population in 1983*	Displaced Population in June 1996**	Population in Relocation Sites in December 1996***
Loikaw	70,143	2,446	1,668
Demawso	41,645	6,160	3,751
Pruso	18,487	1,978	n/d
Shadaw	9,161	10,170	2,416
Bawlake	4,066	3,033	1,850
Pasaung	16,159	2,419	1,984
Meh Set	n/d	n/d	n/d
Total	**159,661**	**25,206**	**11,669**

n/d = no data available
* Figures taken from the 1983 survey before Meh Set township had been formed
**Figures compiled by the KNPP
***Figures compiled from various sources

[134] Karenni State: Forced Relocation, Concentration Camps and Slavery, Karen Human Rights Group, 1992.

3.4 Displacements by Township

This section describes the displacements that took place within the townships primarily in 1996 based on data collected by the KNPP and other organisations working with IDPs. Due to on-going fighting and the existence of many different armed groups who control different areas, access to all areas by any one group is limited. While the KNPP carried out an extensive survey in 1995 and 1996, some of the data has been lost and as a result, much of the information at township level is incomplete. There are also discrepancies between data from different sources making analysis and comparisons difficult. Furthermore, none of the data is gender disaggregated and while it may be assumed that displacements affect men and women differently, this cannot be confirmed.

Figure 9 shows the known displacements in Karenni and location of relocation sites. Details of village level movements are given in Appendix 3.

Loikaw Township

The information received on relocations in Loikaw township relates to all the villages north of Loikaw, except for village clusters 10 and 11, which are located east of the Pon River. There was no information available to this report about Loikaw city itself. A total population of 12,009 was enumerated in this area during the 1996 KNPP survey. Of these villages, 17 villages, with a total population of 2,042, are reported to have been relocated in 1996. The majority of these were in village clusters 10 and 11. At least some of the village clusters north of Loikaw are administered by the KNPLF under their 1994 cease-fire agreement, while others are still contested areas where SPDC, KNPP and KNPLF troops are all known to patrol. This area also saw an inflow of at least 1,200 internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the southern point of Loikaw township as well as Shadaw township, who are known to have settled in Nwa La Boe and Daw Hta Hay relocation sites as well as in other areas such as Wa Ngaw and Daw She villages. There was also an inflow of people to Loikaw city from Shadaw township, Loilim Le and Daw Ler Dah areas, although it is not known how many.

Demawso Township

Demawso township can be divided into two sections: one area situated south-east of Demawso town with villages clustered along the road to Daw Tama Gyi and the second, the densely populated area situated to the west of Demawso town. A total population of 6,180 was enumerated by a KNPP member who surveyed this area[135] in 1995 and 1996. All of this population was listed as having been relocated in 1996.

The first recorded displacements in this township took place in 1985 when Daw Kleh Lee village was moved to make way for the building of 102 Battalion's military camp. When the camp was enlarged in 1991, two sections of Ngwe Daung town were also displaced.

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[135] Population data only but not location was available for a limited area between south of Ngwe Daung along the road to Daw Tama Gyi; elsewhere data on the location and names of villages was available throughout the township.

Figure 9: Displacement in Karenni



In 1992, displacements took place in the western half of the township where remote villages were moved to Demawso town. It is not known how many villagers were displaced.

In 1996, 22 out of the 40 known villages in the eastern half of the township were displaced into three relocation sites — Htee Po Klo, Daw Tama Gyi and Ta Nee La Leh. During 1999, many IDPs reportedly returned to their villages of origin, although in Daw Phu village cluster, 5 out of the 7 villages have been displaced a second time and are unable to return.

Pruso Township

Data made available for this report from Pruso township does not include population statistics from individual villages except in the case of two village tracts where a displaced population of 1,978 was recorded. In this report, 8 village clusters have been identified, all of which are situated in the northern half of the state. Detailed information was not available for the southern half of the state,[136] at least some of which (mainly around Hoya) are administered by the KNPLF and other armed groups, all of whom agreed cease-fires. However, this area is also known as Township 4 and 5 of KNPP-designated District Two. The KNPP claim to control this area. There were no relocations in this part of the township reported during 1996 but there were widespread relocations in 1992 when the whole of the village cluster around Hoya was relocated to sites north of Pruso township. These relocation sites were named Myain Thaya (wealthy site), Shway Pyi Tha (golden site), Kon Myint Tha (elevated site) and Mya Thi Da (emerald site). According to reports, people started to move back to their own villages during 1993 and 1994.

Relocations in 1996 were concentrated mainly in the north-eastern part of the state in three village clusters. Some villagers were reportedly able to return to their villages, and although the extent of this is not known, local KNDA troops have apparently taken responsibility for these villages.

Shadaw Township[137]

According to 1996 KNPP survey data, there was a total population figure of 10,422 in the township. Of these 6,060 were ordered to move into relocation sites, while another 2,362 from village clusters 8, 9 and 10 on the eastern bank of the Salween were displaced in fighting between the KNPP and *Tatmadaw* in 1992 and 1996. On the west bank of the Salween, all villages were ordered to relocate in June 1996 to the Shadaw relocation site. The most affected populations were those from village clusters 1, 2 and 3 that found it very difficult to remain in the area unless they complied and moved to Shadaw. Many of the refugee arrivals at the Thai border are believed to have come from this area. Some of the

[136] The KNPP report that that there are at least 49 villages in this area with a population of 7,238. Documentation on Internally Displaced Persons in Karenni, CIDKnP, 16 June 1999.

[137] This township has been recently described by UN agencies as a black area, an area operating off-limits where access is denied and security cannot be guaranteed. Within Burma, several zones are known to exist which have different administrative characteristics; white areas – areas under the control of the State; brown areas – where non-State actors have control but State officials, apart from the army, have no access; and black areas – non-State controlled areas which are not accessible to the State or army. Also, grey areas are identified as areas where neither the State nor non-State actors have full control.

IDPs from villages situated north of Shadaw in village clusters 4, 5, 6 and 7, are known to have moved either to the Karenni/Shan state borders or to smaller relocation sites and villages in Loikaw township. In 1992, three villages in cluster 9 were displaced because of a military offensive and as a result 577 persons arrived at the Thai border where they initially settled in Karenni refugee Camp 2. In 1993, they reportedly returned to their villages. They were again displaced during the 1996 military offensive along with the four remaining villages in this cluster as well as all the villages in clusters 8 and 10. All these villages are reported to have arrived at the Thai border and settled in Karenni Camps 2 and 3 between June and December 1996 except for Htee Deh Hi Leh which moved to Thailand but did not enter the refugee camps. Figures suggest that the refugees who arrived in 1996 were as likely to have been displaced by fighting as by orders to relocate.

Bawlake Township

Information is only available on three village clusters in Bawlake township where a displaced population of 3,033 was recorded. In village cluster 1, all villages were ordered to Ywathit relocation site. No other movements of these villages are known. In village cluster 2, none of the villages were ordered to relocate but all villages were displaced by fighting during offensives in 1991 and 1996. During this time, these villagers were reported to have moved to refugee camps in Thailand. From village cluster 3, all villagers were ordered to relocate and two villages are reported to have moved to Ywathit. It is not clear where the rest of the population from the remaining villages are, but some are known to be in the Thai border refugee camps.

Pasaung Township[138]

Neither population data disaggregated by village nor village location data in this township was available for this report**.** The most recent data available was collected by KNPP members but this does not include statistics from all villages and hideouts in the area due to security problems making access difficult. For the purposes of this report, five village clusters have been identified and 24 villages have been marked as displaced.

The small number of villagers in both Mawchi and Pasaung relocation site indicate that a significant number of the population never went to the site at all, but are reportedly hiding in the area. There are still areas in this township, particularly around village clusters D and E that are known as either black and brown areas and are still controlled and administered by the KNPP. It would seem from interviews with refugees that IDPs living in hideouts in the area tend to live in bigger groups, with more contact between hideouts than elsewhere.

Meh Set Township

Twelve villages have been identified for this report, most of which are either Shan or Karen. Displacements occurred in this area between 1992 and 1994, when five villages were displaced. IDPs who were displaced elsewhere are reported to have moved to Mae Set town.

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[138] Data on village locations and displacements have been compiled by the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG).

Population data by village and village location data in this township was not available for this report. There are no displacements reported in this township, control of which is shared between KNPLF and the *Tatmadaw*.

3.5 Relocation Policy

Since 1990, the State has given priority to a planned programme of border area development carried out under the auspices of the Ministry for Progress of Border Areas and Development of National Races. Its objectives amongst others, included the resettlement of rural populations for 'all round development', promotion of national unity and the provision of basic needs. The areas for the programme are selected *'due to the geographical situation, difficulties in transportation and the wounds inflicted by post-independence insurgency, thus isolated from other regions of the country and lagging behind in all areas of development including economic and social.'*[139] In these border areas two groups were 'eligible for resettlement' -- former insurgents who laid down their arms in so called 'welcome' sites and populations displaced by military action between the army and non-State actors. Seen as a parallel equivalent of the forced urban resettlement programme, rural relocations were undertaken in an absence of any regional or state planning and have been largely based on military set objectives.

3.6 Services in Relocation Sites[140]

Significant variations in the running of the relocation sites and the services offered indicate that while the order for relocations may have been a State or war office directive, responsibility for the sites themselves were most likely devolved to township level. Comparative data on services within the sites themselves is not available. In addition to the reasons outlined above, there are a number of difficulties in collecting data and making assessments about what services were offered, were available or denied. Previous research has tended to discuss these issues in a human rights context as intimidation, threats, and actual physical violence (including executions) occurred throughout the period of displacement and resettlement; however, due to this, analysis has focussed on the assumption that the lack of services offered in the sites represents a denial of basic human rights while little information is available on the services and the social impact.[141] Despite these difficulties, a number of observations can be made about services in relocation sites.

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[139] MPBANRDA, 1994.

[140] For information on health services in relocation sites, see section on Health and Education Needs and Responses below.

[141] See for example Exodus: An Update on the Current Situation in Karenni State by Green November 32; Forced Relocation in Karenni, Update on Karenni Forced Relocations, A Struggle Just to Survive and Continuing Fear and Hunger Update on the Current Situation in Karenni by the Karen Human Rights Group; Human Rights Abuses in Karenni State Under the Military Junta (SLORC) — a series of interviews conducted by students in Karenni Camp 5 and Claire Whieldon; and Forced Relocation, Human Rights Abuses in Karenni State by the All Burma Students Democratic Front.

The Relocation Process

Relocation orders were sent out in June 1996 in the Shadaw and Ywathit areas, and in July 1996 in other areas. In some cases the orders specified where the villagers should relocate to, in others the order simply stated that the villagers should leave the area. In most cases the order was accompanied with a threat of violence against anyone still in the village after a certain date — in many cases, seven days after the letter was written. To prevent villagers from remaining in or returning to their village, some villages were burnt down and *Tatmadaw* units searched the area in frequent patrols. A few villagers were able to resist the relocation order; in a few cases a Buddhist Monk or Parish Priest gave guarantees that the villagers would not help the armed groups and in one case the KNPLF took responsibility for the security of three villages in Pasaung township.[142]

In the relocation sites, there seems to have been little attempt to mobilise or re-organise resources to support new arrivals.[143] The inability or unwillingness to consider issues such as the availability of water, food supplies, cultivatable land and employment is largely a reason why communities who were relocated to these sites were not able to settle there. It is of course possible that the permanent resettlement of IDPs was neither intended nor planned for. At many sites, the unpreparedness of the site authorities and the insufficient services (such as the lack of household latrines and water) provided within them have forced IDPs to adopt ad-hoc approaches that may significantly compromise and endanger women's safety.[144] The displacements occurred during a critical phase in the rice planting calendar, when rice seedlings were being transferred into the paddy fields. Because IDPs were not allowed back to their villages in the first few months after displacement except to collect stored rice, the rice crops in these areas failed. This led to an increased dependency on rice distributions in the following years, at a time when the delivery of rice rations had stopped in almost every site and there was a lack of viable employment for IDPs who are mostly farmers. Moreover, the splitting of communities and the displacement process — either into relocation sites or into hiding — may well have curtailed or changed access to the informal market sector further undermining income earning opportunities, which are operated largely by women.

Security at the Relocation Sites

Interviews with refugees have shown that there have been attacks on both men and women including rapes, both in relocation sites, and just outside.[145] Refugee accounts make it clear that while they may have been protected against non-State armies in the relocation sites, they were much more vulnerable to the abuses of State forces against which they could do very little. In one case, security was provided by the KNDA.[146] Barbed wire fencing and the establishment by the State of civilian sentry guards in some sites provided no protection

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[142] Images Asia Interview No. 101.

[143] In one case people were ordered to dismantle their houses and transport them to the Palaung relocation site. Images Asia Interview No. 35.

[144] In Shadaw relocation site, the water supply was located half an hour's walk from the camp. Images Asia Interview No. 63.

[145] Images Asia Interview Nos. 60, 63, 70, 71, 72, 84, 87, 90.

[146] Images Asia Interview No. 93.

in this sense and when abuses were reported to State authorities, they were largely not taken up. In addition, there appears to have been little or no provision of safe sleeping quarters for unmarried women, female-headed households and unaccompanied children. Insufficient rations meant that many women were compelled to supplement their food from forests or small farmed plots outside the camp, during which they were more vulnerable to attacks.

Access to Electricity

One site, Nwa La Boe, situated north of Loikaw, appears to have received electricity and the people were permitted to use kerosene lamps. However, the electric fittings were subsequently stolen. At other locations, such as Shadaw, even dry cell batteries were not permitted to be sold inside the site. The lack of provisions for night lighting, which has elsewhere been found to be effective in reducing attacks on women, and the refusal to allow torches and batteries in Shadaw underlines the lack of planning for and the increased vulnerability of women.

Access to Farmland/Employment

The situation in each site varied. Some sites like Daw Tama Gyi were able to access farmland around the site, while in other sites such as Shadaw, IDPs were unable to access farmland and grow crops for a considerable time after displacement. At all sites, the problem appears to have been that the amount of land allocated was either insufficient for basic survival or unsuitable for farming. In the case of Shadaw, IDPs were ordered to clear an area of forest for cultivation, though once it was cleared it was confiscated by the military to grow beans. The IDPs were then made to clear another site for their crops.

At each site, IDPs were able to leave the site with a leaving pass; in some places this was issued by the authorities responsible at the site, while in other cases the village headman issued it. Leaving passes brought by refugees to the Thai border were issued to the senior male member of each household[147] with other members listed on the pass rather than being issued with their own passes. This would make non-household heads, particularly women more vulnerable to suspicion and reprisals if they were found alone outside the relocation site or separated from their families during the displacement process. The lack of individual passes, if practised on a large-scale basis, would handicap monitoring and protection efforts.

The leaving passes permit IDPs to stay out of the camp on a daily basis[148] (in other cases on a weekly basis) to tend crops, collect forest products or do labouring on land in areas where the local population have not been relocated. However, in some cases people were ordered to provide forced labour for local army camps so frequently that they were unable to grow crops or work elsewhere.[149] In addition, there were incidents of violence against IDPs outside the camp, or in some cases accusations that they had contacted armed groups when they returned to the camp.

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[147] One pass indicated that a female was the head of the household. New Arrivals from the SLORC Relocation Site, Shadaw, Report by the Karenni Social Welfare Committee, KSWC #96-1, September 1996.

[148] Images Asia Interview Nos. 35 and 63.

[149] Images Asia Interview No. 63.

New arrivals at the Thai border in 1999 said that they had been able to find daily labour on local farms earning between 40 and 120 kyats per day.

Figure 10: Map of Shadaw Town and Relocation Site

Layout of Shadaw relocation site
A map of the layout of Shadaw relocation site, Figure 10, shows a geometrically divided area of roughly 2.52 sq. km. set aside to accommodate an expected population of 8,000 people.

This regimented approach to site planning contrasts sharply with the lack of planning or service provision that seriously impeded the chance of making a successful transition from village community to relocation site. While the furthest distance between the Shadaw site and services in the town, such as the public clinic, was only just over one kilometre away, it is evident from the layout of the map that there were no services sited in the relocation site itself. People were expected to utilise services such as schools, clinics, churches and temples that had been set up for the population of Shadaw town. At this particular site, the size of the 1996 inflow (between 2,429 and 3,993) in proportion to the population of Shadaw town (1,338 in 1983) is significant. Refugees coming from Shadaw commented on the inadequacy of service provision, especially lack of schooling.

Registration and Site Organisation
Once in the sites, IDPs were organised into sections according to village of origin, with each section represented by a village headman.[150] In most sites, each household was registered by the authorities according to the system used throughout Burma — a household registration that includes the names of every person living in the house; this is checked periodically. Guests staying overnight are expected to register with the local authorities. Those who fail to comply can expect a fine or short prison sentence. Refugees who had come from Mawchi relocation sites said that the fine was 500 kyats for the guest and 50 kyats for the host.

The combination of such enforced regimentation and registration, together with the lack of services, particularly insufficient food rations and restricted access to cultivatable land, resulted in a highly mobile population with people moving in and out of the relocation sites. With the proliferation of armed groups and the continuation of the conflict (including the marking off of territory with landmines), the situation, both for the IDPs and for organisations offering assistance, has become extremely complex.

3.7 Smaller Relocation Sites and so-called 'Gathering Villages'

In addition to the larger relocation sites, villages in some areas were grouped together into so-called 'gathering villages.' Information about these villages is hard to obtain but the following is a list of some 'gathering villages' or smaller relocation sites.[151] Most of these appear to be a spill-over from Shadaw and were situated in the northern part of the state or across the Shan border.

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[150] Images Asia Interview Nos. 42 and 63.

[151] Information about these sites was obtained from the KNPP and from interviews with refugees who had stayed there.

Loikaw township
Peh Ya Pyo: where a small group of 21 IDPs from two villages, Three Dah in Shadaw township and Daw Mu Sweh in Loikaw township joined an existing population of 130 people.

Daw Hta Hay: where a group of 300 IDPs from five villages in Shadaw township joined an existing population of 220 people.

Wa Nga East and West: where a group of 133 IDPs from four villages in Shadaw township joined an existing population of 678 people spread across two villages.

Daw Seh relocation site: where 472 IDPs from two other villages in the same cluster were relocated to join an existing population of 155 people.

Demawso township
Ta Nee La Leh relocation site (population unknown): where 490 IDPs from three other villages in Daw Phu village cluster were relocated.

Pruso township
Tha Leh relocation site: where an unknown number of IDPs from two villages were relocated.

Shan state
Hang Nyee relocation site: where an unknown number of Karenni IDPs from three villages were either relocated or voluntarily moved.

Ler Mu Su relocation site: where at least 40 households from six villages were either relocated to or voluntarily moved.

IDPs at these sites appear to have received less in terms of facilities or services such as health care and food rations.[152] At one site, refugees claim that following the initial orders to relocate, SPDC authorities never visited the site at all. In such situations, IDPs were much more dependent on the local host population and in more than one case, there was conflict between the two populations. In one instance, it is known that IDPs were prevented from bringing their domestic animals to the village by the local residents.[153]

3.8 Displacement into Shan State

A group of over 200 families from Shadaw township appear to have crossed the border into the southern townships of Shan state in 1996, where they joined existing Karenni communities, set up temporary settlements in remote areas or dispersed in small groups into the forest. In addition, an unknown number of displaced Karenni, some from northern Karenni as well as others who live just across the Shan state border in Pekon and Mobye, have also moved into the southern townships of Shan state. Many cite the deteriorating

[152] Images Asia Interview No. 71.

[153] Ibid

economic situation, heavy taxation and demands for forced labour as reasons for moving. Some also said that they had to move because they could not pay off heavy debts. People who subsequently arrived at the Thai border also spoke of ethnic tensions with some of the host communities. In the case of IDPs from Pekon township, it is likely that many of them were being displaced for the second time around; the first time being during the 'Four-Cuts' operation in 1985. A total of 639 families and 2,661 people were known to have crossed the border and were living in Shan state in February 1999.

3.9 Displacement as a Passing Phenomenon

Although there is little information available, it seems as if many IDPs are moving out of the relocation sites and back to their villages (see Table 5). In some cases, these IDPs have subsequently migrated to the refugee camps in Thailand.[154]

Table 5 : Population in Relocations Sites and Gathering Villages

Data shown as number of households/number of people

Relocation Site /Gathering Village	**Sept. 1996**	**Dec. 1996**	**Oct. 1998**	**Jan. 1999**	**June 1999**	**Aug. 1999**
Pasaung	131 / 1040	176 / 775	117 / 770	80 / 820	71 / 532	102 / 951
Mawchi	n/d /300	229 / 1209	32 / 210	32 / 213	32 / 213	n/d
Meh Set	n/d	n/d	16 / 121	38 / 158	41 / 180	54 / 192
Shadaw	505 / 2429	505 / 2416	548 / 3310	353 / 2041	394 / 1706	437 / 1981
Punchaung	52 / 314	143 / 768	158 / 768	153 / 750	130 / 600	77 / 653
Nwa La Boe	n/d	155 / 900	121 / 635	112 / 602	64 / 340	85 / 442
Ywathit	52 / 255	170 / 850	181 / 992	180 / 996	150 / 802	187 / 969
Loilim Le	78 / 415	n/d	n/d	28 / 142	35 / 165	446 / 2363
Bawlake	n/d	200 / 1000	180 / 704	150 / 680	n/d	227 / 1272
Dothe	n/d	n/d	25 / 125	28 / 142	n/d	n/d
Shan state*	n/d	n/d	42 / 155	40 / 155	n/d	n/d
Htee Poh Kloh	277 / 1451	518 / 2930	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
Daw Tama Gyi	277 / 1451	145 / 821	155 / 870	n/d	n/d	140 / 870
Namphe	n/d	113 / 565	121 / 605	105 / 600	n/d	111 / 621
Dotada	n/d	n/d	59 / 441	34 / 302	n/d	186 / 1230
Kaylyar	n/d	n/d	60 / 370	n/d	n/d	n/d
Htibyanyi	n/d	n/d	65 / 320	n/d	n/d	n/d
Total no of people	**7,855**	**12,234**	**10,398**	**7,551**	**4,538**	**11,544**[155]

n/d = no data available

Source: Information collected from various sources

* This data relates only to IDPs from Karenni who have moved to Shan state. It does not include people displaced from their homes in Shan state

[154] Images Asia Interview Nos. 84, 87.

[155] The most recent statistics, from August 1999 indicate that the population of IDPs in relocation sites had increased by over 7,000 in two months. The reasons for this sudden large increase are not clear.

In the dry season of 1998-1999, there was a large, and as yet unexplained, population movement from the relocation sites to the Thai border. A large proportion of those who arrived at refugee camps appears to have come from Shadaw relocation site.[156] Evidence suggests that they were able to travel in large groups; on 1 February 1999, a group of 400 arrived in Camp 2 at the same time. Since then, refugees have indicated that the numbers left inside the relocation sites are very small,[157] some estimating that there were only 300-500 people remaining in the Shadaw relocation site.[158] Other sites, such as Htee Poh Kloh and Daw Tama Gyi are known to have closed down. However, not all the villages from these areas have been able to move back to their original villages; in some cases they have been displaced a second time and relocated to more accessible villages in the area.

In July 1998, IDPs who had come to the border from relocation sites at Nwa La Boe, Mawchi and Pasaung had been ordered to leave the relocation sites and return to their villages. At Nwa La Boe, many of the resettled families had come from villages in the Shadaw area, where villagers were still unable to return to their home villages. IDPs from Nwa La Boe reportedly refused to return — most likely for this reason. According to one refugee, at Mawchi and Pasaung, families who were told to go back to their village by the SPDC column commander later received orders from the Regional Control Command to remain at the site.[159]

It is not clear why IDPs are moving back to their villages. In some cases the return appears to be voluntary, while in others people are being ordered back. However, the lessening of the conflict between the *Tatmadaw* and the KNPP appears to be a factor; and where pro-government or cease-fire groups operating in the locality have taken responsibility for security, IDPs have been allowed back to their villages.

3.10 Displacement, Resettlement and Transition

In addition to IDPs who resettled in relocation sites, a significant proportion of those who were ordered to leave their villages in 1996 are currently still displaced outside relocation sites. In the first few months following the order to relocate, there were at least 13,537 IDPs in this situation. Many of these people had initially moved into the relocation sites, but then quickly moved out either to hide in the forest, move to Thailand, or relocate further inside the region. IDPs who have since reached the refugee camps in Thailand have described their situation hiding in the forest.[160] Forced to live in small communities of three or four families to avoid detection, some groups moved to a new location every few days. Fear of

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[156] Out of 1,944 new arrivals at Camp 2 between 5 January 1999 and 30 June 1999, at least 857 are known to have come from the Shadaw area.

[157] Images Asia Interview Nos. 26, 63 and 84.

[158] While this supports figures released at the Thai border in March 1998, which estimated 1,092 people were left inside the camp, it contradicts figures from Loikaw which estimates 2,041 people in the camp in January 1999 and 1,706 in June 1999, showing a total decline of 335 in the first half of 1999.

[159] Images Asia Interview No. 101.

[160] Images Asia Interview Nos. 22 and 27

detection meant that there was likely little contact between groups in the same area and many groups avoided activities such as digging wells, building shelters or building sanitation arrangements. Immediately after displacement in 1996, attempts were made by the *Tatmadaw* to find and force IDPs into relocation sites. During this process, rice supplies, domestic animals and fruit trees in the deserted villages were destroyed. Two years later, in May and June of 1998, there was another attempt which resulted in some IDPs being forced into relocations sites, while some 87 IDPs arrived in the refugee camps at the Thai border.[161]

Very little is known about IDPs who moved to urban areas further inside Burma. Many of them were presumed to be staying with relatives but had not registered themselves. One particular group, consisting of three villages from southern Shadaw township moved to Loikaw after receiving their relocation orders. They stayed in the hospital quarter of Loikaw town, apparently sheltered by residents there, until they were relocated again to a new site five miles north of Loikaw, at Nwa La Boe village in September 1996.

3.11 Women outside Relocation Sites

Outside the relocation sites, women have become targets of violence in a range of different situations, including when they are in hiding, when they are travelling and in resettlement in their original villages. Factors which increase their vulnerability include:

- the current registration system which means that many women do not have individual identification cards;
- the fact that a significant number of women in Karenni do not speak Burmese, and are therefore disadvantaged in their dealings with State personnel and civilians from other ethnic groups;
- women headed households rely on men in their community to support them in terms of labour and protection, particularly in the case of return and resettlement;[162]
- that when soldiers approach villages, village men tend to hide to avoid accusations and orders to work for the *Tatmadaw*.[163] This places an extra burden on women.

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[161] Burma Issues, Vol. 8 No. 10, October 1998, p5.

[162] Images Asia Interview No. 43.

[163] Images Asia Interview Nos. 42, 59, 63, 68, 70, 81, 82 and 88.

4. OTHER FORMS OF DISPLACEMENT

There is very little information available on other forms of displacement in Karenni due to conflict, near non-existent reporting mechanisms and severely restricted access.[164]

4.1 Development Induced Displacement

Most displacements arising from development projects appear to have taken place in the 1960s and 1970s during the period when the Belauchaung River was dammed and Lawpita power plant was built. This was during the socialist years of the BSPP when the focus on large-scale engineering projects tended to disregard the effects of population displacement. An article about Mobye dam, written in 1969, speculated on the benefits this project could bring to local communities: *'Modern residential buildings will change a virgin land to a place of new style of living where the native folks will become owners of land and houses. This is the fruit of the socialist economy bringing development to the Union, assuring unity to policy.'*[165]

Prior to the building of the dam, the area, where a majority of the population are Kayan, had seen a large land nationalisation and redistribution program between 1964 and 1969. In the dam basin itself,[166] an estimated 114 villages — nearly 1,740 people — were relocated out of the area without compensation before the end of 1969.[167] Local people were not employed in the building of the dam and the lack of local skilled labour necessitated the employment of 800 migrant labourers from Myingyan, Kyauk Padaung, Thazi and Taungoo in central Burma. It is not known how the original Kayan inhabitants were resettled but some of the farmland was redistributed to the migrant workers on completion of the project.[168]

According to the KNPP, a similar land nationalisation and redistribution programme displaced an unknown number of villages from their farms in the lowlands of Demawso in 1965. The redistribution of these lands to Burman migrants was interpreted by Karenni nationalists as '...[a] *colonisation, alien occupation by a racist regime. This is fiction but to cover the skin of a goat with the skin of an elephant.'*[169]

One of the larger infrastructure projects in Karenni was the building of the Lawpita hydroelectric power plant (Belauchaung I) in 1961. According to the KNPP, thousands of

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[164] For example, in October 1992, there was a major earthquake, centred in the eastern part of Karenni which measured six on the Richter scale. There is no information available about extent of the damage, displacement of populations or relief efforts. 'Burmese Quake Jolts Bangkok Skyscrapers,' The Nation, Bangkok, 29 October 1992.

[165] 'Image of Switzerland in Asia,' Zawana, The Mirror, 25 June 1969.

[166] Set on a plateau 5,000 feet above sea level, the dam is 37 miles long and five miles wide and is reported to have been built with technical assistance from Sweden and the United Nations.

[167] The Mirror, 25 June 1969.

[168] Dossier of Karenni, p13.

[169] Dossier of Karenni, p19.

villagers were displaced from the area without compensation.[170] When the plant at Lawpita was renovated in 1991, work camps were set up and prison labour was used to complete the project.[171] The use of prison labour for development and infrastructure projects, supervised by units of the *Tatmadaw*, is a recent phenomenon; it marginalizes local group participation in the planning, construction and utilisation of these resources. In the late 1980s and 1990s, there were fewer development projects in Karenni and very few large-scale projects of the type undertaken twenty years earlier. While this may be attributed to economic mismanagement and low levels of foreign investment, the fact that there have been so few projects in the area further undermines the cease-fire process in which development was supposed to play a major part. Despite this, a number of observations can be made about the development environment in Burma and the way this reflects on projects in Karenni. Firstly, a serious shortage of public funds means that many projects that are implemented are labour intensive but with low capital inputs. Forced labour contributions are often supervised by military units. Second, the hostility towards Burma that has led to economic sanctions and a reluctance to provide financing may well have led to an increased reliance on forced labour to make up for shortfalls in capital inflows. And finally, there appears to be a reliance on expanding the agricultural sector to '*...introduce a growth-based industry based on agriculture*.'[172] Given the shortage of public funds and the low levels of foreign financial and technical investment, it would appear that this is the only route to development possible under present political circumstances. This route requires an intensification of agricultural methods and an expansion of farm areas by any means in order to maximise the export sector and foreign exchange receipts.[173] On the ground in Karenni, development projects have tended to follow this pattern, with almost no large-scale foreign-funded projects. The many small-scale ones, such as road constructions are reported to be built with forced labour, often pooled from relocation sites. A related, though separate, area consists of the construction and maintenance of military garrisons throughout the state, which has also relied on forced labour. This has led to displacements of civilians when cultivatable land has been confiscated for military use. In 1990, 745 people from five villages in Loikaw township were relocated to existing villages north of Loikaw. These villages had been situated near to the Lawpita hydroelectric plant in an area where a second plant, (Belauchaung II) was completed in 1992.

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[170] Dossier of Karenni, Appendix 3.

[171] 'Towards a Modern Nation Through All-Round Development,' New Light of Myanmar, Yangon, 28 April 1996.

[172] Quotation taken from an interview with Director General of the Department of Agricultural Planning in the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation of Burma published in The Nation. 'Doubts on Junta's Agricultural Revolution,' The Nation, Bangkok, 2 September 1999.

[173] An article in the New Light of Myanmar on 27 January 1999 exhorted '*National entrepreneurs who have the capital, management skill, techniques and know-how should be encouraged in taming wetlands, vacant, virgin and fallow lands to do agriculture on commercial scale.*' Quoted in Voice of the Hungry Nation, The People's Tribunal on Food Scarcity and Militarisation in Burma, Asian Human Rights Commission, October 1999, p124.

Figure 11: Displacements in Loikaw City



4.1.1 Displacements in Loikaw City

In 1996, 56 houses were destroyed and 12.88 acres of land requisitioned when the runway at Loikaw airport was repaired and extended — see shaded section A of Figure 11 showing information on displacements provided by the KNPP. The inhabitants of this area were reportedly forced to find their own alternative accommodation and are living at a site where there is no accessible water supply.

In 1998, 500 acres of land near Loikaw prison was confiscated to build a regional college[174] — see shaded section B of Figure 11. In 1995, a sports stadium was built close to the airport resulting in an unknown number of displacements — see shaded section C.

Several other small-scale infrastructure projects that have taken place in and around Loikaw city have also resulted in population displacements. These include two extensions of one of Loikaw's main roads leading to the Japanese bridge in the centre of the city, the first in 1992 and the second in 1995 — see shaded section E. This is reported to have resulted in the destruction of 98 residential properties. Preparation for a nation-wide student festival held in Loikaw in 1995 also resulted in the destruction of 23 residential properties and the displacement of unknown numbers of families. They were forced to sell or abandon their homes without compensation because they were unable to fulfil home improvement requirements specified in street beautification projects. The total number of people displaced at that time is estimated by the KNPP to have been about 2,000.

Another project that caused an unknown number of displacements was the rail link between Loikaw and Aung Ban on the border with Shan state. Work on the railway, which is 40 kilometres long, started in 1991 and was completed in 1994. During this time, 31 acres of farmland plus 9 acres of land in Loikaw city were requisitioned to make way for the line — see shaded section D of Figure 11. A further 24 households were displaced in Loikaw to make way for additional but unspecified transport infrastructure projects. In each case no compensation was made. In addition to the displacements which came about directly as a result of the railway, the building of the embankments disrupted (in some cases blocked) irrigation systems and supplies of water to local farms. This then resulted in a further voluntary displacement, the extent of which is not known.

In an attempt to divert more water to power the Lawpita hydroelectric power station, a dam is being constructed across the Tabetchaung River. Started in September1998, construction is being carried out using forced labour from surrounding villages. It is not clear what will happen once the dam is completed but it is expected that some of these villages will be displaced.[175]

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[174] Karenni News Agency for Human Rights No. 5/98, July - August 1998.

[175] Karenni Farmers' Union Statement 01/98.

Figure 12: Map of No. 427 Light Infantry Battalion Headquarters at Ngwe Daung Showing Location of Reportedly Confiscated Agricultural Lands



4.1.2 Confiscation of Land by the *Tatmadaw*

Military development, particularly the confiscation of farmland either for the construction and maintenance of *Tatmadaw* garrisons or for the intensification of agriculture has also contributed to displacement. While the extent of this is unknown, it includes the following.

The confiscation of 200 acres of farmland in Tee Sar Kar village cluster in Loikaw township for a new military garrison near to Daw Ta Hay and War Kai villages in April 1998. The seizure of this land put increased pressure on the available resources in the area, since in 1996, 300 IDPs had moved to Daw Ta Hay from Shadaw township.[176]

Many of these displacements have taken place in Demawso township where at least 2,400 acres of paddy fields are reported to have been confiscated in 1993 alone.[177] At Light Infantry Battalion 427's main garrison, based between Ngwe Daung town and Daw Lya Ku village, a total of 96.13 acres of paddy land and 73.56 acres of farmland were said to have been confiscated (see Figure 12).[178]

In 1985, 175 people from Daw Klee and 460 people from two sections of Ngwe Daung town were ordered to relocate north of Ngwe Daung when IB 102's garrison was constructed and extended. In 1998, four villages were ordered to dig a pond to ensure water supplies for the battalion.[179] In the same year, on 25 August, some of those same villagers were ordered to give up a further 3,840 acres of farmland.[180]

In addition to the requisitioning of farmland, the practice of using forced labour to maintain garrisons, build fences, tend crops, fetch water and carry wood appears to be widespread. In some cases, the demands for forced labour are so frequent that villagers and IDPs in relocation sites are unable to tend their own crops satisfactorily. In a situation where people are struggling with conflict, widespread displacement, food shortages and drought, such demands are likely to increase the numbers of voluntary displacements, although the extent of these are unknown. One refugee who explained why she had come to the Thai border said, *'We could not look after our dry paddy field as the military always asked us to go and work in their fields. As a result, the field did not yield enough and we had to buy rice to eat. We could not afford it and so came here.'*[181]

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[176] Karenni News Agency for Human Rights No. 3/98, April 1998.

[177] Karenni Farmers' Union Statement 01/98, October 3 1998.

[178] At Tee Su Pya village, an estimated 500 acres were confiscated and subsequently rented out to villagers again at a cost of 16 rice tins per year per field. Images Asia Interview No. 45.

[179] Karenni News Agency for Human Rights No. 6/98, September - October 1998.

[180] Karenni Farmers' Union Statement 01/98, 3 October 1998

[181] Images Asia Interview No. 116.

4.2 Displacement as a Result of Resource Scarcity

4.2.1 Food Scarcity

In October 1999, the People's Tribunal on Food Scarcity and Militarization in Burma[182] found that *'the case studies show hunger as a silent, insidious epidemic and militarization as its relentless ubiquitous cause'*[183] with the following as contributory factors:[184]

- the destruction of staple crops;
- the uncompensated conscription of civilians as labourers and porters which prevents them from growing their own food;
- the displacement of civilians into areas where food is either not available or difficult to grow;
- the government paddy procurement system which compels local farmers to supply the government rice at below market prices regardless of whether the harvest was adequate or the farmer has enough to eat or is in debt.

In Karenni, this situation is further complicated by the fact that the state is unable to grow enough rice to feed its own population. As far back as 1901 when it had an estimated population of 37,150, Karenni had to import rice. Today, with a population of over 200,000, Karenni has a serious food production shortfall requiring significant imports from lowland areas to feed the inhabitants. In such cases, the price of transporting essential commodities to upland communities pushes up prices significantly to the disadvantage of upland communities by comparison with their lowland neighbours.

It is not known how displacements have affected paddy production in Karenni. Of the main wet-rice growing areas of the state (in Loikaw and Demawso townships), very few villages were relocated, except from villages south-west of Demawso town, where almost all the villagers were ordered into relocations sites. However, in areas where hill paddy is grown, such as Shadaw township where the majority of the population was displaced, the entire 1996 crop is assumed to have been ruined as a result of displacement. Since then there has been a significant reduction in the land area where paddy is permitted to be grown.

Moreover, deliveries of rice into some areas such as Shadaw town were severely restricted following displacement, creating supply shortfalls and price rises[185] at a time when demand

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[182] Set up by the Asian Human Rights Commission, the tribunal received testimonies and evidence about food scarcity from 10 of the 14 states and divisions in Burma. The tribunal's findings were published in a report — Voice of the Hungry Nation, The People's Tribunal on Food Scarcity and Militarization in Burma, Asian Human Rights Commission, October 1999.

[183] Ibid, pix.

[184] Ibid, p78.

[185] The price of a sack of rice in Loikaw in August 1996 was reported to be 1,250 kyats. In May 1997, this had risen to 1,450 kyats and in July 1997 it had risen further to 1,650 kyats. Chronic inflation is also likely to have played a major part in these price increases. The price in Shadaw town is likely to have been much higher due to transport costs and restrictions.

in Shadaw town had more than doubled and street prices, even in Rangoon, were increasing by between 126-170%.[186] This drastic curtailment in distribution together with a war strategy aimed at cutting off supplies to armed groups has led to population movements. In villages where people had been ordered to move from, crops were destroyed and it was very difficult to store and hide food. One IDP hid rice in caves and holes in the ground to prevent it from being destroyed.[187] Refugees said that when they left the relocation site to tend their crops nearby, they were not allowed to take uncooked rice with them.[188]

Indeed the effect of such shortages was to drive IDPs either into relocation sites, refugee camps or areas where food shortages were not so acute. Even in relocation sites, refugees claimed that rations were either insufficient, or stopped after a few months.[189]

At the same time there appear to have been contradictory efforts to intensify agricultural production as farmers living in the irrigated areas of Loikaw and Demawso have received orders to grow an extra rice crop, most likely for the export market. For this second crop, farmers must bear the cost of the chemical inputs and fertiliser themselves. According to the People's Tribunal on Food Scarcity and Militarisation in Burma, farmers who *'don't buy the necessary materials cannot participate in the program; their unproductive land, officially designated for double-cropping is reassigned to a more able household.'*[190]

4.2.2 Water Shortages

Structural water insecurity throughout Karenni is characterised by:

- the limited number of settlements with access to permanent water supplies;
- the seasonable availability of water in upland areas;
- the distance between water sources and hilltop villages;
- dependence on rain-fed agriculture;
- concern over the quality of water — particularly salinity, smell and turbidity.

Since 1997, water insecurity in both Karenni and Shan states has been affected by low levels of rainfall and shorter monsoon seasons.[191] By mid-1999, the water level in Inle Lake in Shan state was reported to be so low that previously non-existing islands appeared. Inle Lake is the source of the Belauchaung River and water levels in this river were also reportedly so low that it was possible to cycle across the river in places where it had previously been difficult to navigate by boat.[192] There was very little rainfall in southern Shan state and

[186] Burma Issues, Unpublished, 1999.

[187] Images Asia Interview Nos. 27.

[188] Images Asia Interview Nos. 26 and 42.

[189] Image Asia Interview No. 63.

[190] People's Tribunal on Food Scarcity and Militarization in Burma, 1999, p9.

[191] In Shadaw relocation site, there was not enough water for people to grow crops in 1997 and 1998. Images Asia Interview Nos. 42 and 47.

[192] Interview with Khu Lu Reh taken from Drought in Karenni State and Its Impact on the Livelihoods of the Karenni People, Brief Paper of Karenni Evergreen, Undated.

much of Karenni between June and August 1999. Normally productive wells (20-40 feet deep) dried up and in many places it became necessary to dig wells to 60-80 feet deep. Heavy rainfall in September and October 1999 meant that by the end of the rainy season, water levels in the state were significantly higher although the lack of rainfall early in the season meant that much of the rainy season rice crop was destroyed. In addition to the drought, water consumption generally is thought to have increased since farmers were asked to grow a second dry-season crop on irrigated land in the lowland rice plains around Loikaw and Demawso, a practise which started in 1992. It is this combination of low rainfall and increased water consumption which is thought to be responsible for low water levels in both the Mobye and Ngwe Daung dams, especially after the 1998-99 dry season.

The construction of the Lawpita hydroelectric plants in Loikaw township, which provide electricity throughout Burma, has led to a situation where water from Karenni is needed to power the nation. The two hydroelectric power plants, Belauchaung I and II, are currently the largest in Burma. Located below the Lawpita waterfalls the plants use the fast drop in altitude to create electricity. The plants use water supplied from a canal and a stream diverted out of the Belauchaung River at the Mobye dam. Following electricity generation, the water is released into the Pon River where it can no longer be utilised by farmers on the Demawso plain which is approximately 1,000 feet above the Pon River valley.

Successful water management involves balancing national and local needs to ensure sufficient electrical power in the delta areas as well as the irrigation of the state's rice plains around Loikaw and the water needs of the communities there. This was recognised in the 1960s when construction of the Mobye dam was delayed, and subsequently enlarged to ensure adequate local water supplies. However these needs may well be incompatible rather than complementary, as the timing of the release of water from the dam may not be suitable for farmers downstream, and the drawing off of the water by farmers downstream may slow the water current and produce less electricity.

The decrease in rainfall since 1997 and the low water levels in the Mobye dam coincided with serious electricity shortages throughout the country, including industrial areas and the urban centres of Mandalay and Rangoon. While water shortages in Mobye dam are clearly a cause of this, observers have also stated that a key concern is turbine maintenance problems at the Lawpita power plant.

Perhaps because of these shortages, farmers who normally draw their water from Mobye and Ngwe Daung dams have found that since 1998, supplies have been restricted by the State. Farmers reported that both the left- and right-hand canals leading from Mobye dam were closed,[193] so that all available water could be channelled through to Lawpita hydroelectric plant. This meant that further downstream in Loikaw and Demawso, the farmers were unable to plant crops.

Elsewhere, villages living close to the Hso Bawthe and Loinam Pah streams, west of Demawso

[193] Ibid

town, were informed that they would be fined if they were found taking water from these sources.[194] In early 1999, refugees from Pruso township said that water levels in streams and small lakes were very low. This resulted in hill paddy, maize, cucumber, and pumpkin crops being spoiled. In conjunction with the lessening availability of water, the price of water in the area increased in 1998.

The lack of rain early in the 1999 wet season spoiled much of the rice crop in Karenni. IDPs in Shadaw and Loikaw townships also said that the combination of water shortages and high temperatures killed off their paddy plants.[195] While some farmers may grow alternative crops on former paddy fields (such as maize, beans and potatoes), others are thought to have voluntarily migrated in search of employment elsewhere, including to Thailand.[196] In other cases, villagers have moved closer to larger rivers because small streams and other water sources dried up. An unknown number of villagers from Daw Tama Gyi are known to have moved closer to the Pon River for this very reason.[197]

4.3 Voluntary Migrations

While it could be said that the vast majority of displacements in the area are forced, the full extent of other movements in the state remains unknown. In the past, these have included the movement of Burman communities into the state, largely to work on infrastructure projects, after which they are given farmland to settle down with. No. 2 Plantation, a village in Demawso township, is reported to have been founded for Burman settlers in 1958 during the building of Ngwe Daung dam.

Other movements into the state have included migrant workers in the Mawchi mines area. During the colonial period it is estimated that 75% of these were Gurkhas. In the past, the mines were extremely profitable and large numbers of individual prospectors migrated from all over Burma to Mawchi to work there. The private mine owners and prospectors sold their ore to the State. It was thought that on average, the mines produced a total of 125 tonnes of ore a month, the major proportion coming from the private sector. However the following description of the mines from a refugee who lived at Mawchi suggests that it may not now be as lucrative as it was formerly.

'Ore had to be washed with water before sale but when the broker collected the ore they refused proper payment saying that it was dirty. Such things like that happened all the time and the villagers were the ones who suffered. They paid us for one viss 60 kyats only. We could mine half a viss per day, therefore we earned only 30 kyats per day. That was clean and washed ore'.[198]

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[194] Karenni News Agency for Human Rights No 01/99, January - February 1999.

[195] Images Asia Interview Nos. 63, 81 and 85.

[196] Images Asia Interview Nos. 51 and 52.

[197] Karenni News Agency for Human Rights No. 02/99, March - April 1999.

[198] Images Asia Interview No. 117.

Little is known about migration out of the state into other areas of Burma. However, there appears to be a consistent, though small, movement of people to Thailand for work, or in the case of young people, for education in the refugee camps.

5. HEALTH AND EDUCTION NEEDS AND RESPONSES

Karenni, like other states in Burma, has an underdeveloped information system and information which is available on the whole does not acknowledge the impact of conflict on the health or education status of the population. On the other hand, health and education data collected along the Thai-Burma border by NGOs, cross-border groups or refugee committees primarily documents the impact of conflict and displacement. This difference in focus does not on the whole allow for comparisons between the two data sets.

The health and education status of the population of Karenni is similar to that of the rest of the country. However, Karenni's remote location, its poor communications and transport infrastructure, and the continued civil unrest between non-State armed groups and the *Tatmadaw* have meant that development efforts in all sectors including the all important sectors of health and education have been impeded resulting in lower levels of attainment of health and education than most other parts of the country.

In its efforts to build a new modern state, the military government on 25 May 1989, under notification No. 23/89 formed a central committee for the Development of Border Areas and National Races to oversee general development of the border areas of the country. In September 1992, the Ministry for Progress of Border Areas and National Races and Development Affairs (MPBANRDA), which is manned by key military personnel, initiated a number of projects for the development of border areas and approached key UN specialised agencies to participate in these endeavours. Promoted as efforts to further 'national consolidation,' the projects prioritised infrastructure development and simultaneously encouraged development in the social, economic and national security spheres. Importantly, armed groups who chose to return to the 'legal fold' through 'cease-fire' arrangements with the government, were also included in the development arrangements in areas under their control. Other important facets of these projects involved resettlement, drug control and curtailment of smuggling.

In total, 18 project areas in seven states and two divisions fell within this programme, covering a total of 154,043 sq. km. and a population of over 5.7 million which included 65 different 'national races.' In Karenni three areas were defined: a Padaung region, which included Pekon township and two Kayah regions, which included parts, or all, of Loikaw, Demawso, Pruso, Bawlake and Meh Set.[199]

In these project areas, health and education activities were to be prioritised. Guided by a National Health Committee and a National Education Committee, both of which are chaired by SPDC Secretary (1), Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt, the policies were to be implemented by both the Ministries of Education and Health in partnership with military departments and international partners.[200]

[199] MPBANRDA, 1994.

[200] See sections 13 and 14 on the contribution of health and education to national consolidation of Symposium on Socio-Economic Factors Contributing to National Consolidation, Office of Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defence, 1999.

5.1 Health Policy

The main objectives for border areas laid down by the Ministry of Health (MOH) in the National Health Plan for 1996-2001 included:

a) To promote the health status of national races of the border areas especially to reduce the mortality and morbidity of diseases among women and children.
b) To provide primary health care (PHC), especially maternal and child health care (MCH).
c) To promote morbidity survey, disease surveillance and communicable disease control activities in border areas.
d) To improve the quality of health care by providing sufficient amount of essential drugs and health services not only at hospitals and dispensaries but also at homes
e) To transform the existing health institution into systematically organised health tiers which includes township hospitals, station hospitals, rural health centres and sub-centres.[201]

This strategy seeks to decrease the gap in health services between central and border areas, by upgrading and expanding health delivery and curative services at all levels, and seeking to integrate these activities into a primary health care-based community and disease control programme. This was to be achieved by constructing and establishing hospitals and rural health centres, expanding health manpower, supplying essential drugs and medical equipment, training health staff, controlling drug abuse, providing extra incentives to health staff and coordinating activities between ministries and NGOs. Recipients and areas were to be targeted under the guidance of the Border Area and National Development Committee in combination with the Health sub-committee, both of which are strategically linked to the State security institutions.

5.2 Health Services

Despite a gradual contraction of health finances and services and an acute shortage of supplies and equipment which has occurred in certain areas of the public health system since 1989,[202] the MOH and the MPBANRDA have reported an expansion of health facilities throughout all border areas in the post-1989 period. Government figures suggest that 33 hospitals and 71 dispensaries have been newly constructed, and government doctors, nurses and midwives have been appointed to provide services. In Karenni, in the post-1994-95 period, following cease-fire agreements with several groups, two dispensaries were built and seven were upgraded to active service. Tables 6 and 7 suggest that there has been a substantial expansion of health infrastructure particularly in Loikaw with a shift away from hospitals to health centres in line with the national policy of shifting activities towards PHC objectives. In reality, however, some of these facilities may well exist only on paper. As government budget constraints have led to real cuts in running costs, the absence of health structure

[201] National Health Plan 1996-2001, Department of Planning and Statistics, Ministry of Health, December 1996, p241.

[202] Myanmar: An Economic and Social Assessment, World Bank, Washington DC, September 1999, p86, Figure 5.6.

maintenance has also had an adverse effect on the quality and utilisation of the facilities.

Table 6: Health Facilities in Karenni in 1991

Township	General Hospital	25 Bedded Hospital	16 Bedded Hospital	Station Hospital
Loikaw	1	-	-	2
Demawso	-	-	1	3
Pruso	-	1	-	-
Shadaw	-	1	-	1
Bawlake	-	-	-	1
Pasaung	-	2	-	1
Meh Set	-	-	1	1
Total	**1**	**4**	**2**	**9**

Source: MOH Annual Hospital Statistics Report, 1991

Table 7: Health Facilities in Karenni in 1998

Township	Township Hospital	Station Hospital	Rural Health Centre	Sub-Centre
Loikaw	1	2	7	27
Demawso	1	1	7	24
Pruso	1	1	5	13
Shadaw	1	-	2	8
Bawlake	1	1	1	4
Pasaung	1	1	2	4
Meh Set	1	1	3	12
Total	**7**	**7**	**27**	**92**

Source: UNICEF, 1998

In addition, as there is still continued insecurity and fighting in various parts of the state, health facilities may exist only as buildings where services are restricted to the distribution of elementary medicines, registered health workers are working elsewhere and supply and distribution systems are very weak. These facilities are not likely to extend into areas controlled by non-State armed groups which have not signed cease-fires with the government. Interviews conducted with refugees arriving in Thailand would suggest that there is little or no public health care services available at the village level in much of the state.

In terms of health manpower, it was recorded by the MOH in 1991 that there were 50 doctors, 71 nurses, 19 health assistants and 161 midwives working in the public health system in Karenni. Yet as Table 7 indicates, there seems to have been a shift to lower level staff by 1998 (although there is no record for the number of nurses). According to the MOH and the MPBANRDA, since 1994, both have been involved in training community health workers, assistant nurses and midwives for border areas. In Loikaw, this includes training courses which have taken place since 1994 with support from UNICEF. A total of 112

auxiliary midwives, 221 community health workers and 65 assistant nurses/midwives have been given training.

Table 8: Health Personnel in Karenni in 1998

Township	Doctors	Midwives	Assistant Nurses	CHWs* and AMWs**
Loikaw	40	43	25	100
Demawso	4	36	11	78
Pruso	4	22	6	43
Shadaw	2	8	6	0
Bawlake	3	6	4	45
Pasaung	1	6	5	0
Meh Set	3	12	3	1
Total	**57**	**133**	**60**	**267**

Source: UNICEF, 1998

*Community Health Workers

**Auxiliary Midwives

While these figures are impressive, the public health system in Karenni is still seriously understaffed — numerous facilities are not sufficiently manned or staffed with personnel with adequate skills.[203] At present there is one doctor for every 3,638 persons, which is below the national average.

Moreover, there still seems to be quite a gap between what is noted on paper and the reality on the ground. Given the level of civil strife still present in the state, many of the health personnel appointed to facilities in rural and remote areas, as has been documented elsewhere in the country, have settled in military garrison towns where they draw government salaries but work wholly or partially in the private sector. Moreover, as Table 8 indicates, nearly 40% of all health staff in Karenni are assigned to Loikaw, the majority of which are presumably in the main town, the state capital.

Monitoring and supervision of health manpower is cause for serious concern. According to documents provided by UNICEF which is active in the state, the insecurity has meant that it has been able to do little in regards to determining how local staff are selected, how inputs are used in the field or how medicines are being administrated. Few, if any baseline assessments have been undertaken prior to the placement of health personnel and the participation of local communities seems mainly restricted to community cost sharing arrangements and community involvement in the construction of facilities.

In terms of access to health services, the overall coverage in Karenni is very low. Access to public health services is primarily limited to urban areas. In rural and remote areas, services are provided on an outreach basis, perhaps once every four months or at best periodically.

[203] The MOH acknowledges that there are insufficiently trained personnel, particularly in the border areas. See for instance the National Health Plan 1996-20001, MOH, 1996.

Several townships remain very difficult to access, such as Meh Set and Shadaw townships where medicines for malaria and tuberculosis are unavailable.[204] In other townships, major constraints include limited physical access to facilities, acute shortage of drugs and supplies, and a shortage of staff. Moreover, as many of the government sponsored border area initiatives in the state have only recently started, much practical grassroots or organisational experience has yet to be developed. Immunisation activities in the state started in the early 1990s but several townships were not covered until the Crash Immunisation Campaign in 1998. According to the UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) survey of 1997, a total of 43% of children in rural areas of Karenni were fully immunised in 1997 and a further 33% were immunised for tetanus only. National level figures were 77.3% and 75% respectively. In addition, those working in the public health sector in rural and remote areas have also been hampered by their limited knowledge of Karenni languages, which significantly limits communications.

Services at Relocation Sites

Health services in the many relocation sites throughout the state have fallen under the Housing Construction Work sub-committee of MPBANRDA and the Department of Human Settlements and Housing Development. These projects are difficult to appraise since very limited information is available. In general though, the 12 large relocation sites in the state (see Figure 9) started off as empty areas of land where shelter, facilities or sanitation arrangements were either insufficient or non-existent. According to refugees this resulted in high morbidity and mortality with significant numbers of deaths during the initial resettlement period in certain sites, particularly Shadaw.[205] Moreover, the burden for sheltering and caring for the displaced at relocation sites was often placed on the local community.

At each of the large sites, there is evidence of an intention[206] to provide health care to IDPs, either at a health facility inside the site or at a nearby health centre. In practice, however, given the general constraints to the public health system, services were not utilised well. With facilities both under-equipped and under-supplied, health care providers were often left to do the best they could.[207] In some of the other sites, such as Htee Poh Kloh and Mar Kraw Shay, refugees said there were no health facilities at the site.[208]

Access to water varied at each site. In addition to streams and lakes at the sites, wells were dug. In some areas this appears to have been sufficient, but in others such as Shadaw, the lack of potable water appears to have continued to cause problems long after the camps were set up.[209] Several IDPs from this site have alleged that in an attempt to solve the problem, chemicals were added to water sources which was said to have led to cases of sickness and even death.

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[204] As reported in February 2000 by agencies working with public health personnel in Karenni.

[205] Images Asia Interview No. 33.

[206] Images Asia Interview Nos. 33 and 63.

[207] Refugees report that in some cases health workers were selling medicines at higher prices on the black market. Images Asia Interview Nos. 50 and 57.

[208] Images Asia Interview Nos. 54 and 55.

[209] Images Asia Interview No. 63 and 72.

Distribution of rice appears to have taken place in some camps at the beginning of the resettlement process. Two '*pyis*' (about eight milk tins) worth per month seems to have been given out in most camps, although at some camps only half this amount was provided.[210] In almost every case, the rations were stopped after a few months.[211] In the relocation site at Nwa La Boe, which is the site closest to Loikaw city, rations were given out for a longer period.[212] At this site, rations were given out free for the first year, although these were reportedly insufficient. For the second year, the authorities sold rice at subsidised prices. It seems that salt was also given out in this camp. A refugee who came from the relocation site at Mawchi maintained that rice intended for the IDPs was diverted and sold by local township authorities. Access to Shadaw relocation site was severely restricted and during 1996 transporting rice into the area was extremely difficult. There was also a lack of other essential foods, particularly protein foods which do not appear to have been distributed and it is not known how the diet of the IDPs was supplemented.

Sanitary facilities such as latrines do not appear to have been built at the sites before IDPs were relocated, which possibly accounts for higher levels of sickness reported by refugees who have stayed at the sites. In some sites, each family was instructed to build a latrine. However some IDPs said that they did not want to. One refugee who had come from Shadaw relocation site in 1999 reported that people were using an area set aside in the forest (known as the logs).[213] Except in one relocation site,[214] it is not known if flooding affected these ad hoc facilities. Nor is it known if any arrangements were made either for waste disposal or for the separation of latrines from clean water sites.

Traditional health practices

Many remote Karenni villagers have never been accustomed to the use of western medicines. Herbal remedies are used for fever, coughs, diarrhoea and skin diseases. Infusions of bark and various leaves are also widely used. Traditional health care practices are very much influenced by animist beliefs in spirits, and illnesses are almost always felt to be caused by a bad spirit such as a '*ney*' or a '*loh*'.[215] Chickens may be killed and the bones examined in rituals to discern the particular offending spirit or '*nat*' so that a decision may be made about the right diagnosis and cure.

While it has been noted that many of the refugees in refugee camps in Thailand deny having any knowledge of 'traditional medicine,' traditional patterns of recourse for illness are still common practice in many of the remote areas of the Karenni.[216]

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[210] An agency working in Burma estimates that a household needs 11.75 kg. of rice per person per month.

[211] Images Asia Interview Nos. 68 and 70.

[212] Images Asia Interview No. 86.

[213] Images Asia Interview No. 65.

[214] Nwa La Boe relocation site was flooded within the first few months after it was set up. At that time there were no arrangements for sanitation.

[215] Recent Arrivals in Karenni Camp #2, An Ethnographic Report, Sandra Dudley, Oxford University, 1997, p28.

[216] For examples, see section on Health and Illness. Ibid.

Moreover the lack of access to western medicines means that groups are forced to rely on locally collected alternatives.[217] Very little is known about what is available and it is assumed that it is the lack of medicines that is responsible for much of the morbidity. However, at least some of these communities have lived in very remote areas prior to displacement and it is not clear what type of medicines they had used previously nor how effective they were in treating illness or maintaining good health

5.3 Health Status of the Population

With the exception of hospital-based data and narrative accounts from refugees and mobile medical (back-pack) teams who access the area from the Thai border, there is little information about the health status of the population. What is generally acknowledged is that the health status of the population in Karenni is poor. This is linked to:

- the high level of poverty in the state,
- chronic conflict and insecurity,
- general deprivation characterised by inadequate income levels,
- a general lack of education and knowledge,
- lack of access to health care,
- poor housing,
- lack of access to safe water and sanitation, and
- lack of control over the reproductive process,

Public health data is limited given the under-served nature of the state. However, as Table 9 shows, communicable diseases are still the leading causes of morbidity and mortality in the state. When disaggregated by township, the data indicates that in terms of morbidity, Loikaw township accounts for nearly 50% of all morbidity cases in the state and up to 33% of mortality cases. Other townships with a high reporting status include Demawso, Pruso and Bawlake. Both Meh Set and Shadaw townships report little or no morbidity and mortality. This may be an indication that the health information system in these two townships is not functioning properly, or that health facilities are not operational.

Morbidity data collected by groups, which access Karenni from the Thai border, demonstrate a similar pattern of morbidity as that collected by the MOH. Such accounts usually note the 'poor' condition of villagers, especially those displaced and hiding in jungle hide-outs. In these reports, the leading causes of morbidity are noted as malaria, diarrhoea, dysentery, acute respiratory infections (ARI)/pneumonia, worms, skin infections and 'malnutrition'—however the latter is often not defined further.

[217] Images Asia Interview Nos. 23, 27.

Table 9: Diseases under National Surveillance in Karenni: Number of reported cases January–December 1997

Disease	Morbidity	Mortality
Malaria	5994	104
Diarrhoea	3260	6
ARI/Pneumonia	3255	2
Dysentery	1495	0
Viral Hepatitis	65	0
Enteric Fever	54	0
Snake Bite (Poisonous)	27	0
Tuberculosis (Suspected)	21	0
Food Poisoning	8	0
Measles	2	0
Whooping Cough	1	0
Acute Food Poisoning	1	0
Total	**14,183**	**112**

Source: Department of Health Planning, MOH, 1998

One mobile trip to Shadaw township, undertaken in 1998 gives a breakdown of morbidity statistics shown in Table 10.

Table 10: Mobile Medical Team Visit, July 1998

Disease	No. Of Cases	% of TotalCases
Malaria	625	20.0
Acute Respiratory Infections	327	10.5
Anaemia	274	8.8
Worms	211	6.7
Diarrhoea/dysentery	209	6.7
Beri beri	189	6.0
Moderate malnutrition**	165	5.3
Skin disease/ringworm	103	3.3
Urinary tract infection	91	2.9
Acute malnutrition**	70	2.2
Trauma	46	1.5
Presumptive tuberculosis	9	0.3
Others	798	25.5
TOTAL	***3126**	**100.0**

*2,905 patients treated in 26 contact points in Shadaw township
** Malnutrition as measured by mean upper arm circumference

5.3.1 Communicable Diseases

Communicable diseases are the leading cause of morbidity and mortality in Karenni. Malaria, which is recognised as a major impediment to socio-economic development, remains the

number one priority disease in the country. As Table 11 indicates, Karenni, has the highest malaria morbidity and mortality, along with Rakhine state, eastern Shan state and Kachin state. Malaria remains the main cause of death in Karenni[218] and 90% of hospital patients are malaria cases, indicating that malaria is the single biggest cause of morbidity in the state (though these are not necessarily microscopically proven cases). Moreover, treatment in Thai border refugee camps indicates that many malaria cases in the region are likely to be at least partially resistant to Quinine, requiring Mefloquine and/or Artesunate.

Table 11: Malaria Mortality and Morbidity Rate in Border Townships of Four States in Burma 1992-1996

Border	**Morbidity Rate (per 1000 pop.)**					**Mortality Rate (per100,000 pop.)**				
Townships of:	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Karenni	175	215	184	223	454	27	44	50	78	183
Kachin state	74	40	55	41	46	20	14	33	18	12
Rakhine state	14	15	9	10	20	6	7	6	6	5
Eastern Shan state	49	37	26	9	9	21	12	10	6	7

Source: Vector Borne Disease Control Programme, MOH, 1997

After malaria, diarrhoea is ranked second as the leading cause of morbidity, closely followed by ARI and other vaccine preventable diseases, with higher figures amongst malnourished children. Indeed, many of the leading causes for mortality are vaccine preventable diseases. According to the 1997 MICS, for Karenni 48% of children were fully immunised, 57% were immunised against measles only and 71% were immunised against tuberculosis only. This compares with 77.3%, 80.2% and 85.6% respectively at the national level. The MICS also reports low coverage in most hilly and border regions due in part to the inaccessibility and recent introduction of immunisation campaigns. Many of the under-five children arriving in the Thai border refugee camps have no history of immunisation, a fact confirmed by those screening refugee populations at the border.[219]

With people being forced into relocation sites or being grouped together in secure sites around military bases, communicable disease are on the increase in Karenni, further exacerbating health problems. Data collected in the health facilities of the townships of Meh Set and Shadaw by the Vector Borne Disease Control Programme of the MOH attributes the worsening malaria situation in these townships, in part, on the impact of collectivisation of disperse villages and on increased prevalence due to uncontrolled population migration.[220]

No data could be found for the level of HIV infection in the state. It might be expected that imported labour in the Mawchi mine area might increase the risk of infection. In contrast to

[218] Despite this, the MOH malaria team leader post in Loikaw remains empty, as do many other basic health posts under the Vector Borne Disease Control (VBDC) Programme.

[219] As reported in February 2000 by agencies working with public health personnel in Karenni.

[220] Malaria Situation in Border Areas Myanmar (1992-1996), VBDC, Ministry of Health, October 1997.

the large numbers of Burman, Shan and Karen girls in the sex trade in Thailand, Empower Foundation, a Thai NGO, reported never having come across ethnic Karenni sex-workers working in northern Thailand.[221]

The main road and rail junctions into Karenni are situated at Aung Ban in southern Shan state. This is a well-known truck stop between Taunggyi and Rangoon where prostitutes are known to work out of guest houses or wait at night for customers on the main road. There is no data available on the rate of HIV infection in the town. According to one refugee, sex-workers come down from Aung Ban to work in Loikaw.[222]

5.3.2 Nutrition

Malnutrition and shortages of food supplies appears to be a main problem for displaced populations. In nearly all cases, people questioned have mentioned that food was insufficient and that certain items such as salt are extremely difficult to find. Some groups moved temporarily into relocation sites when they could not get food from other sources.

According to the MICS (1997), malnutrition among under-three and under-five children remains high in Karenni, where the rate for severe malnutrition is 14% and 11% respectively and the rate for moderate malnutrition is 46% and 39%. This augurs unfavourably with national figures, where the rates for severe malnutrition are 12.5% and 12.6% respectively and 35.5% and 38.6% respectively for moderate malnutrition. When the data is disaggregated by state and division, it is apparent that Karenni has a higher rate of malnutrition than most other areas in Burma, except for Rakhine state and parts of eastern Shan state.

Morbidity figures from the medical mobile trip documented above reveal an overall malnutrition rate of 7.5% in the total population tested. As a ratio of the under-five's tested by mean upper arm circumference, this works out to be 239 children from a tested population of 432, i.e. 55.3%. Data from two trips to Pasaung Township in 1996 and 1999, collected in the same way, reveal a malnutrition rate amongst under-five's of 51.3%.

If such figures are taken to represent a statistically significant population and the measurements to have been made accurately, then the rate of malnutrition would be high in comparison with other internally displaced populations. However, the data should be interpreted cautiously since it is taken from only three surveys of self-selected populations. No other data was available to this report. Accurate statistics to assess malnutrition status of populations need weight-for-height Z-score calculations.

[221] Conversation with Jackie Pollock, an HIV/AIDS educator, 21 June 1999.

[222] Images Asia Interview No. 47.

Table 12: Prevalence of Acute Malnutrition (<80% median weight for height) among Children <5 Years of Age in Selected IDP Populations

Date	Country/region	Population affected	Malnutrition prevalence
1983	Mozambique	-	12-28%
1985	Ethiopia (Korem)	800,000	70%
1988	Sudan (Khartoum)	750,000	23%
1988	Sudan (S. Darfur)	>80,000	36%
1990	Liberia (Monrovia)	500,000	35%

Source: 'Famine Affected Refugee, and Displaced Populations, Recommendations for Public Health Issues,' CDC Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, Vol. 41, Georgia, Atlanta, USA, July 1992.

Generally, a developing country may have some 5% of children with a Z score of <-2 when compared with the reference population, particularly at certain times of the year. Relief organisations generally agree that a nutritional emergency exists if more than 8% of the children sampled have a Z score of <-2 (equivalent to an upper arm band measurement of less than13.5 centimetres).

A rate of malnutrition of 55.3% would put the level of the disaster in Karenni on par with the Korem famine in Ethiopia. It is therefore imperative that these figures are further investigated and a larger sample studied.

5.3.3 Reproductive and Women's Health

Data is not disaggregated according to gender and there is little information the status of women's or reproductive health in Karenni. What is known is that one of the leading causes of low birth weight in newborns in Karenni is maternal malnutrition, with iron deficiency anaemia affecting over 50% of pregnant women.[223]

No disaggregated data could be obtained for maternal mortality in Karenni. The high incidence of malaria in the state could be expected to have dramatic effects on maternal morbidity and mortality. There is a need for further gender disaggregated data to be collected on this and other health indicators.

5.3.4 Landmine Casualties

No data could be found for injuries due to landmines in Karenni. With continuing conflict in the state, and the widespread use of landmines, injury and death caused by landmines is expected to be high.

Non-Violence International estimates that, overall in Burma, 50% or more of landmine victims die from their injuries. With many of these accidents occurring in rural areas, it can

[223] UNICEF, 1998, p5.

be anything from a few hours to ten days walk away from a clinic where first aid might be available. Almost all landmine victims lose one or more limbs and children may constitute some 10% of the victims.[224]

Given the nature of the on-going conflict in Karenni, it is important that more data is collected on the use of landmines, its impact and the availability of prostheses for those affected.

5.3.5 Iodine Deficiency and Goitre

Iodine deficiency is a serious problem all over Burma, with goitre affecting some 33.08% of school children. The highest rates are found in Kachin and Chin states, though Karenni also has a high incidence. Iodine deficiency is the leading cause of preventable mental disability in Burma.

5.3.6 Vitamin A Deficiency

Vitamin A is found in fresh fruits and vegetables. Vitamin A supplementation has been shown to reduce mortality in a number of childhood infections, particularly measles.

A telltale sign of Vitamin A deficiency is the presence of Bitot's spots in the eye. A survey of children between six months and six years, which was undertaken in 1991,[225] gave a breakdown by state and division. In this breakdown, Karenni was ranked seventh out of 14 regions (Chin state excluded). Sagaing and Magway divisions had much greater incidences (1.9% and 1.6% respectively) of Bitot's spots in children than Karenni (0.3%). It is acknowledged that this government survey may not have included villages in all areas, and certainly not those from the displaced population in jungle areas. A more recent survey undertaken in various refugee camps, including a Karenni refugee camp along the Thai-Burma border amongst school children in 1995-1996 indicated that in the Karenni Camp 2, 194 (1.0%) students examined appeared to have Bitot's spots.

5.3.7 Water and Sanitation

Like in many other states and divisions in Burma, the safe water supply and sanitation for both urban and rural populations in Karenni is not satisfactory. According to the MICS (1997), the percentage of household residents with access to safe and convenient drinking water was 81% in urban areas and 21% in rural areas. The contrast between urban and rural access to drinking water is very stark in Karenni. In rural areas, these are the lowest figures for the entire country, where nationally 59.9% were recorded as having access to safe drinking water. Moreover according to the same survey, only 21% had access to safe and convenient excreta disposal. Given the high incidence of water-borne diseases in the state, and the fact

[224] Burma and Anti-personnel Landmines: A Humanitarian Crisis in the Making, Non-Violence International, Bangkok, Undated.

[225] 1991 National Nutrition Survey, detailed in Children and Women in Myanmar: A Situation Analysis, UNICEF, Yangon, 1995, p50.

that settlement patterns have been disturbed in recent years, further investigation into access to safe water supplies needs to be undertaken.

5.4 Responses to Health Needs

The number of agencies or institutions able to respond to health concerns in Karenni remains very limited. Other than public health services, a number of local religiously affiliated agencies and UNICEF, no other organisations have been allowed to develop health care activities in Karenni. Some non-government health services have been extended to relocation sites and an NGO based in Loikaw has delivered humanitarian assistance, principally supplies of rice into relocation sites since the displacements in 1996. More recently the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been able to visit the state, although no international medical NGOs have so far been allowed access to Karenni in the same way that some international NGOs have been able to work in Rakhine or Kachin state. For communities and villages in contested areas of the state where non-State armed groups still operate, services are provided mainly by the occasional visit of a mobile health team sent from the Thai border. This assistance is being provided by a number of local organisations who are restricted because of limited territorial access and security concerns. Assistance is primarily limited to mobile clinics via periodic visits. All these organisations have access to trained health manpower and work according to outreach coverage plans.

In the three refugee camps for Karenni refugees in Thailand in Mae Hong Son province, the camp populations have been assisted both in curative and preventative health care by an international NGO. In 1997, the Karenni Refugee Committee which has been coordinating assistance in all the camps to assure a fair and systematic distribution system was founded.

To date, there has been very little coordinated effort put into developing ways to meet the many health care needs of the peoples in Karenni. Given the level of conflict in the state, the general inaccessibility and the serious constraint on resources, it would seem critical that more be done to reach these population groups which are facing a humanitarian crisis.

5.5 Education Policy

Education policy throughout Burma is centralised at the level of the Ministry of Education in Rangoon. To ensure that correct educational policy is implemented, the Myanmar Education Committee was established with Secretary(1), Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt as Chairman.

As it is classed as a border area, much of the recent developments and plans for education in Karenni have come under the auspices of the MPBANRDA. Nationally, by 1996-97 some 379 schools (with 1,473 teachers and 34,322 students) came under the auspices of this specially established ministry.[226]

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[226] Human Resource Development and Nation Building in Myanmar, Office of Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defence, Yangon, 1997.

The work of the Ministry of Education is divided between basic education and higher education. Implementation of basic education policy is split between two departmental offices, one in Mandalay (for upper Burma) and one in Rangoon (for lower Burma). A third office attends separately to the needs of Rangoon City schools. These three departmental offices are able to implement policy in the fields of curriculum, syllabus and textbooks.

Education in Burma is in eleven steps:

	Primary school					Middle school				High school	
Grade	KG	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Age	5+	6+	7+	8+	9+	10+	11+	12+	13+	14+	15+

The Basic Education Law of Burma states that the five aims of education throughout the country are:

- to enable each citizen of the Union of Myanmar to become a physical and mental worker well equipped with basic education, good health and moral character;
- to lay the foundation for vocational education for the benefit of the Union of Myanmar;
- to give precedence to the teaching of science capable of strengthening and developing productive forces;
- to give precedence to the teaching of arts capable of preservation and development of culture, fine arts and literature of the states; and
- to lay a firm and sound educational foundation for the further pursuance of university education

These aims, as stated above, do not mention language policy, though Burmese is the adopted language for all Government-run school education learning. Mother tongue learning, in Karenni is left to monastery and Sunday school teaching, as in the other ethnic states of the country.

5.6 Educational Services and Coverage

5.6.1 Traditional Attitudes to Education

Prior to independence there were very few schools in Karenni, and hence the area suffered high illiteracy rates. Counting, at that time, was said to rely on making tally marks on posts or walls with charcoal, while the passing of time was marked by the agricultural seasons, and the time of day by the sound of cocks crowing and birds' songs.

A bamboo tie could also be used in the same way — items of production or sale would be recorded with a small knot made in the length of the bamboo tie and any debts repaid recorded by untying one of the knots. The brewing of *'khaung yay'* alcohol being such an integral

part of the society, sometimes a whole year's brewing would be recorded by the use of tallies made up of small bundles of rice bran tied in pieces of cloth.

During the colonial period, the Christian missionaries established mission schools. After independence, the government built many village primary schools and made primary education compulsory for five to six year olds. Recorded literacy levels vary between the various Karenni sub-groups. In the 1960's, only about 30% of the Kayan were literate; however, in the same period about 80% of Yintaleh children were said to be literate (in Burmese).[227]

As an area that relies primarily on subsistence agriculture, many children drop out of school before completion of secondary education, often after completion of only three or four years schooling, in order to help their parents with farm work. Other children gain some form of education through Buddhist temples, and, most likely, Sunday school in Christian churches. Children who have dropped out from school learn crafts at home, such as weaving, spinning cooking and the making of *'khaung yay'* rice-based alcohol.

5.6.2 Educational Services in Karenni

Despite a recorded 80% increase in primary schools and a 170% increase in teachers in State-run schools in Karenni between 1983 and 1993,[228] Table 13 shows that numbers of schools, teachers and students are universally lower in Karenni than in other parts of Burma, with the exception of eastern Shan state which has a lower school enrolment for both high and middle school levels. Correspondingly, Karenni commands only a tiny fraction of the government resources devoted to education. However, without reference to the school age population this information is difficult to interpret. According to government statistics, in comparison with Rangoon, Karenni accounts for only 0.66% of the national school student enrolment while Rangoon accounts for 13.6%. Similarly, Karenni has only 0.97% of the nation's schools while Rangoon has 6.7% of all the schools in the country, and Karenni has 0.6% of the nation's teachers while Rangoon has 14.6% of the teachers from the whole country.

There is a distance education programme for tertiary level studies operating in Burma and administered from Rangoon. No data on the number of students enrolled from Karenni was available to this report.

By 1995, twelve primary and two middle schools had been constructed as part of the MPBANRDA project for Karenni.

As in the case of health care, many of these facilities may not exist in reality. At a national level, more than two thirds of primary schools are understaffed and in rural areas, most schools have only two or three teachers for the five primary grades. Moreover, nearly two

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[227] Gazette, 1967, Chapter 5.

[228] UNICEF, 1995, p58.

thirds of primary school teachers are untrained in classroom management, effective teaching methods and basic life-skills education.

In addition, many rural schools are also chronically under-equipped; in some cases children are attending school without pencils, papers or slates.

Table 13: State Schools, Teachers and Students in Selected Regions (as of 30 September 1998)

Table 13a: Number of State Schools in Selected Regions

Region	High school	Middle school	Primary school	Total	%
Kachin	39	86	1,165	**1,290**	**3.30**
Karenni	10	35	333	**378**	**0.97**
Chin	24	83	1,054	**1,161**	**2.98**
Sagaing	86	196	3,927	**4,209**	**10.80**
Mergui	69	182	3,589	**3,840**	**9.86**
Mandalay	109	224	3,958	**4,291**	**11.02**
Shan (S)	47	104	2,157	**2,308**	**5.92**
Shan (E)	14	21	510	**545**	**1.40**
Shan (N)	32	84	1,508	**1,624**	**4.17**
Total	**430**	**1,015**	**18,201**	**19,646**	**50.42**
Rangoon division	157	238	2,213	**2,608**	**6.69**
Training schools	-	5	12	**17**	**0.04**
National total	**937**	**2,108**	**35,906**	**38,951**	**100.00**

Source: Basic Education Department, Ministry of Education, Yangon, 1998

Table 13b: Number of Teachers in Selected Regions

Region	High school	Middle school	Primary school teachers & principles	Total	%
Kachin	488	1,469	3,556	**5,513**	**2.71**
Karenni	133	290	820	1,243	0.61
Chin	262	864	2,608	**3,734**	**1.83**
Sagaing	1,552	6,823	16,091	**24,466**	**12.03**
Mergui	1,171	3,793	14,082	**19,046**	**9.36**
Mandalay	1,859	7,795	20,853	**30,507**	**15.00**
Shan (S)	498	1,593	6,578	**8,669**	**0.43**
Shan (E)	102	305	1,429	**1,836**	**0.90**
Shan (N)	388	1,327	4,554	**6,269**	**3.08**
Total	**6,453**	**24,259**	**70,571**	**101,283**	**45.95**
Rangoon division	3,215	10,054	16,524	**29,793**	**14.64**
Training schools	-	80	122	**202**	**0.10**
National total	**14,506**	**53,021**	**145,879**	**203,406**	**100.00**

Source: Basic Education Department, Ministry of Education, Yangon, 1998

Table 13c: Number of Students Enrolled in Selected Regions

Region	High school	Middle school	Primary school	Total	%
Kachin	19,519	63,654	161,476	**244,649**	**3.53**
Karenni	4,757	12,221	28,973	**45,951**	**0.66**
Chin	8,559	21,892	67,205	**97,656**	**1.41**
Sagaing	56,710	152,773	589,146	**798,629**	**11.54**
Mergui	54,581	119,595	439,862	**614,038**	**8.87**
Mandalay	89,321	227,284	647,860	**964,465**	**13.93**
Shan (S)	17,536	55,335	211,307	**284,178**	**4.10**
Shan (E)	2,327	9,941	39,864	**52,132**	**0.75**
Shan (N)	11,306	42,346	155,335	**208,987**	**3.02**
Total	**264,616**	**705,041**	**2,341,028**	**3,310,685**	**47.83**
Rangoon division	126,465	287,301	531,077	**944,843**	**13.65**
Training schools	-	1,586	4,111	**5,697**	**0.08**
National total	**573,895**	**1,537,816**	**4,810,451**	**6,922,162**	**100.00**

Source: Basic Education Department, Ministry of Education, Yangon, 1998

Education department statistics disaggregated according to township within Karenni, as shown in Table 14, indicate clear disparities in the provision of services between different areas, although without school age population figures it is very difficult to analyse these fully. It is clear that most of the education services within the state are primarily available in Loikaw and Demawso townships while Shadaw and Meh Set townships, by contrast, seem to have very few services available. Both these two latter townships lack any high school and have only one middle school each. Both townships also have very small populations.

Very little is known about education in areas where armed groups operate. Due to the military reversals of the late 1990s, a large part of the KNPP education system is now located in the Thai border refugee camps. The KNPP Ministry of Education claims to operate schools in Mawchi township, and in the refugee camps there are primary schools in each of the three camps and one middle/high school in Camp 5. Interviews conducted amongst the refugees have confirmed that, at least for some, the availability of schools in the border camps and lack of educational opportunities inside Karenni, is one factor in choosing whether to leave and move to Thailand.[229]

An assessment of education services carried out in September 1995 by a consortium of agencies[230] found that in the camps there was generally a shortage of teachers and a lack of resources in the schools. Many of the teachers have no teacher training and being mainly young and female they tend to leave early to marry and start a family.

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[229] Images Asia Interview Nos 22, 118, 123, 124 and 126.

[230] Educational Assessment of Mon and Karenni Refugee Camps on the Thai/Burmese Border, Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT), Bangkok, September, 1995.

Table 14: State-run Schools, Teachers and Students in Karenni (as of 30 September 1998)

	Schools				Teachers				Students			
Location	**High**	**Middle**	**Primary**	**Total (%)**	**High**	**Middle**	**Primary***	**Total (%)**	**High**	**Middle**	**Primary**	**Total (%)**
Loikaw district												
Loikaw	5	16	96	**30.95**	94	137	278	**40.94**	3,787	6,603	13,032	**50.97**
Demawso	1	12	102	**30.42**	15	72	253	**27.35**	626	3,822	10,170	**31.81**
Pruso	1	3	71	**19.84**	5	32	132	**13.60**	148	746	3,145	**8.79**
Shadaw	0	1	18	**5.02**	2	6	33	**3.30**	0	106	397	**1.09**
Total	**7**	**32**	**287**	**86.24**	**116**	**247**	**696**	**85.20**	**4,561**	**11,277**	**26744**	**92.67**
Bawlake district												
Bawlake	1	2	24	**7.14**	7	22	48	**6.19**	71	424	925	**3.09**
Meh Set	0	1	4	**1.32**	0	5	10	**1.21**	0	26	236	**0.57**
Pasaung	2	0	18	**5.29**	10	16	66	**7.40**	125	494	1,068	**3.67**
Total	**3**	**3**	**46**	**13.76**	**17**	**43**	**12**	**414.80**	**196**	**944**	**2,229**	**7.33**
Grand total	**10**	**35**	**333**	**100.00**	**133**	**290**	**820**	**100.00**	**4,757**	**12,221**	**28,973**	**100.00**

* plus primary principles

Source: Basic Education Department, Ministry of Education, Yangon, 1998

The difference in distribution of school education services within Karenni is summarised in Table 15.

Table 15: Percentage Distribution of School Education Services within Karenni

Township	Schools	Teachers	Students
Loikaw	30.9	40.9	50.9
Shadaw	5.0	3.3	1.1
Meh Set	1.3	1.2	0.6
Other Townships	62.8	35.4	47.4

Literacy rates in Karenni are quoted in the government's 1983 census report. The percentage of the population aged five years and over who were literate[231] was reported to be 57% (males 63.3%, females 50.3%). These figures would seem to be in line with literacy figures found in the border refugee camps[232] where, amongst the age group 15 years and over, 60-80% of men were found to be literate (mainly in Burmese), though the figure was less for women — only 50-60%. National adult literacy rates (adults aged 15 and over) for the year 1980, as quoted by UNICEF (see Table 16), reported 86% literate for males and 66% literate for females.

Notwithstanding the discrepancy in age range of the sample populations, this would indicate a substantially lower literacy rate in Karenni than found in the country as a whole.

Enrolment rates of primary school age children in Karenni is very low, as in other parts of the country. A survey of primary school attendance in five regions of the country in 1990[233] reported that nearly 39% of eligible children had never attended school. Major causes for non-enrolment were cited as poverty and inability of parents to pay for costs such as textbooks, and additional ad hoc contributions. Moreover, in Karenni, only 50% of children in urban areas completed the primary school cycle, a rate which dropped to only 23% in rural areas; these figures are comparable to national completion rates. Repetition rates are also higher in rural areas with about 25% of rural students in the country repeating a grade each year.

Many refugees have said that following displacement they were no longer able to send their children to school, either because they had lost access to a stable income which made the cost too high or because schooling was no longer available in the area they were relocated to. In Shadaw, the existing school in the town was not large enough to accommodate all the displaced children in Shadaw relocation site. In another case, the village school closed down after the villagers were relocated and teachers left the area. One refugee, whose parents lived in Shadaw relocation site and who was sent to school in Loikaw, reported that the teachers discriminated against her because it was known she was from a rural area and her parents lived in a relocation site.[234]

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[231] It is not clear how literacy was defined in this census.

[232] CCSDPT, 1995.

[233] UNICEF, 1995, p57-59.

[234] Images Asia Interview Nos. 42, 45, 47, 84, 87, 90 and 91.

Table 16: Selected Educational Indicators for Burma and Other Countries within the Region.

Indicator	Thailand	Burma	Laos	India
Adult literacy (male) 1980	92%	86%	56%	55%
Adult literacy (female) 1980	83%	66%	28%	25%
Adult literacy (male) 1995	96%	88%	69%	64%
Adult literacy (female) 1995	92%	78%	44%	35%
Primary school attendance (male), 1990-98	n/d	85%	70%	75%
Primary school attendance (female), 1990-98	n/d	85%	67%	61%
Primary school entrants reaching grade 5, 1990-95	88%	n/d	53%	59%
Secondary school enrolment rate (male), 1990-96	38%	29%	36%	59%
Secondary school enrolment rate (female), 1990-96	37%	30%	23%	39%

n/d = no data available
Literacy is defined as the percentage of persons aged 15 and over who can read and write
Source: The State of the World's Children 2000, UNICEF, New York, Undated.

5.7 Responses to Educational Needs

5.7.1 Responses from the Thai-Burma border

International NGOs based in Thailand have assisted with education services in the Karenni refugee camps providing basic school supplies and school building infrastructure. More recently teacher training has been provided.

Educational services implemented in the border camps by international NGOs is dictated by policy set by the Thai Ministry of Interior (MOI). In the past this has been limited to basic school supplies. However, by February 2000, MOI had given approval for basic agriculture training to be carried out in border camps and for an extension of education beyond primary school level.

MOI approval was given in 1998 for implementation of an English Language distance education programme (DEP) within the Karenni refugee camps based in Mae Hong Son province on a pilot project basis.

5.7.2 Responses by International Humanitarian Agencies from Inside Burma

Very little is known about the availability or impact of education programs run by international humanitarian agencies inside Burma and there is no information about whether these have extended to Karenni.

UNICEF has set up educational programs elsewhere in the country; however, whether these have been able to be extended to rural border areas with continuing civil strife, such as Karenni, is not known.

Elsewhere in Burma, an education programme set up jointly between the government and UNICEF is working towards implementation of the Myanmar Programme of Action goals of achieving universal access to basic education and completion of primary education by 80% of primary school age children. This programme of action consists of two separate projects — 'Continuous Assessment and Progression System' (CAPS) and 'All Children in School' (ACIS). CAPS attempts to address the issues of high failure, repetition and drop out rates by developing teacher training methods, designing new learning materials, instituting local information exchange centres and collecting education data. ACIS attempts to ensure all children receive complete primary education by collecting and analysing data on village level school drop out rates and setting target rates and enlisting support amongst local communities through mass media to attain those rates. Incentives, such as exemption from school fees, ad hoc costs and the provision of clothing and school lunches are also provided in disadvantaged townships. An assessment of these two projects was carried out in 1998[235] but it is not known whether they have been extended to Karenni.

[235] A Study on Quantitative Assessment of CAPS and ACIS Projects, Department of Basic Education/UNICEF, Myanmar, June 1998.

6. CONCLUSIONS

There is a long history of conflict in Karenni. The underlying reasons for this protracted conflict are complex and diverse. There is a myriad of armed State and non-State groups vying for control of populations and territory in Karenni; these include government armed forces, cease-fire groups, splinter groups, opposition groups partially based in Thailand and smaller militias. What started out as a separatist armed movement has developed into a situation of rivalry between different armed groups vying for control of resources, future representation, inter-ethnic rivalry, personal protection or a more powerful stake in the current balance of power. The government armed forces have further instigated and perpetuated group rivalries and conflict.

For each group, conflict has become rooted in winning political allegiances and strengthening logistical support. Calls for self-determination and hyper-nationalism or national consolidation and assimilation demonstrate that ethnic tensions are manipulated by warring parties to achieve political or economic goals.[236] Appealing for ethnic inspired action enables groups to mobilise populations and extend patronage and other obligatory ties in a diverse and multi-ethnic society where all sides share the same support base and loyalties are interchangeable. Because of these links, inter-ethnic conflict tends to follow political patterns.

As such, control of and access to the civilian population is critical for recruitment, protection and the building of political support bases; and control of and ability to exploit resources is necessary to finance the continuation of the conflict.

This arming of civilian supporters has resulted in all villagers, including men, women and children becoming unwilling targets for all sides. It has exacerbated social breakdown as coping strategies have split family and communities, undermined traditional authority structures, increased migration and banditry and led to further antagonism over the shrinking resource base.

The Importance of the Economy

The deterioration of the formal economy — destruction of infrastructure, replacement of State institutions by military organisations and restricted public finance — has led to the formation of an extra-legal State economy that all groups in Karenni, including State military organisations, rely on. Characterised by the rapid and unsustainable cross-border and illegal logging trade of the late 1980s, as well as forced taxation, this economy focuses on extraction of natural resources rather than the production of resources or provision of services.

Participation in and control of the extra-legal State economy enables armed groups to continue to escalate the conflict. Factors that have enabled this to develop — cross-border and illegal trade, economic stagnation and international economic sanctions — make it likely that the

[236] The characteristics that often identify ethnic confrontations — fixed identities that are mobilised by political organisations emphasising ethnicity to the exclusion of all else; institutions split down ethnic lines; and military strategies that pursue outright victories to reduce security threats from the other side, seem not so significant in this case.

extra-legal State economy will survive well into the current cease-fires. Indeed, opportunities for perceived benefits of participating in the extra-legal State economy might, for some groups, outweigh the advantages gained from political resolution and economic reconstruction within an effective cease-fire environment. Under current cease-fire conditions, it appears that the cease-fire groups' participation in the extra-legal State economy has been authorised and legitimised by the State.

The rapid and predatory depletion of the resource base is likely to increase competition for control of assets and population resources, transform the relationships between armed groups and lead to a more intense conflict over what is left. Groups who rely solely on the extra-legal State economy are increasingly predatory and violent in their attempts to protect their asset bases. This has implications for future population displacements and the further fragmentation of armed groups and military structures.

Conflict and Displacement

Coupled with the long history of conflict, is a history of displacement in Karenni which has been exacerbated by economic instability and resource scarcity. Since the 1960s, the State has displaced civilians to secure decisive military solutions where total occupation may be too difficult and protracted to achieve alone. Today, the State remains the leading exponent of displacement in Karenni. Since 1996, at least 15% of the state's population have been displaced for military purposes including the entire population of Shadaw township (with the exception of Shadaw town).

More recently, the State has also demonstrated its willingness to move populations around in power-sharing agreements with cease-fire groups. For non-State groups, the corralling of populations has made it increasingly difficult to survive.

Providing the opportunity for Burman settlers in the state, which has been a major irritation for some non-State groups, may fulfil the same goals.[237]

The requisitioning of land by military battalions and the appropriation of land for development projects has led to further population displacements. On the other hand, populations may also be compelled to stay on the land by armed groups when it is no longer economically viable or safe to do so.[238]

Rather than providing durable solutions, the displacements have led to the expropriation of vast tracts of land and natural resources, and this has shattered the fragile resource base of the local communities. This has increased the competition for survival, as available resources and opportunities diminish sharply. It has also led to the alienation of the population from

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[237] Other characteristics of occupation, such as the marrying of local girls by *Tatmadaw* soldiers, may well also achieve these goals. It is commonly believed that the *Tatmadaw* is encouraging and rewarding soldiers who marry local girls in Karenni.

[238] In Karen state, some farmers have told observers that they were forced to stay on the land by non-State groups to prevent the area from falling into government hands.

their customary rights to land and resources such as water, their agricultural customs and traditional farming techniques.

Of those displaced, few are able to stay in government allocated relocation sites because services are inadequate and opportunities to make a livelihood are insufficient. Living in relocation sites where there is not enough food and not enough land to grow food has led to great suffering and deprivation. This has resulted in further increased mobility and insecurity amongst the displaced population, and an increase in the number of refugee arrivals at the Thai border. In the absence of lasting and substantive peace agreements, the displacement of civilians is likely to continue.

Cease-fires

The existence of cease-fires appears to suggest that there is a process towards the peaceful re-integration of former armed groups.[239] However to many observers, that process appears to have stalled, with no other viable initiatives on the horizon. Indeed, the assumption that there is a process may be incorrect; cease-fires may represent little more than a patchwork of ad hoc economic deals where the success of each would depend on the group involved rather than the overall political process. Such agreements have entrenched power structures leading to further dispersal, factionalism and cronyism in the competition for increasingly scarce resources.

The implications of such arrangements are critical for the delivery of humanitarian aid, which will have to negotiate passage through a patchwork of State and non-State structures to access civilian groups. Key issues such as the refusal to provide access to non-partisan third party observers and continuing conflict on the part of warring parties raises questions about the extent of consensus and coercion amongst the groups in agreeing to cease-fires. The answer to this question will have implications for any future initiatives at conflict resolution as well as the delivery of humanitarian aid. Such initiatives will need to examine how far the present cease-fire environment has undermined the concept of, and support for, cease-fires in general and whether entrenched parties have an interest in reducing the conflict.

Protracted Conflict and Humanitarian Aid

The protracted conflict and displacements in Karenni have caused extensive humanitarian concerns, including in health and education. The internally displaced people, especially those in jungle hideouts, lack any permanent form of services.

There is an urgent need for a thorough examination into the food security and nutrition status of the population since the small number of health morbidity reports made available to this report indicate a high level of malnutrition amongst the civilian population, whether displaced or not. This would suggest that the effect of the conflict on the civilian population is perhaps more serious than previously assumed. It is therefore imperative that data collected by international organisations, NGOs and other actors be shared, analysed and acted upon.

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[239] Indeed in the eyes of the international community, the State has been legitimised by successfully negotiating the cease-fires.

So far most humanitarian interventions in Karenni have focussed on relief strategies and short-term physical inputs. While indispensable and significant, this assistance does little to protect the rights of the internally displaced. In the present context where the conflict is both protracted and complex, much more needs to be done. In addition to provision of humanitarian assistance, the international community needs to make a serious commitment to conflict reduction and resolution rather than the present response which aims at containment.

Relatively little information is available about the effectiveness of current humanitarian inputs, or how programs could be designed more appropriately.

Assistance should be carried out, as stated in Principle 24 of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, in accordance with the principles of humanity and impartiality and without discrimination. Humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons should not be diverted for political or military reasons. Two mechanisms have currently been developed for giving assistance; one is delivered through or in support of government structures (despite the fact that local populations view the State's military involvement in the conflict as significant and negative); while the other relies on cross-border assistance delivered through non-State structures. Both mechanisms rely on partisans to the conflict to deliver aid, who can use the assistance to strengthen their support bases, exacerbate local insecurity, intensify group hostilities and reaffirm authority and leadership of such groups in the eyes of the recipients.

The focus of much of the assistance so far has been to target one or more specific groups. This is not always successful in delivering the benefits in a way that discriminates in favour of the most vulnerable or reaches all those with needs. In such situations it is difficult to avoid pitfalls where resources are diverted or manipulated.[240] An approach which seeks to assess both humanitarian needs and delivery, as well as the political impact of the assistance is needed.

The challenge is to find ways to de-link the delivery of humanitarian aid, locating it away from warring parties in a way that is impartial and works with all groups. One way of doing this would be to coordinate and relocate aid distribution points away from warring parties. NGOs might also usefully initiate a process of consultation between opposing groups over issues relating to aid. This may increase transparency and replicate confidence building measures in an environment where impartial observers are denied access.

As Principles 25, 26 and 27 of the Guiding Principles go on to point out, national authorities and other appropriate actors have the right to offer their services in support of the internally

[240] In one such case, in January 2000 an indigenous NGO, supported by a Trade Union organisation and accompanied by one of the armed groups visited a village in one of the western townships close to the base of a cease-fire group. In 1996, villagers from this area had been displaced into a relocation site and two years later they had been able to return to their homes. The NGO approached villagers with offers to improve water supplies and provide health-care services. However, according to an observer, fighting broke out when it became known that the armed group was there. The villagers have said that they are afraid of being displaced again as a result of the incident.

displaced. These offers need to be seen in good faith and should solicit a response, particularly from the State. The authorities concerned should also grant and facilitate free passage of humanitarian assistance and allow those engaged in the provision of assistance rapid and unimpeded access.

Moreover assistance needs to be protection oriented and should seek to insure and restore the rights of the displaced. The present environment in which the cease-fire agreements between the State and various non-State actors have been signed are not binding agreements. They offer no recourse to the civil legal system or any other form of non-partisan arbitration. International agencies mandated to protect the internally displaced need to offer their services to all parties concerned. In doing this, organisations and other appropriate actors should respect relevant international standards and codes of conduct.

Appendices

Appendix 1: A Comparison of Populations in Relocation Sites in Karenni from Different Sources

Comparison of Numbers in Relocation Sites in June and December 1996 - as reported by the KNPP in June 1996 and the Catholic Diocese in September 1996 by household and population (HH / P)

Relocation site / Gathering Village	June 1996	September 1996
Shadaw	846 / 3993	505 / 2425
Daw Tama Gyi	664 / 3330	277 / 1451
Kay Lya	177 / 958	n/d
Tee Bya Nay	151 / 703	n/d
Mar Kraw Shae	63 / 317	n/d
Pon Chaung	94 / 547	52 / 314
Ywathit	171 / 1012	52 / 255
Bawlake	213 / 1175	n/d
Nwalawoe	173 / 769	n/d
Htee Poe Klo	710 / 3786	277 / 1451
Loilim Le	n/d	78 / 415
Pasaung	n/d	131 / 1040
Mawchi	n/d	n/d / 300

Appendix 2: Refugee Arrivals at the Thai Border

Number of Karenni refugees in camps in Thailand

	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	Annual increase (decrease)
1989											1724	1824	n/a
1990	2125	2338	2699	2614	2632	2971	2971	2793	2793	2793	2793	2793	668
1991	2836	2904	3163	3156	-	3389	3496	3520	3520	3677	3525	3514	678
1992	3524	3537	3537	-	-	4952	5219	5188	5194	5373	5763	5872	2348
1993	5801	5659	5685	5743	5887	5887	5955	5974	5960	5945	6041	6025	224
1994	6089	6129	6083	5421	5254	5309	4607	4607	5083	5083	5118	5133	(956)
1995	5103	5174	5206	5252	5252	5229	6047	6065	6123	6111	6162	6109	6
1996	6124	6119	6119	5562	5572	7398	8758	9022	9247	10495	10524	10524	4400
1997	10810	10994	10993	10993	11415	11427	11540	11540	11623	11655	11655	11813	1003
1998	11813	11903	12520	12520	13087	13353	13420	13469	13499	13517	13725	13728	1915
1999	13939	15072	15098	15357	15742	15834	16205	16408	16501	16506	16545	16630	2902

Displacements in Loikaw Township



Appendix 3 Displacements by Township

Data is limited to what was available to the study. A lack of data in any one township should not be taken to indicate that there is no displacement of the population

1. Displacements in Loikaw Township

Village Cluster A

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Kaw Laung	Not displaced	15	75
2	Eh Sah	Not displaced	19	98
3	Naw Pu Leh	Not displaced	17	87
4	Pain Kyit	Not displaced	39	189
5	Loi Leh	Not displaced	48	246
6	Na Kyaing	Not displaced	24	106
7	Na Kyaing Sa Pya	Not displaced	19	97
8	Daw Ta Naw	Not displaced	26	139
9	Kyauk Ku Leh	Not displaced	23	115
10	Kyauk Ko	Not displaced	25	126
11	Ter Vee	Not displaced	18	93

Village Cluster B

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Yeh Kar	Not displaced	23	108
2	Peh Yah Pyo	Not displaced	26	130
3	Daw Hta Hay	Not displaced, 300 IDPs from Shadaw displaced here	42	220
4	War Kai	Not displaced	25	159
5	Kaw Na (lower)	Not displaced	29	145
6	Kaw Na (Upper)	Not displaced	35	179
7	Naw Law	Not displaced	25	157
8	Ku Paw	Not displaced	20	103
9	Lay Phone Gyi	Not displaced	33	176
10	Nar Kweh	Not displaced	19	96
11	Meh Teh Soh	Not displaced	17	89

Village Cluster C

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Na Noh	Not displaced	20	109
2	Wa Ngaw (East)	Not displaced, IDPs from Shadaw displaced here	25	125
3	Wa Ngaw (West)	Not displaced, IDPs from Shadaw displaced here	96	553
4	Na Su Kwe	Not displaced	23	115
5	Dee Loh	Not displaced	19	95
6	Tham Bi Gyone	Not displaced	9	47
7	Daw Seh	Not displaced, Relocation site here	30	155
8	Daw Pa Pa	Displaced to Daw Seh	49	366
9	Ku Lee Ku	Displaced to Daw Seh	21	106
10	Tha Wah	Split into two villages	35	328
11	Meh Pya	Villagers from Tha Wah settled here in 1996	19	59

Village Cluster D

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Kaya Pa Ya	Not displaced	20	99
2	Koung Tha	Not displaced	23	107
3	Thay Yeh Peh	Not displaced	19	87
4	Leh Phone Gyi	Not displaced	25	128
5	War Ri Kaw Thu	Not displaced	30	154
6	War Ri	Not displaced	25	145
7	Tee Ree	Not displaced	26	139

Village Cluster E

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Nwa La Boe	Not displaced, 703 IDPs from Shadaw township displaced to relocation site here*	42	205
2	Nyee Yaw	Not displaced	33	186
3	Daw Seh	Not displaced	34	195
4	Ni Gyone	Not displaced	38	203
5	Daw Seh (2)	Not displaced	36	196
6	Tee Khu	Not displaced	39	203

*Nwa La Boe Relocation Site included IDPs from the following villages including numbers of (household / population) thought to have moved to Nwa La Boe

<u>From within Loikaw Township</u>
Daw Hay So (16 / 52)
Daw Lya Dah (26 / 113)
Daw Sa See (24 / 100)
Daw Lah Leh (22 / 95)

<u>From Shadaw Township</u>
Daw Ma Leh (20 / 90)
Three Dah (42 / 160)
Daw Mu Sweh (10 / 50)
Daw Kloh Leh (8 / 43)

Village Cluster F

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Daw Plaw Kleh	Not displaced	42	213
2	Daw Saw Lee	Not displaced	38	192
3	Daw Du	Not displaced	37	187
4	Pya Nee	Not displaced	38	
5	Tee Nga Lya	Not displaced	56	293
6	Pa Daw Du	Not displaced	43	216

Village Cluster G

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Naw Koh	Not displaced	42	225
2	Naw Koh Sa Pya	Not displaced	32	163
3	Daw Law Shee	Not displaced	35	177
4	Nyee Ku	Not displaced	26	132
5	3 Miles Sapya	Not displaced	39	197
6	Htee Thaw Ku	Not relocated, IDPs relocated here from Lawpita in 1990	38	192

Village Cluster H

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Chi Ta Ma	Not displaced	59	307
2	Da Saw Bee	Not displaced	48	232
3	Daw Kaw Lo Ku	Not displaced	39	198
4	Htee Tha Nga	Not displaced	42	213
5	Pa Kyaing	Not displaced	38	195
6	Pa Kyaing Sapya	Not displaced	34	172
7	Daw Mu Kla	Not displaced	29	148

Village Cluster K

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Palaung	Not displaced, IDPs displaced to relocation site here, Relocation site here	38	195
2	Daw Ta Kya*	Not displaced	29	146
3	Daw Ta Yaw**	Palaung Relocation Site	37	187
4	Daw Kraw Ku**	Palaung Relocation Site	26	132
5	Daw Seh**	Palaung Relocation Site	29	143

*Daw Ta Kya very close to Loikaw township

** These villages were also reported to have been relocated to Nwa La Boe in July 1998

Village Cluster I*

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Nam Peko	Nwa La Boe RS	8	35
2	Daw Hay So	Nwa La Boe RS	40	212
3	Daw Sa See	Nwa La Boe RS	33	60
4	Ku Leh	Nwa La Boe RS	6	25
5	Daw Lah Leh	Nwa La Boe RS	8	35
6	Daw La Dah	Nwa La Boe RS	30	154

*At the time of displacement, missionaries were active in this cluster; IDPs and people followed the missionaries to Loikaw where they stayed in Chi Keh quarter and from there were relocated to Nwa La Boe

Village Cluster J

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Daw Mee Ku	Shadaw RS	40	211
2	Daw Klo Ku	Shadaw RS	14	66
3	Daw Klaw Tu	Shadaw RS	8	37
4	Taw Teh Leh	Shadaw RS	15	75
5	Dee Leh	Shadaw RS	30	152
6	Daw Hso Doh	Shadaw RS	10	46

2. Displacements in Demawso Township



Village Cluster A

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Daw Law Khu	Htee Po Klo RS	26	230
2	Daw Lya Khu	Htee Po Klo RS	36	180
	Htee Theh Klo	Htee Po Klo RS	40	210
	Daw Khu Lee	Htee Po Klo RS, not able to return to village	42	220
3	Lah Lee Leh	Htee Po Klo RS	20	115
4	Htee Poh Klo	Not Displaced, Relocation site located here	120	n/d
5	Peh Lya	Not Displaced	42	n/d
6	Daw Bya Ku	Not Displaced	38	n/d
7	Daw Tha Da	Not Displaced	62	n/d
8	Daw Ku Say	Not Displaced	18	n/d
9	Daw Khu Twet	Not Displaced	18	n/d

Village Cluster B

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Daw Phu	Ta Nee La Leh RS, now in Daw Peh	55	305
2	Daw Peh	Htee Po Klo RS, now returned to village	33	165
3	Daw Peh Tu	Htee Po Klo RS, now returned to village	35	200
4	Daw So Koe	Htee Po Klo RS, now in Daw Peh	35	120
5	Tee Deh Nga	Ta Nee La Leh RS, now in Daw Law Khu	35	125
6	Da Po	Ta Nee La Leh RS, not able to return to village	35	190
7	Bo Lya	Ta Nee La Leh RS, now in Daw Law Khu	34	175

Village Cluster C

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Daw Tama Gyi	Daw Tama Gyi RS, returned to village in 1998	256	1274
2	Daw Nyay Khu	Daw Tama Gyi RS, returned to village in 1998	165	807
3	Daw Saw Pla	Daw Tama Gyi RS, returned to village in 1998	117	559
	Daw So Kale	Daw Tama Gyi RS, returned to village in 1998	30	155
	Kay Bi So	Daw Tama Gyi RS, returned to village in 1998	12	55
4	Daw Ta Keh	Daw Tama Gyi RS, returned to village in 1998	37	210
5	Daw Kaw	Daw Tama Gyi RS, returned to village in 1998	35	170
6	Daw Pha	Daw Tama Gyi RS, returned to village in 1998	12	60

Village Cluster D

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
	The Nee La Leh	Not Displaced, relocation site located here	n/d	n/d
	Daw Ta Gyi	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Daw Seh	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Daw Ta Myi	Not Displaced		
	Nam Twee	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Daw Klo Du	Not Displace		

Note: These villages are reportedly providing IB72 with security

Village Cluster E

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
	6 Mile Village	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
	5 Miles Village	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
	Sam Phone	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
	Koraka	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
	No 2* Plantation	Not displaced	n/d	n/d

*No 2 Plantation— this Burman village was set up in 1958 after Ngwe Daung was built

Village Cluster F (there are known to be 13 other villages in this cluster)

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Daw Kleh Lee	A site north of Ngwedaung in 1985	n/d	175
2	Ngwe Daung Town	Two sections moved to the same site in 1991	n/d	460

Village Cluster J (sited at Lawpita, but not marked on the map)

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Htee Tho Ku	Relocated to new site in Loikaw township,now known as Htee Tho Ku	36	220
2	Daw Way Maw	Relocated to Ta Nee Lah Leh in Loikaw township	30	160
3	Pya Gneh	Relocated to Ten Miles village near Lawpita	18	95
4	Daw Ku Lee	Relocated to Leh Nge Su near Lawpita	20	115
5	Daw So Shay	Relocated to Six Miles village near Lawpita	30	155

These villages were apparently moved to secure the site at Lawpita in 1990

Village Cluster G

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
	Ve The Ku (North)	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
	Ve The Ku (South)	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
	Paung Taw	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
	Paya Pyu	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
	Nam Saka (East)	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
	Lee Woh	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
	Kupra Htoo	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
	Sein Taung	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
	Kapeh Ku	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
	Nam Me Khon	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
	Aw Keh	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
	Daw Tha Shee	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
	Thaiya	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
	Khone Taw	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
	Daw Pita	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
	Daw Lya Lee	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
	Daw Bu Ko	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
	Daw Seh	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
	Si Leh	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
	Daw Kah Mee	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
	Saw Du Ywathit	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
1	Si Li Doh	Displaced to Demawso town in 1992	n/d	n/d
	Ha Thaw Ku	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
2	La Leh (new)	Displaced to Demawso town in 1992	n/d	n/d
3	La Leh (old)	Displaced to Demawso town in 1992	n/d	n/d
4	Baw Pah	Displaced to Demawso town in 1992	n/d	n/d
	They Su Leh (new)	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
	Theh Su Leh (old)	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
	Khone Tra	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
	Daw Nga Ka	Not displaced	n/d	n/d

Village Cluster H

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Haw Wah Upper	Displaced in 1992 to Law Ba Ku Village - started to return in 1994	n/d	n/d
2	Haw Wah Lower	Displaced in 1992 to Law Ba Ku village - started to return in 1994	n/d	n/d
3	Daw Taw Ku	Displaced in 1992 to Deemawso Town - started to return in 1994	n/d	n/d
	Law Ba Ku	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Saung Da	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Lo Pu Kaung Son	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Lo Pu Daw Sheh	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Peh Mu Saung	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Saung Bu G'neh	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Ba Sa M'Nu	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Ka Theh Ku	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Daw Kee	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Raung Ku	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Paw K'nah	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Wa Thaw Ku (old)	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Tee Pa Ah Ku	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Wah Thaw Ku (new)	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Daw Koh Aw	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Kweh Thaw Daw	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Tee Saw Daw	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Tee Keh Kaw	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Leh Khone	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Lway Nam Pha	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Si Saung Ku	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Mya Leh	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Pa Daung Ku	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Shi Mee Saw Lah	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Shi Mee Saw Dah	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Pay Say Lah	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Four Miles	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Si Pu Ghone	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Daw Shee Ee	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Daw Paw Ku	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Daw Klaw Du	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Daw Ta Ngu (new)	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Daw Ta Nga (old)	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Daw Ta Pu	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Daw No Ku	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Daw Su Klaw	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Naw Pah Lay	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Oo Koo Ree	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Taneh Oo Kweh	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Sa Ta Rah	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Ma Nam Plaw	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Sa Baw Theh	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d

Village Cluster I

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Wah See Saw	Relocated to Demawso Town in 1992	n/d	n/d
2	Ku Bra (new)	Relocated to Demawso Town in 1992	n/d	n/d
3	Ku Bra (old)	Relocated to Demawso Town in 1992	n/d	n/d
4	Ku Bra	Relocated to Demawso Town in 1992	n/d	n/d
5	Ba Ku	Relocated to Demawso Town in 1992	n/d	n/d
6	Ya Bu Plaw	Relocated to Demawso Town in 1992	n/d	n/d
		Relocated to Demawso Town in 1992	n/d	n/d
7	Ku Peh Taw	Relocated to Demawso Town in 1992	n/d	n/d
8	Dah Taw	Relocated to Demawso Town in 1992	n/d	n/d
9	Daw Roh Ku	Relocated to Demawso Town in 1992	n/d	n/d
10	Daw Weh Ku	Relocated to Demawso Town in 1992	n/d	n/d
11	Le Mah An Ku	Relocated to Demawso Town in 1992	n/d	n/d
12	Saung P'Taung	Initally ordered to relocate in 1992 but later permitted to stay in the village	n/d	n/d
13	U Saw Maw Saw	Initally ordered to relocate in 1992 but later permitted to stay in the village	n/d	n/d
14	Saung Du La	Initally ordered to relocate in 1992 but later permitted to stay in the village	n/d	n/d
	Tee Lah Thu Keh	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Lwi Ka Thi	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Wam Bam Plaw	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Saung P'Taung	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Daw Ta Wee	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Yu Saw Maw Saw	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Saung Du La	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Eh Naw Pah Leh	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Law See	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Kaung Blaw	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
15	Kway Nga	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Nga Raw	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
16	Kway Nga	Displaced to Kway Nga in 1992, displaced nearer the road in 1996	n/d	n/d
	So Deh Ku	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Ku Bra Nga	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d
	Zay Ghone	Not Displaced	n/d	n/d

3. Displacements in Pruso Township



Village Cluster A

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Ngwe Daung (New)	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
2	Kandala	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
3	Htee Thaw Ku	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
4	Htee Paw So	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
5	Daw Nye Khu	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
6	Daw Ku Ku	Not displaced	n/d	n/d

Village Cluster B

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Htee Klu Daw	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
2	Kaw Sa Maw	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
3	So Lyar Ku	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
4	Maw Soe	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
5	Law Ku Koh	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
6	Law Lya Ku	Displaced to Htee Po Klo 1996	n/d	n/d
7	Pruso Town (4 sections)	Not displaced	n/d	n/d

Village Cluster C

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Daw Ta Naw	Htee Po Klo RS	n/d	n/d
2	Ngu Sway Leh	Htee Po Klo RS	n/d	n/d
3	Daw Ta Kleh	Htee Po Klo RS Ti Bya Nyi RS Keh Lya RS	96	430
4	Htee Bya Nyi	Keh Lya RS	35	187
5	Daw Bya Ku	Keh Lya RS	n/d	n/d

Village Cluster D

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Keh Lya	Displaced to Keh Lya relocation site	66	364
2	Daw Law Ku	Displaced to Mar Kraw She	28	142
3	Mar Kraw She	Relocation site located here	35	175
4	Htee Theh Ku	Displaced to Key Lya and Mar Kraw She RS	36	197
5	Daw Ku Leh	Displaced to Keh Lya and Mar Kraw She RS	20	104
6	Law Pya Leh	Displaced to Key Lya and Mar Kraw She RS	15	85
7	Daw Mu Sheh	Displaced to Keh Lya and Mar Kraw She RS	15	72
8	Bu Ku	Went to Tha Leh	n/d	n/d

Village Cluster E

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Daw Klaw Leh	Displaced to Mar Kraw She	n/d	n/d
2	Daw Thee Du	Displaced to Mar Kraw She	n/d	n/d
3	Ta Naw Klaw	Displaced to Mar Kraw She	n/d	n/d
4	Po Kray Ku	Displaced to Mar Kraw She	n/d	n/d
5	Law Kee Ku	Displaced to Mar Kraw She	n/d	n/d

Village Cluster F

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Dee Ku Leh	Displaced to Pruso town in 1992	n/d	n/d
2	Htee Der Ku	Displaced to Pruso town in 1992	n/d	n/d
3	Daw Raw Ku	Displaced to Pruso town in 1992	n/d	n/d
4	Daw Ku Leh	Displaced to Pruso town in 1992	n/d	n/d
5	Htee Thaw De Nee	Displaced to Pruso town in 1992	n/d	n/d
6	Law Taw Der Naw	Displaced to Pruso town in 1992	n/d	n/d
7	Weh Thu Taw	Displaced to Pruso town in 1992	n/d	n/d
8	Bi So	Displaced to Pruso town in 1992	n/d	n/d
9	Htoo Kwe So	Displaced to Pruso town in 1992	n/d	n/d
10	Lya Du	Displaced to Pruso town in 1992	n/d	n/d
11	Kaw Ra Ku	Displaced to Pruso town in 1992	n/d	n/d
12	Htee Lya So	Displaced to Pruso town in 1992	n/d	n/d
13	Law Taw Der Naw	Displaced to Pruso town in 1992	n/d	n/d
14	Law Kya	Displaced to Pruso town in 1992	n/d	n/d

Village Cluster G

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Ba Ku return in 93	Displaced to Pruso Town and Hoya in 92 began to	n/d	n/d
2	Gyi Soe return in 93	Displaced to Pruso Town and Hoya in 92 began to	n/d	n/d
3	Nay Du Ku return in 93	Displaced to Pruso Town and Hoya in 92 began to	n/d	n/d
4	Ka Kya Ku return in 93	Displaced to Pruso Town and Hoya in 92 began to	n/d	n/d
5	Ku Say Ku return in 93	Displaced to Pruso Town and Hoya in 92 began to	n/d	n/d
6	Ha Lee return in 93	Displaced to Pruso Town and Hoya in 92 began to	n/d	n/d
7	Bi Ya return in 93	Displaced to Pruso Town and Hoya in 92 began to	n/d	n/d
8	Hoya return in 93	Displaced to Pruso Town and Hoya in 92 began to	n/d	n/d
9	Daw Mo Ko return in 93	Displaced to Pruso Town and Hoya in 92 began to	n/d	n/d

10	Daw Raw (Upper)	Displaced to Pruso Town and Hoya in 92 began to return in 93	n/d	n/d
11	Daw Raw (Lower)	Displaced to Pruso Town and Hoya in 92 began to return in 93	n/d	n/d
12	Ka Beh	Displaced to Pruso Town and Hoya in 92 began to return in 93	n/d	n/d
13	Doh Meh Saw	Displaced to Pruso Town and Hoya in 92 began to return in 93	n/d	n/d
14	Doh Mu Kaw	Displaced to Pruso Town and Hoya in 92 began to return in 93	n/d	n/d
15	Htee La Khu	Displaced to Pruso Town and Hoya in 92 began to return in 93	n/d	n/d
16	Haw Maw Htee	Displaced to Pruso Town and Hoya in 92 began to return in 93	n/d	n/d
17	Tay Kaw	Displaced to Pruso Town and Hoya in 92 began to return in 93	n/d	n/d
18	Ya Aye Pra	Displaced to Pruso Town and Hoya in 92 began to return in 93	n/d	n/d
19	Yoh Sa Pra	Displaced to Pruso Town and Hoya in 92 began to return in 93	n/d	n/d
20	Kaw Kaw	Displaced to Pruso Town and Hoya in 92 began to return in 93	n/d	n/d
21	Maw Shee Der	Displaced to Pruso Town and Hoya in 92 began to return in 93	n/d	n/d
22	See Sah	Displaced to Pruso Town and Hoya in 92 began to return in 93	n/d	n/d
23	Naw Kroh Ku	Displaced to Pruso Town and Hoya in 92 began to return in 93	n/d	n/d



4. Displacements in Shadaw Township

Village Cluster A

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Daw Kraw Aw	Shadaw RS	105	335
2	Daw So Kya	Shadaw RS	75	380
3	Daw Klaw Leh Phu	Shadaw RS	25	130
4	Nga Meh Loh Soh	Shadaw RS	21	110
5	Daw Klaw Leh Du	Shadaw RS	35	180
6	Baw Law Ku	Shadaw RS	20	108
7	Daw Ta Ma Nyeh	Shadaw RS	8	35

Village Cluster B

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Daw Ngu Say	Shadaw RS	25	130
2	Daw Bo Lo	Shadaw RS	30	160
3	Daw Ta Ma	Shadaw RS	15	75
4	Daw Ta Ma 2	Shadaw RS	13	68
5	Daw Taw Khu	Shadaw RS	17	90
6	Daw Klo Khu	Shadaw RS	36	183
7	Daw Pu Ee	Shadaw RS	15	80
8	Daw So Sa	Shadaw RS	40	208
9	Daw Wee Ku	Shadaw RS	10	48
10	Daw Ee Seh	Shadaw RS	n/d	n/d
11	Daw Saw Bu	Shadaw RS	9	40
12	Daw Kleh Teh	Shadaw RS	8	38

Village Cluster C

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Pleh Leh	Shadaw RS	8	39
2	See Ko Leh	Shadaw RS	70	360
3	Daw Ta Myeh	Shadaw RS	n/d	n/d
4	Daw Seh	Shadaw RS	20	97
5	Daw Ei Lah	Shadaw RS	15	77

Village Cluster D

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Daw Ta Naw	Shadaw RS / Shan State border	37	493
2	Daw Mu Leh	Shadaw RS	37	299
3	Daw Mu Seh	Shadaw RS / Shan State border	19	95
4	Naw Plo	Shadaw RS / Shan State border	13	83
5	Deh Leh	Shadaw RS	10	52
6	Daw Ta Ko	Shadaw RS	21	102
7	Daw Ka Dwi	Shadaw RS / Shan State border	24	123
8	Daw Ee Dah	Shadaw RS / Shan State border	10	34
9	Daw Naw Klu	Shadaw RS	42	202
10	Daw Teh Rah	Shadaw RS	8	42
11	Leh Du Kah	Shadaw RS / Shan State border	23	106
12	Leh Du	Shadaw RS / Shan State border	19	105
13	Daw So Maw	Shadaw RS / Shan State border	3	16

Village Cluster E

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Three Dah (East)	Shadaw RS / Shan State border	85	461
2	Daw Way Raw	Shadaw RS / Shan State border	16	95
3	So Plaw	Shadaw RS	72	423
4	Daw Naw Ku	Shadaw RS	9	29
5	Kyaw Leh	Shadaw RS / Shan State border	17	88
6	Kla Leh	Shadaw RS / Shan State border	13	44
7	Na Aung Leh	Shadaw RS / Shan State border	15	75
8	Teh Keh Baw Leh	Shadaw RS / Shan State border	21	79
9	Dee Lweh	Shadaw RS	31	139
10	Teh Keh Maw Leh	Shadaw RS	8	32
11	Three Dah (West)	Shadaw RS / Shan State border	4	22

Village Cluster F

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Daw Klaw Leh	Shadaw RS	19	95
2	Daw Klaw Ku	Shadaw RS	49	219
3	Daw Mu Mar	Shadaw RS	39	188
4	Daw Seh	Shadaw RS	32	120
5	Daw Doo	Shadaw RS	15	53
6	Daw Kraw Aw Pu	Shadaw RS	16	75
7	The Nar Leh	Shadaw RS	16	73
8	Daw Mu Say	Shadaw RS	17	80
9	Tee So Ku	Shadaw RS	8	31
10	Daw Yu	Shadaw RS	8	37
11	Daw Kee Neh	Shadaw RS	11	58
12	Daw Saw Kleh	Shadaw RS	16	92

Village Cluster G

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Sa Laung	Shadaw RS	30	173
2	Pa Leh	Shadaw RS	7	35
3	Nah Kyaing	Shadaw RS / Shan State border	11	48
4	Daw Leh Ku	Shadaw RS / Shan State border	14	76
5	Daw La Bo	Shadaw RS	17	70
6	Daw Ee Taw	Shadaw RS	15	75

Village Cluster H

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Do Ver Roh	Thai border (96)	32	131
2	Daw Tama	Thai border (96)	29	101
3	Daw Pe	Thai border (96)	31	136
4	Daw Ploh Du	Thai border (96)	30	127
5	Daw Ka Loh Ku	Thai border (96)	28	87
6	Klo Beh Leh	Thai border (96)	12	66
7	Saw Swi Leh	Thai border (96)	29	133
8	Daw Meh Kyo	Thai border (96)	17	103
9	Daw La Leh	Thai border (96)	13	83

Village Cluster I

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Daw Bu Lo Leh	Thai border (92 and 96)	27	98
2	So Ree Leh	Thai border (96)	26	128
3	Tee Ko Leh	Thai border (96)	23	130
4	Klo Tu Leh	Thai border (92 and 96)	34	153
5	Kyee Kyeh Ker	Thai border (92 and 96)	11	65
6	Daw Ta Keh	Thai border (96)	18	83
7	Ta Pleh Tee Leh	Thai border (96)	24	107

Village Cluster J

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Saw Pyi Leh	Thai border (96)	3	21
2	Hti Deh Hi Leh	Thai border (96)	10	35
3	Deh Pyar Leh	Thai border (96)	8	48
4	Daw Leh Kra	Thai border (96)	10	43
5	Law Kaw Too So	Thai border (96)	24	111
6	Huay Sa Leh	Thai border (96)	20	114
7	Meh Steh	Thai border (96)	49	219
8	So Ta War Ku	Thai border (96)	10	40

5. Displacements in Bawlake Township



Village Cluster A

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Nam Lin	Ywathit RS	15	103
2.	Lwaing Win	Ywathit RS	18	103
3	Mine Law	Ywathit RS	n/d	n/d
4	Wan Pa Gyi	Ywathit RS	25	130
5	Wam Pala	Ywathit RS	30	129
6	Wan Chai	Ywathit RS	35	217
7	Nan Noh	Ywathit RS	33	215
8	Chi Kweh	Ywathit RS	25	115
9	Sa Laung	Ywathit RS	21	115
10	Wang Au Nauk 1	Ywathit RS	17	102
11	Wang Au Nauk 2	Ywathit RS	120	768

Village Cluster B

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Htee The Keh Leh (Upper)	Camp 5 (1991)	16	125
2	Daw Du Leh	Camp 5 (1991)	21	148
3	Htee The Keh Leh (Lower)	Camp 5 (1991)	11	95
4	Kya Leh	Camp 5 (1991)	10	75

Village Cluster C

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Wan Loi	Ywathit RS	36	186
2	Per Ku Dah	Ywathit RS	14	65
3	Tee So Ku		32	152
4	Daw Ku Lee		20	95
5	Daw Leh Ku		20	95
6	Daw Ta Na		8	n/d

Displacements in Pasaung and Meh Set Townships



6. Displacements in Pasaung Township

Village Cluster A

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Paho	Displaced to an unspecified area	n/d	n/d
2	Ku Tru	Displaced to an unspecified area	n/d	n/d
3	Peh Koh Kee	Displaced to an unspecified area	n/d	n/d
4	Lay Law Tee	Displaced to Mawchi RS	n/d	n/d
5	Kayeh Chi	Displaced to an unspecified area	n/d	n/d

Village Cluster B

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Tu Doh Leh Ko	Displaced to Mawchi RS	n/d	n/d
2	Baw Taw	Displaced to an unspecified area	n/d	n/d
3	Bu Law Po	Displaced to Mawchi RS	n/d	n/d
4	Har Thay Do	Displaced to an unspecified area	n/d	n/d
5	Sho Daw Ko	Displaced to an unspecified area	n/d	n/d

Village Cluster C

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Pan Put	Displaced to an unspecified area	n/d	n/d
2	Nam Kut	Displaced to an unspecified area	n/d	n/d
3	Pahaw Ko	Displaced to an unspecified area	n/d	n/d
4	Yemupeh	Displaced to an unspecified area	n/d	n/d
5	Poh Hoh Sak	Displaced to an unspecified area	n/d	n/d
6	Baw Tar	Displaced to an unspecified area	n/d	n/d

Village Cluster D

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Geh Lo	Displaced to an unspecified area	n/d	n/d
2	Kaw Baw Hta	Displaced to an unspecified area	n/d	n/d
3	Yaw Der Ka	Displaced to an unspecified area	n/d	n/d

Village Cluster E

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Sholoh	Displaced to an unspecified area	n/d	n/d
2	Buko	Displaced to an unspecified area	n/d	n/d
3	Kawchi	Displaced to an unspecified area	n/d	n/d
4	Kathokee	Displaced to an unspecified area	n/d	n/d
5	Thee Boh	Displaced to an unspecified area	n/d	n/d

In addition, the following villages are listed as ordered to relocate to Mawchi and Pasaung relocation sites. No geographical position or population data is given for these villages.

1. Mawchi Relocation Site
Mo Sar Kee
Pwaw Per
Kaw Tu Der
Ywa Thae Doe

2. Pasaung Relocation Site
Pahaw Koe
Namku
Tha Law Lo
See Lo
Swah Pe

7. Displacements in Mae Set Township

No	Village	Displaced to	HH	P
1	Wan Keng	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
2	Meh Set	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
3	Ho Mang	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
4	Ho Set	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
5	Nam Pin Hay	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
6	Meiseinan	Not displaced	n/d	n/d
7	Ho Kyit	Displaced to an unspecified area	n/d	n/d
8	Pan Teng	Displaced to an unspecified area	n/d	n/d
9	Pan Hai	Displaced to an unspecified area	n/d	n/d
10	Nam Hoe	Displaced to an unspecified area	n/d	n/d
11	Ho Mang	Displaced to an unspecified area	n/d	n/d
12	Hay Saw Law	Not displaced	n/d	n/d

Appendix 4: Examples of Population Movements during the Displacement, Resettlement Transition Period

1. 'Nga Reh' — lived in Daw Mu Leh village, Shadaw township. Ordered to leave village. Lived in hiding for 2 years with six other families. Lived with relatives in Shan state for one year then moved to refugee camp

2. 'Gordon Htoo' — lived in Daw Law Khu village, Demawso township. Ordered to move to Htee Poh Klo. Lived in Htee Poh Klo for 3 years. Moved back to village in 1998. Moved to refugee camp in November 1998.

3. 'Mee Reh' — lived in Saw So Leh, Shadaw township. Ordered to leave village. Moved to Nwa La Boe relocation site. Returned to burnt village after 3 months, hid for 2 years near village, moved to refugee camp

4. 'Play Reh' — lived in Daw Tama village, Shadaw township. Ordered to leave village with seven days notice. Moved to Shadaw relocation site. Left the relocation site with a day pass to collect food from his village, was arrested by soldiers and kept tied in the forest for two nights before being returned to Shadaw. After two and a half months left the relocation site to hide in the forest near his village. One month later moved to the refugee camp

5. 'Naw Seng' — lived in Lin Phone Gyi village, Loikaw township. Came to the Thai border in 1998 because of the lack of water and drought in her village which resulted in diminishing farm labour opportunities for her husband. Continuous frequent demands for villages to do unpaid work at the local army base also made it difficult to maintain her family.

6. 'Lee Reh' — lived in Daw Peh village, Demawso township. Ordered to move to Daw Tama Gyi relocation site. Asked to return to the village in January 1998 by the Naga armed group. Moved to the refugee camp in December 1998

7. 'Nyee Reh' — lived in Kyu Leh village, Shadaw township. Ordered to leave the village in 1996. Moved to Tee Lone village tract in Loikaw township to stay with relatives. Moved back to Kyu Leh after one year, because there were no work opportunities in Tee Lone. Hid in the forest near his village and worked as a day labourer in Shan state when he needed to buy food. His wife gave birth to a child in the forest in 1998. Moved to the refugee camp in 1999 because his family were frequently sick and could not find food.

8. 'Paw Moo' — Moved to Pasaung town during the KNPP - SLORC ceasefire with relatives who worked for the KNPP. After the ceasefire breakdown she heard she was to be arrested so she moved to Kwachi. Fled from Kwachi during fighting in 1996 and lived in a hideout in the forest. Moved to the refugee camp in 1999.