



BUILDING A ROBUST CIVILIAN CEASEFIRE MONITORING MECHANISM IN MYANMAR: Challenges, Successes and Lessons Learned

Working Paper and Recommendations Report

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Executive Summary

Since the advent of Myanmar’s transition to democracy in 2012, peacebuilding practitioners throughout the country’s ethnic areas have begun implementing a new approach to monitoring the fragile and nascent ceasefire agreements between ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and the Union of Myanmar Government. This approach, which engages the direct participation of communities, is known as Civilian Ceasefire Monitoring, or CCM. While some CCM groups—referred to here as “mechanisms”—draw from previous experiences monitoring conflict in their regions, others are only beginning to develop the tools, practices and knowledge necessary to achieve their goals. These mechanisms are actively engaged in overcoming persistent difficulties of monitoring security, gender exclusion, communication gaps in incident reporting, and building monitor capacity. Many have fostered successful collaborations with local and international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to advance their work.

Despite this progress, significant challenges remain: monitors at village- and township-levels face insecurity and instability; many are not seen as legitimate actors by state government, EAOs or the Joint Monitoring Committee; communication gaps lead to stalled progress in reporting; response processes are inadequate and rarely reported back to communities; gender discrimination remains a persistent and often invisible impediment; and collaboration between mechanisms and the nascent Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) is often stalled. In addition, tensions remain between the stated goals of a mechanism’s focus on monitoring the breaking of a formal ceasefire agreement and engaging in the civilian protection monitoring (CPM) processes that address broader human rights issues.

This working paper presents an overview of the landscape of Myanmar’s emerging and experienced CCM mechanisms, and highlights some of the challenges, successes, and lessons learned from actors in these environments. It also offers recommendations for ways in which the international community can better support these efforts. In seeking to understand what elements are needed to build a robust mechanism in the Myanmar context, we ask: Where are CCM mechanisms operational and what do their structures look like? What issues do these mechanisms monitor and why? How do these groups operationalize their reporting processes, and what communication challenges do they face? How do mechanisms foster a response to incidents as they arise? What role does gender inclusion (and omission) play in these processes, and how do gender dynamics inform or color organizational functionality? Finally, what actions could be taken by the international community to advance the work of Myanmar’s CCM mechanisms?

We address these questions through field research in six ethnic states. As part of Mercy Corps’ Supporting Civilian Ceasefire Monitoring (SCCM) program, in March 2016, the program’s Technical Advisor and field research team visited Kayah, Kachin, Chin, Shan, Kayin, and Mon States, and conducted semi-structured interviews with a sample of mechanism representatives. We present these findings here, and offer recommendations for the international community on ways to respond to this grassroots peacebuilding environment in need of support.

These recommendations include:

1. Bolstering technical and practical support to CCM mechanisms;
2. Implementing cross-learning opportunities focused on gender;



3. Increasing research on gender and CCM;
4. Building the capacity of the nascent State and Union-level Joint Monitoring Committees (JMC);
5. Assisting with relationship management; and
6. Training in the use of a national-level incident database.

The findings presented here illuminate issues to be considered by actors supporting the work of CCM mechanisms, and build on the national-level progress being made by stakeholders in the CCM/ CPM space. Six conclusions emerged, including:

1. Mechanisms are operational across a wide range of areas, with varying capacities.
2. The discrepancy between CCM and CPM is an ongoing debate, with gender playing a significant role in influencing a mechanism's focus.
3. Reporting processes remain closed communication systems, despite use of formalized tools.
4. Response to incidents is limited, and more effective from the bottom-up rather than the top-down.
5. Mechanism functionality improves when gender inclusion strategies are in place.
6. Support systems are in place, but could be bolstered.

Introduction

Civilian ceasefire monitoring missions represent a new way of addressing the reality that as global conflicts escalate, increasing numbers of civilians bear the burden. As Nonviolent Peaceforce has documented, the end of 2012 saw over 45 million people forcibly displaced globally—the highest level in almost 20 years.¹ Many are caught in civil, rather than cross-border, conflict contexts. Such crises demand that alternative approaches are adopted by states engaging in proactive, albeit tenuous attempts at building peace.

Civilian Ceasefire Monitoring began as an answer to the failed United Nations (UN) model of armed civilian protection in contexts such as Rwanda, Bosnia and Somalia throughout the 1990's.² It differs from other peacebuilding approaches in that it engages the direct participation of communities working on the ground, rather than relying on “outside” actors (such as the UN) to monitor conflict. In the CCM approach, villagers are trained to understand the ceasefire agreements in place, and monitor incidents that breach those agreements. Often included in this work is “unarmed civilian protection monitoring,” which engages villagers’ participation in reporting on broader human rights violations (i.e. land grabbing, sexual assault). Notably, civilian ceasefire monitors must remain neutral in their efforts—making a commitment to align with neither side of an armed conflict. They also, by definition, must remain unarmed.

¹ Nonviolent Peaceforce. (2015). Donor Briefing.

² *Ibid.*



Prior research on CCM in other international contexts has pointed to obstacles of resource constraints, imbalanced and uneven monitoring capabilities, tenuous monitor neutrality, and self-censorship.³ However, there are measurable achievements through CCM interventions including “influencing armed actors to discontinue harming civilians; supporting local civilian efforts to prevent violence; strengthening community self-protection strategies; building peace infrastructures; contributing to peace negotiations at the community and regional levels; and expanding the confidence of everyday people to engage in peace promoting activities.”⁴

Civilian ceasefire monitoring mechanisms in Myanmar are diverse in their practices, goals and capacities. While some draw from previous experiences monitoring conflict in their regions, others are only beginning to develop the tools and knowledge necessary to achieve their goals. Overall, though, the mechanisms are aligned in their mission to actively monitor violations that persist in ethnic conflict areas. Additionally, all face insecurity and lack of trust in relationships with government and EAO actors,⁵ despite early efforts by the nascent JMC to encourage civilian participation in monitoring.⁶

Thus far, little has been documented about Myanmar’s CCM mechanisms, the complex, quickly changing environments in which they function, and the key issues and challenges they face. The data presented here highlights some of the obstacles and successes experienced by CCM mechanisms in Myanmar, and introduces key themes for consideration.

Background: Myanmar’s Ethnic Conflicts

In Myanmar, active armed conflict has gripped the country’s seven ethnic states for over five decades, forcing upwards of 120,000 civilians to become internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the past five years alone.⁷ Even as conflict escalated in pockets of the country, a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) was signed by eight EAOs in 2015,⁸ ushering in what many hope will be an end of armed conflict. It is within this context that civilians, spurred by a dynamic and active civil society, have begun to participate in monitoring the behavior of armed actors and their compliance with ceasefire agreements. Below is a brief overview of six of the conflict-affected ethnic states.

Kayah State, in eastern Myanmar, is the smallest of the ethnic states, and one of the poorest. The Karen National Progressive Party (KNPP), Kayah’s largest ethnic armed group currently operates in four of the state’s seven townships, with troop levels of over 600.⁹ The KNPP signed a bilateral ceasefire agreement

³ Samset, I. (2004). Trapped in the Peace Process: Ceasefire Monitoring in Sri Lanka. *The Occasional Paper Series of the Working Group on Peace Support Operations*. Nordic Research Programme on Security.

⁴ Furnari, E. Oldenhuis, H. & Julian, R. (2015): Securing space for local peacebuilding: the role of international and national civilian peacekeepers. *Peacebuilding*. DOI: 10.1080/21647259.2015.1040628].

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Mizzima. (October 20, 2015). “Public to be involved in ceasefire monitoring.” Retrieved from http://www.mizzima.com/news-domestic/public-be-involved-ceasefire-monitoring?utm_source=BurmaNet+List&utm_campaign=edfe

⁷ Kachinland News (2014). *Reflecting Humanitarian Response*. Retrieved from <http://kachinlandnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/IDP-Relief-Monitoring-Report-2014-1.pdf>

⁸ Eleven (n.d). *KIO/KIA Awaits NLD’s Invitation to Peace Talks*. Retrieved from <http://www.elevenmyanmar.com/local/kiokia-awaits-nld%E2%80%99s-invitation-peace-talks>

⁹ BNI Myanmar Peace Monitor (n.d). *Karen National Progressive Party*. Retrieved from <http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/stakeholders/armed-ethnic-groups/160-knpp>



with the Union of Myanmar (UOM) government in 2012; however, militia groups remain active,¹⁰ and IDPs, refugees and cross border migrant workers who have faced persecution, sexual violence,¹¹ and human rights abuses number in the thousands.¹² Land confiscation remains a key concern to the KNPP,¹³ who declined to sign the NCA in 2015.¹⁴

Kachin State is home to five ethnic armed organizations,¹⁵ with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) (the armed wing of the Kachin Independence Organization, or KIO) claiming ten thousand troops in five brigades.¹⁶ The KIO signed a ceasefire agreement with the central government's State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in 1994.¹⁷ Thereafter, the KIO rejected the UOM government's Border Guard Force¹⁸ plan in 2010, and in 2011 fighting resumed. Armed conflict has continued in Kachin and Northern Shan states,¹⁹ resulting in the internal displacement of over one-hundred-and-twenty thousand civilians.²⁰ The KIO declined to sign the NCA in 2015, deeming it non-inclusive.²¹

Kayin (Karen) State's primary armed group, the Karen National Union (KNU), has been operational prior to Myanmar's independence from Britain in 1948.²² Based in Thaninthary, Bago, and Mon State,²³ the KNU has since seen its organization splinter into three additional EAOs.²⁴ Land confiscation, natural resource extraction, and foreign-led development projects are ongoing concerns of citizens,²⁵ with armed actors often implicated as perpetrators.²⁶ The KNU, along with the Democratic Karen Benevolent

¹⁰ Jolliffe, K. (2015). Ethnic Armed Groups and Territorial Administration in Myanmar. Retrieved from <https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/ConflictTerritorialAdministrationfullreportENG.pdf>

¹¹ Karenni Civil Society Network (2014). Where is Genuine Peace? burmalibrary.org, pp.12. Retrieved from http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs20/KCSN-2014-12-Where_is_genuine_peace.pdf

¹² TBC (2015). The Border Consortium. Annual Report, January-December 2015, p.6. Retrieved from <http://www.theborderconsortium.org/media/67600/2015-Annual-Report-Jan-Dec.pdf>

¹³ Oudot, C. and Baudey, M. (2015). We Want a Real Peace, Not a Fake One. Retrieved from <http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/17122-we-want-a-real-peace-not-a-fake-one.html>

¹⁴ Radio Free Asia (2015). Myanmar Political Party Leaders Call For All-Inclusive Peace Accord. Retrieved from <http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/political-party-leaders-call-for-all-inclusive-peace-accord-09302015165116.html>

¹⁵ Global Security (n.d.). Kachin Independent Army. Retrieved from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/kachin.htm>

¹⁶ BNI Myanmar Peace Monitor (n.d.). Kachin Independence Organization. Retrieved from <http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/background/constitution/155-kio>

¹⁷ Kachinland News (2014). Memoirs of Kachin Peace Efforts (1994). Retrieved from <http://kachinlandnews.com/?p=25155>

¹⁸ BNI Myanmar Peace Monitor (n.d.). Border Guard Force Scheme. Retrieved from <http://mmpeacemonitor.org/background/border-guard-force>

¹⁹ Watts, J. (June 2011). Dozen killed in Burma amid clashes over Chinese dams. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/16/china-burma-hydropower-clashes>

²⁰ Kachinland News (2014). Reflecting Humanitarian Response. Retrieved from <http://kachinlandnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/IDP-Relief-Monitoring-Report-2014-1.pdf>

²¹ Eleven (n.d.). KIO/KIA Awaits NLD's Invitation to Peace Talks. Retrieved from <http://www.elevenmyanmar.com/local/kiokia-awaits-nld%E2%80%99s-invitation-peace-talks>

²² Karen National Union (n.d.). KNU History. Retrieved from <http://karennationalunion.net/index.php/burma/about-the-knu/knu-history>

²³ BNI Myanmar Peace Monitor (n.d.). Karen National Union. Retrieved from <http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/background/conflict-resumption/161-knu>

²⁴ Naing, S.Y., and Weng, L. (2014). Karen Leadership Puts Problems on Hold. Retrieved from <http://www.irrawaddy.com/burma/karen-leadership-puts-problems-hold.html>

²⁵ KHRG (2013). Losing Ground: Land Conflicts and Collective Action in Eastern Myanmar. Retrieved from <http://khr.org/2013/03/losing-ground-land-conflicts-and-collective-action-eastern-myanmar>

²⁶ KHRG (2015). With Only Our Voices, What Can We Do? Land Confiscation and Local Response in Southeast Myanmar. Retrieved from <http://khr.org/2015/06/with-only-our-voices-what-can-we-do-land-confiscation-and-local-response>



Army, and Karen National Liberation Army-Peace Council signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA).²⁷

Mon State's governing body, the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and its armed wing, the Mon National Liberation Army (MNLA) have an estimated strength of eight hundred. In 1995, they signed a ceasefire with the UOM government;²⁸ however, large-scale development projects have impacted Mon,²⁹ and in 2010 the ceasefire was broken.³⁰ The NMSP signed a second ceasefire agreement in 2012, but have abstained from signing the NCA out of protest around its non-inclusiveness of other EAOs.³¹ Following Kachin and Shan, Mon State remains one of the most highly affected regions suffering from sexual violence committed against ethnic women by the Tatmadaw.³²

Shan State is home to seven major ethnic armed groups.³³ While the Restoration Council for Shan State/Shan State Army-south (RCSS/SSA-S) and Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO) signed the NCA in 2015,³⁴ armed conflicts in the northern part of Shan State remain active, with over five thousand ethnic Shan and Ta'ang displaced in 2016.³⁵ Shan is one of the largest states suffering from sexual violence in armed conflict.³⁶

Finally, **Chin State**, a remote, isolated area of Western Myanmar with scant natural resources and little infrastructure³⁷ is one of the poorest regions in the country with the highest rates of illiteracy.³⁸ The Chin National Front (CNF) and the Chin National Army (CNA), its military apparatus, signed a bilateral ceasefire agreement in 2012,³⁹ and the CNF is now a signatory to the NCA.⁴⁰

²⁷ RFA (2015). Myanmar Signs Historic Cease-Fire Deal With Eight Ethnic Armies. Retrieved from <http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/deal-10152015175051.html>

²⁸ BNI (n.d). New Mon State Party. Retrieved from <http://mmpeacemonitor.org/component/content/article/57-stakeholders/164-nmsp>

²⁹ HURFOM (2012). Destination Unknown-Hope and Doubt Regarding IDP Resettlement in Mon State, p.21. Retrieved from <http://www.rehmonnya.org/upload/Destination-Unknown.pdf>

³⁰ Karen News. (2012). Mon armed group sign ceasefire. Retrieved from <http://karennews.org/2012/02/mon-armed-group-sign-ceasefire.html/>

³¹ Mizzima. (October 2015). NMSP Agrees with NCA But Will not Sign in October. Retrieved from <http://mizzima.com/news-domestic/nmsp-agrees-nca-will-not-sign-october/>

³² Mon News Agency (2014). Mon State Experiencing Amongst the Highest Rates of Sexual Abuse by Burmese Army. Retrieved from <http://monnews.org/2014/11/27/mon-state-experiencing-amongst-highest-rates-sexual-abuse-burmese-army/>

³³ Jolliffe. K. (2015). Ethnic Armed Conflict and Territorial Administration in Myanmar. Retrieved from <https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/ConflictTerritorialAdministrationfullreportENG.pdf>

³⁴ Ghosh. N. (2015). Myanmar Signs Ceasefire Accord with Eight of 16 Ethnic Armed Groups. Retrieved from <http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/myanmar-signs-ceasefire-accord-with-eight-of-16-ethnic-armed-groups>

³⁵ Zaw, M. (2016). Shan IDPs fear wider communal conflict. Retrieved from <http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/18994-shan-idps-fear-wider-communal-conflict.html>

³⁶ SHRF (2005). Sexual Violence by Burmese Government Troops Continues Despite Ceasefires in Shan State. Retrieved from <http://www.shanhumanrights.org/index.php/news-updates/236-sexual-violence-by-burmese-government-troops-continues-despite-ceasefires-in-shan-state>

³⁷ Bawi, S.V (n.d). Asia Pacific Sociological Association (APSA) Conference. Chin Ethnic Identity and Chin Politic in Myanmar. Retrieved from http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/Identity/Salai-Vanni-Bawi-2015-Chin_Ethnic_Identity_and_Chin_Politic_in_Myanmar-en.pdf

³⁸ Myanmar Peace Monitor. (2015). Ethnic Grievances. Retrieved from <http://mmpeacemonitor.org/background/ethnic-grievances>

³⁹ The Global New Light of Myanmar. (2015). Peace Deal Signed- President Extends Olive Branch to Those Who Haven't Signed. Retrieved from <http://globalnewlightofmyanmar.com/peace-deal-signed-president-extends-olive-branch-to-those-who-havent-signed/>

⁴⁰ *Ibid*.

Methodology

Mercy Corps conducted twelve interviews with eighteen respondents (ten male and eight female) from mechanisms in six ethnic states, including Chin, Mon, Kachin, Kayah, Shan, and Kayin.⁴¹ Eleven respondents held managerial roles in the mechanisms, while seven served as committee members. Two interviews were conducted per field site, with one focusing on mechanism functionality and the other on gender dynamics. Interviews took place in the field offices of the CCM mechanisms, lasted between forty-five minutes and one-and-a-half hours, and were audio recorded while the Technical Advisor (TA) took notes by hand. A translator and research assistant (RA) were present. Data was then transcribed, color-coded, and analyzed according to emergent themes.

Key Findings

1. Structure and Coverage

The findings indicate that **CCM mechanisms operate across a wide range of areas, according to their capacities.** At time of writing, approximately 250 monitors are working in 37 townships and 13 districts throughout Kayah, Kachin, Kayin, Shan, Chin, and Mon states. These monitors are connected to mechanisms that were initiated by and/or receive support from local Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs).⁴² Details of each mechanism's structure and coverage are outlined below.

- **Kayah State:** The Kayah State Peace Monitoring Network (KSPMN) began implementing CCM activities in 2012, with the support and collaboration of civil society groups throughout Kayah. Spurred by the KNPP and UOM Government's signing of a bilateral ceasefire agreement, KSPMN implemented a CCM mechanism with dual goals: 1) To monitor the bilateral ceasefire agreement and 2) To monitor human rights violations in the community. Currently, 35 monitors are operating throughout all seven townships of Kayah State, and a Joint Ceasefire Monitoring team of ten is active at the state level. A 25% gender quota is in place. At time of writing, KSPMN has received one of two technical trainings on monitoring.
- **Kachin State:** The Civilian Ceasefire Monitoring-Kachin State (CCM-K) mechanism plans to operate in 10 of 18 townships⁴³ with the participation of 60 monitors and a 30% gender quota for women's participation. Loosely operational since 2013, the mechanism was formed by Kachin CSOs, and includes a working committee of 23 members. At time of writing, the first technical training for monitors is being planned.

⁴¹ See Appendix for Interview Respondent Profiles

⁴² Nonviolent Peaceforce. (2015). "Reflections on Civilian Protection and Ceasefire Monitoring Efforts in Myanmar" p. 3

⁴³ States and Region of Myanmar. Retrieved from <http://www.myanmar.net/myanmar/kachin-state.htm>



- **Kayin State:** The Hser Mu Htaw CSO was formed in 2011 and operates in three of seven townships with a total of 44 monitors (four of whom are women).⁴⁴ Formed with attention to community development, the mechanism now focuses primarily on CPM, and plans to broaden its lens to include CCM. Additionally, **The Karen Women’s Empowerment Group (KWEG)** includes 38 monitors operating in four townships and includes a 30% gender quota.
- **Mon State:** The CCM Committee-Mon formed a working group of 15 members in 2013. To date, 25 monitors (five per township; 70% at the village-level) in five of the state’s ten townships are active on CCM and CPM, and have received two initial technical trainings.
- **Shan State:** The Women and Peace Action Network and New Generation CSO, in Southern Shan, are now forming a nascent mechanism dedicated to practicing CCM/CPM from a gender perspective. Plans are underway to cover thirteen districts within the 52 townships across Shan State. A 30% female gender quota will be in place
- **Chin State:** Chin’s Civilian Ceasefire Monitoring Team (CCMT) has been operational since 2012, and covers all nine townships in Chin. A total of 54 monitors and office staff (five or less women) are active, with five-member township committees overseeing five to ten monitors per township. Monitors are mandated to adopt a CCM approach.

⁴⁴ Requires verification

Table 1. CCM Mechanism Profiles

No.	Name	State	Area Covered	No. of Monitors	Focus Issues	Agreement
1	Kayah State Peace Monitoring Network	Kayah	7 townships	35 monitors	CCM	Bilateral (2012)
2	Civilian Ceasefire Monitoring - Kachin State	Kachin	10 townships	Plan to have 60 monitors for 10 townships	CCM CPM?	Bilateral (2013)
3	Civilian Ceasefire Monitoring Team- CCMT	Chin	9 townships	52 not including monitors & office staff *1- 7 women	CCM	NCA
4	Women and Peace Action Network	Shan	13 districts (planned)	* 30% gender quota	CPM (planning) CCM (soon)	NCA (only RCSS and SSAS)
5	New Youth Generation	Shan	13 districts (planned)	Not yet operational	CPM	NCA (only RCSS and SSAS)
6	Hser Mu Htaw CSO	Karen	3 townships	40 monitors *4 women	CPM CCM (future)	NCA
7	Civilian Ceasefire Monitoring Committee	Mon	5 townships - 4 in Mon - 1 in Karen	25 monitors - 5 per township	CPM	Bilateral (2011, 2012)
8	Karen Women's Empowerment Group	Karen	3 townships	38 village monitors - 4 townships - 3 villages - 3/ village	CCM CPM	NCA
9	Twee CSO	Karen	Kaokareik Tsp	?	CPM	?
10	N-Shan CCMWC	Northern Shan	Above 10 Tsp	35 monitors	CCM	Bilateral, NCA

2. Mandate

There is an ongoing tension characterizing the CCM space in Myanmar involving the question of whether mechanisms should take a CCM approach—monitoring troop movements and other incidents constituting the breaking of a formal ceasefire agreement—or whether to adopt a civilian protection monitoring (CPM) approach, which incorporates broader focus on human rights issues affecting members of the community. This tension can often be seen in the programming foci of INGO and LNGO support organizations, whose perception of the discrepancy between CCM and CPM, and what constitutes these categories, differs vastly. For example, Nonviolent Peaceforce and Nyein Foundation suggest that there is a great deal of fluidity in these categories, because, they explained, the CP focus comes out of the CCM focus, and is, in fact, part of the mandate of the bilateral agreements and NCA. Civilian protection, these actors suggest, is a way of operationalizing issues already inherent within the mandate of these agreements.⁴⁵

In contrast, Gender Development Initiative (GDI) has suggested that the ceasefire agreements in place inadequately take into account the realities of civilians living in conflict contexts. Therefore, a civilian protection focus, which takes into account a broader array of rights violations, is a preferable approach.⁴⁶

On the ground, this tension plays out across the mechanisms. The Kayah State mechanism, for example, has to date, adopted a CCM approach, focusing on monitoring the bilateral ceasefire agreement between the KNPP and the UOM government. The Kachin and Chin State mechanisms have followed suit, with a stated focus on CCM. Mechanisms in Shan, Mon, and Kayin States, however, stated a commitment to monitoring broader civilian protection issues.

Despite these seemingly clear-cut objectives, our research showed that a debate remains within the mechanisms about which mandate is most appropriate. Often, mechanism members remain uncertain about which mandate to adopt, or how to best manifest their mandate's goals. Definitions are cloudy, and capacity constraints hinder the progress toward operationalization.

We suggest that clarifying the distinctions between mandates is an important area of focus for the mechanisms in Myanmar. While overlaps and fluidity may occur, each mandate's framework nevertheless holds its own unique advantages and disadvantages. Advantages to the civilian protection

CCM VS CPM TRADEOFFS

Advantages of CCM

- *Limited scope of issues helps mechanisms stay effective*
- *Mitigates dangers of policing human rights abuses*
- *Monitors develop focused expertise*

Advantages of CPM

- *Issues are front and center in people's lives*
- *Monitors are more equipped to address them*
- *Monitors gain greater access to response actors*

⁴⁵ Personal communication with Nonviolent Peaceforce and Nyein Foundation, Yangon, May 17, 2016.

⁴⁶ Personal communication with Gender Development Initiative (GDI), Yangon, November 20, 2015.



monitoring mandate include directly addressing issues that are front and center in the lives of civilians. In addition, civilian protection issues and monitor capacity often go hand in hand. Finally, the CPM focus allows monitors greater access to response actors working to build community resilience around human rights issues.

Conversely, there are also advantages to the CCM focus. These include allowing the mechanism to focus on a limited scope of issues and reducing the risk that they will become so overstretched as to be ineffectual. Additionally, the CCM focus mitigates against potential dangers associated with “policing” human rights violations. Finally, the CCM focus allows a given mechanism to hone in on understanding the minutia of the bilateral and national ceasefire agreements in place, thereby arguably boosting the expertise of monitors working on the ground.

However, many participants felt that increased attention to CPM issues should be included in mechanism mandates. One argument for adopting the CPM focus involved the connection between development and peacebuilding work. According to one respondent from Kayin, “We found out from the community that we cannot work on development issues such as health, education, and business unless there is peace in the region.” Because of this, he explained, CPM issues should be made part of the mechanism’s mandate.

In addition, it was suggested that a CPM approach would better allow monitors to act as first responders. While the topic of civilian response will be discussed more at length below, what is important to note here is that the CPM versus CCM debate speaks to a larger question of what role the community should take in mitigating conflict. As Furnari, et al. explained, “Giving primacy to armed groups in peace negotiations, often excludes non-violent actors and the general public.” Such exclusion can be detrimental, as it can have the effect of putting too much emphasis on armed groups, which can, in turn, increase their will to re-engage in conflict.⁴⁷

Empowering communities to respond to conflict is, therefore, one way to help civilians “take back” their communities by re-framing the way conflict is viewed. A civilian protection focus, coupled with bottom-up response processes (discussed in the pages that follow), speaks to the need for increased community involvement in conflict environments.

› *Gender and the CPM/ CCM Debate*

It was found that **gender perspectives often inform the debate between CCM versus CPM**. In a number of interviews, female monitors expressed the desire for their mechanism to broaden the scope of their work to a Civilian Protection Monitoring (CPM) approach, in order to meet the

⁴⁷ Furnari, E. Oldenhuis, H. & Julian, R. (2015): Securing space for local peacebuilding: the role of international and national civilian peacekeepers, *Peacebuilding*, DOI: 10.1080/21647259.2015.1040628]. p. 6.



needs of women who face the “everyday” abuses of gender discrimination and rights violations. A CPM focus, they explained, would allow monitors to think critically about the structures that affect them, and take an active role in responding to problems in their communities.

One female Kachin respondent, for example, disagreed with her male counterparts that the mechanism’s mandate should only be to monitor the eighteen points of the bilateral ceasefire agreement. “Why don’t we also monitor other cases, for example, jade mining companies in Hpakant?” she asked. “Why monitor only the military conflicts in the field?” The respondent also gave examples of civilian protection issues such as deaths caused by the Myitsone dam project and land violations. “If they read the Agreement carefully, there’s connection to all these issues,” she said.

This response underscores the tension between the CPM and CCM focus, as well as the blurred understanding of where and how these issues are dealt within formal agreements. Without a JMC to oversee response, mechanisms are left to clarify their mandates with little more than the assistance of useful, but only occasional, technical trainings. The data highlights a gap in agreement around what, if any, civilian protection-related issues should be included in a mechanism’s mandate.

Echoing this, a female respondent from Shan explained that in order to augment monitor skills and learning, “We give awareness about civilian monitoring and related topics such as humanitarian law, human rights, gender, and [United Nations Security Council Resolution] 1325.” Land grabbing, the collection of war funds, child soldier recruitment (by EAOs and the Tatmadaw), landmines, and other humanitarian issues were also cited as important focus areas. Learning about these issues, she explained, would improve the awareness of monitors, and aid their ability to work. Again, this illustrates how gender informs perspectives on mechanism mandate, and how these perspectives, in turn, inform a mechanism’s functionality.

Conversely, monitoring groups whose mandate was strictly to monitor civilian ceasefire issues were more intent on understanding the nuances of the bilateral agreements in place, as well as the details of the NCA. While we do not yet know what implications these differences in mandate focus will have, it can be hypothesized that CCM-focused groups will be more attuned to building relationships with state and union level JMC representatives, leaving civilian protection issues to the realm of other response actors.

3. Reporting

The third area of inquiry involved assessing the communication cycles of the reporting process, and what effects, if any, formal tools had on these systems. Across the mechanisms, it was noted that **reporting**

templates are in use, with varying degrees of effectiveness.⁴⁸ While the majority of mechanisms now rely on written templates to document the details of incidents that occur, these templates are not always used properly or presented to core team members in a timely matter. Lack of awareness as to what constitutes a bi-lateral ceasefire or NCA breach can prohibit monitors at the village level from filling out reporting templates in their entirety. In addition, weak communication infrastructure (particularly in remote areas, like Chin) prevents these templates from reaching the offices of the core team in a timely manner.

Additionally, **low monitor capacity** continues to impede the reporting process in several states. As a male respondent in Chin explained, monitors often lack the literacy skills to properly fill out reporting templates and include the level of detail necessary. “It is OK that they don’t know every detail (e.g. the names of actors in EAOs),” he said, “But the problem is that they cannot write the report to be able to see a clear picture of the incident.” This concern was echoed by members of the Kayah core team, who raised concerns about monitors’ lack of literacy skills coupled with fear of being identified, should they fill out the Kayah mechanism’s reporting template.

Monitor security and identification was also identified as an ongoing area of concern and debate. Mechanism representatives reported that **monitors are often wary of identifying themselves** too transparently in reporting process, for fear of retribution from state and ethnic armed actors on whose activities they report. Responding to this concern, some INGO and LNGO support organizations have suggested that, in fact, fuller transparency be made around monitor identification in field contexts. Wearing a “badge” or T-shirt, some suggest, could help bolster the legitimacy of the mechanism members, thereby improving the functionality of reporting.⁴⁹ The debate about how best to address the issue of monitor insecurity remains ongoing.

Despite the use of these formal tools, reporting processes remain “closed” communication systems. Because state-level JMCs are still largely non-functioning, and therefore seldom considered a viable source for reporting, however,⁵⁰ the communication cycle of the reporting process in most states remains a “closed system,” with information seldom making it past the ranks of the core team. Data is stored haphazardly and not subject to analysis. It is also seldom reported to actors outside the mechanism.

REPORTING

- Reporting templates are in use, with varying degrees of effectiveness
- Low monitor capacity impedes the reporting process
- Monitors are wary of being identified
- Some incidents go unreported because of tensions in the social and political environment
- Personal relationships mark the success or failure of reporting

⁴⁸ Kayah’s KSPMN remains the only mechanism implementing a comprehensive database to track and analyze incidents

⁴⁹ Personal communication with CCM Steering Committee member organizations, Yangon, May 17, 2016.

⁵⁰ The notable exception being in Kayah, where the JMC has proven to be an effective means of eliciting response



Furthermore, it was noted that **some incidents go unreported because of tensions in the social and political environment**, with monitors and core team members making an assessment on reporting based on the shifting political and security climate.

As one respondent from Kachin explained, “Our ultimate goal of CCM is trying to support peace process and civilian protection. When we deal with cases, if it creates more problems or make the situation worse, that against our goal.” Reporting, he explained, is not always a reliable course of action in the insecure political environment of Kachin.

In addition to determining reporting procedures based on the social and political environment, respondents explained that often, **personal relationships mark the success or failure of reporting**. Since the JMC is too nascent to be trusted as an effective ally, mechanism representatives (as well as monitors themselves) rely on personal connections with leaders at the state-level and within the EAOs to navigate processes of reporting. An example of this can be seen in Chin, where a fragile relationship between the mechanism’s core team and the state representative has stalled the process of submitting reports.

These responses suggests that reporting on incidents remains an ad-hoc process that, in addition to being “closed,” is often suppressed due to perceived insecurity. The lack of trust for actors in the EAOs, the UOM government and the Tatmadaw fosters an environment reliant upon informal and often politicized processes of information sharing. In addition, because the JMC is not yet seen as an ally, personal relationships with EAO and state government representatives often mark the success or failure of the reporting process.

4. Response

The findings indicated several challenges to effective response procedures. These included lack of awareness of, and disagreement around appropriate response actors; the nascent capacity of the JMC, lack of preparedness on the part of monitors; and potential re-victimization of civilians.

Lack of awareness and disagreement as to who is most suitable to be a response actor was highlighted as a primary challenge. Within the CCM/CPM space, some stakeholders argue that all response processes should be handled by those with the authority to determine the outcome of a given ceasefire violation or civilian protection case, such as legal experts, social service providers, and government

CHALLENGES TO EFFECTIVE RESPONSE

- Lack of awareness of, and disagreement around appropriate response actors
- Nascent JMC capacity
- Lack of monitor preparedness
- Potential re-victimization of civilians



authorities. Responding to ceasefire violations, for example, is ultimately the responsibility of the JMC and relevant military actors, and cannot be undertaken by civilians. Response to broader civilian protection issues may warrant the involvement of actors such as service providers (e.g. health care providers, counselors for survivors of sexual assault) and advocacy actors (e.g. for demining or to halt recruitment of child soldiers). Ideally, identifying the appropriate response actor for a given violation would be determined by a mechanism's decision to include CCM and/or CPM issues in their mandate.

On the ground, however, incidents occurring in real time demand real-time solutions. Discussions of “the ideal” response are tempered by the reality that the JMC remains an ally of the future, but not of the present. Furthermore, relationships between mechanism members and actors in positions of authority (such as in the EAOs and government) are fragile, at best. A consistent concern emerged regarding which civilian protection incidents, if any, should be included in the response processes of CCM/ CMP mechanisms, and what role monitors at the village level should play in implementing response.

Overall, these findings indicate that **response procedures are more effective when structured from the bottom-up rather than the top-down**. A number of respondents stated that empowering monitors to respond directly to incidents serves the goals of the mechanism in ways that top down processes simply cannot. Interestingly, this perspective was most often articulated by mechanisms that incorporated both a gender lens and a CPM focus in their work. By taking on the broader roles as human rights monitors (and defenders), these mechanisms expect their monitors to play a pro-active role in the community, rather than remaining at a distance.

To further complicate this point, as with the other areas of analysis, response practices often take on gendered qualities. One female Project Manager from Kayah explained that male monitors were “braver” than female ones. “For example,” she said, “when (men) hear about the incident (related to troop movement), they just go to monitor.” Women, by contrast, cannot monitor alone and “cannot go out during the night.” Notably, the Kayah mechanism has not adopted a broader CPM approach or trained monitors to engage in direct response. Gender stereotypes, therefore, may be more at play in the attitudes of the mechanism's members toward women's ability to take on this type of work.

By contrast, one female monitor in Kayin explained that her mechanism (which actively engages a gender lens) plans to train its monitors to report incidents directly to the JMC; in essence, bypassing the need to liaise with the core team. In addition, monitors are encouraged to respond directly to incidents when necessary. Describing an incident that occurred in Kawkarek, this respondent recalled how the monitor “called us and told us, ‘we have fighting, and one woman got injured by a bomb. She needs to be sent to hospital, so we called ‘Pado Tha Damoo’,⁵¹ and he communicated with the local Tamadaw officer, and they stopped the fighting.’ Our monitor took the woman to hospital.”

⁵¹ An EAO or State government representative



This example of empowering monitors to directly intervene in armed conflict, and respond to those who are in need, demonstrates the high confidence being instilled in members of the Kayin mechanism. It can be argued that in cases such as these, in which time is of the essence, authorizing monitors to help civilians in distress improves the health of the overall community.

The benefits of direct response are complicated, however, by the potential problem of “re-victimizing” female monitors who suffer the trauma of gender-based violence. As representatives from Nyein Foundation explained, monitors who are not well trained to identify and respond sensitively to issues of sexual violence, for example, risk doing more harm than good. For this reason, some LNGOs suggest that such training be implemented to a select group of first responders, rather than to all monitors. At time of writing, this discussion continues, with planning underway to train select groups in such techniques (personal communication with Nyein Foundation, March 31, 2016). Implementing this type of programming also raises the need for referral systems within the monitoring mechanisms—allowing monitors to connect with other actors who are able to advocate with impunity.

Communication Conduits

We suggest that despite these concerns, monitors who are trained to directly respond to incidents are generally more confident in solving problems in their communities. Such monitors are empowered to help meet the needs of communities in ways that top down response structures, still largely ineffective, do not allow. As such, these monitors act as “communication conduits,” forming ties on the ground, educating communities about the issues that affect their lives, and providing communities with the opportunity to reflect on these issues in meaningful ways.

5. Gender Inclusion

In analyzing the interview data, gender, while initially thought of as being a separate factor from a mechanism’s overall functionality, took on a sweeping role. It was found that **a correlation exists between the overall functionality of a mechanism, and increased attention to gender inclusion strategies.**

To elaborate on this finding, it is important that we first define “functionality”—the benchmark against which we analyze the impact of attention to gender. Here, functionality is identified as “sophisticated approaches to tackling problems faced by the mechanism as a whole.” Clear operational practices, fluid communication, and trust between and among actors in the mechanism, and well-thought out reporting processes and response strategies all fall under the purview of “functionality.”

Effects of strong gender inclusion strategies

Formalized gender inclusion strategies were discussed by mechanisms in Kayin, Shan and Mon states. These groups demonstrated conscious efforts to include women’s voices in decision-making processes, and incorporated women in leadership positions, or in other roles on par with their male counterparts.



An example can be seen in the nascent Shan mechanism, led by a woman with a background in women's rights. Recognizing the need to include women in numerous aspects of the peace process, the Shan mechanism's primary mandate is to "initiate civilian monitoring from a women's perspective."

Explaining the motivation behind this, the leader elaborated: "When I look at things with a gender lens, I see that women have no chance to be in decision-making roles in society regardless of their potential, activeness, and abilities to think critically. I realize that women have the capabilities but they just need opportunity and space to participate. To promote women's participation, we cannot do this individually. We need networking and cooperation. Therefore, I started this network."

Additionally, mechanisms in which gender was made a conscious priority appeared less held back by top-down structures (such as reliance on the state-level JMC to respond to incidents) and communication challenges (such as the limitations of mobile network accessibility). An example can be seen in the case of Mon mechanism, which integrated direct, bottom-up response practices into their work, rather than waiting for the nascent state-level JMC to respond to issues in the community. The Kayin mechanism, which also focused directly on gender inclusion, similarly authorized monitors to communicate directly with service providers, armed actors, and others in positions of power who could respond to incidents. As such, these monitors were encouraged to operate as community advocates, arguably strengthening their social influence.

Effects of weak gender-inclusion strategies

By contrast, mechanisms in Kachin, Kayah, and Chin demonstrated comparably less commitment to including women's voices in their structures and processes. It can be argued that this, in turn, affected the overall functionality of the mechanism. Women from these mechanisms consistently reported being silenced in meetings, excluded from decision-making processes, and discouraged from working as monitors. This negative feedback, they explained, came from the community, their families, and male members of the mechanisms.

Women reported that this negativity led to decreased communication, trust and understanding between them and their male counterparts. One respondent from Chin, for example, described the disparity between women's experiences and men's perceived understanding of them: "We are like fish which are kept in the pot, not in the ocean," she said. "We feel that when we are in water, we have life, but it has a boundary and limitation. We can't go anywhere. That's reality. But when we discuss this with men they don't agree." This respondent linked her frustration about feeling "kept in a pot" to her stunted role within the mechanism. "In big meetings, if women speak much, men will think we just talk nonsense," she explained. She then described the experience of attending meetings with CCM mechanism leaders, trying to express an opinion, but receiving no response. As a result, she explained, the Chin mechanism accomplished less than it otherwise would if male members listened to the perspectives, ideas, and suggestions of their female counterparts.



Low numbers of women’s participation as monitors was also cited as a barrier to mechanism functionality. “We need women monitors,” one female respondent said plainly. “Women are more appropriate persons to talk to other women who have been violated. I also think that women are more skilled in communication and coordination than men.”

A stark example of these low numbers could be seen in Chin, where it was reported that fewer than five women monitors are active, and often face stigmatization from the community. In response, several female respondents expressed a desire to form their own women’s CCM groups. Doing so, they explained, could allow their voices to be heard.

6. Support

The final area of inquiry involved the support that CCM mechanisms are receiving from INGOs, LNGOs and donors, and whether and how mechanisms’ overall support needs are being met. The findings showed that **support systems are in place, but could be bolstered**. At time of writing, five out of the six mechanisms interviewed are receiving technical support in the form of trainings on monitoring procedures, reporting and response.⁵² Much of this support, however, comes in the form of human resources (e.g., technical support, including trainings and mentorings) and does not encompass operational and institutional support. Key gaps in support include funding for monitor stipends, monitor travel costs and mechanism personnel.

In addition, support for building the capacities of mechanisms to raise community awareness was highlighted. A number of mechanisms stated the need to augment their communication and information sharing abilities with the community. Respondents stressed the importance of increasing bottom-up audience awareness—that is, awareness within communities, rather than within

› GAPS IN SUPPORT

- Funding for monitor stipends
- Funding for monitor travel
- Funding for mechanism personnel
- Support for raising community awareness
- Support for clarification of CCM/CPM mandate
- Support in understanding range of response actors available and developing relationships
- Support to improve gender inclusion
- Support for developing strategies to increase legitimacy
- Support for development of wide response network that includes diverse local and international actors
- Support for national coordination and advocacy efforts
- Support for increased coverage of conflict affected areas
- Provision of cross-learning opportunities

⁵² A comprehensive analysis of support organizations and their structures went beyond the scope of this study and thus, is not reflected here.



external audiences—on CCM and CPM issues.

This identified need responds to a gap in community awareness about ceasefire issues and the peace process more broadly. Communities, many respondents explained, often have little to no knowledge about the ceasefire agreements in place. For example, a respondent in Kachin described the mechanisms' mandate to oversee a bilateral ceasefire agreement that had been signed between the KIA and the UOM Government in 2011. The problem, this respondent explained, was that most of the general public, as well as large numbers of KIA themselves, was not aware of the existence of the agreement, let alone the terms stipulated within it. Compounding this was the difficulty in reaching the KIA to bolster their awareness. To do this, he explained, the mechanism sought to work through the community itself. "We are trying to reach them through the public, like a forest fire," he said.

The image of awareness "rippling" through a community like a forest fire is evocative and powerful. Indeed, "outward" communication was not on the agenda of these CCM mechanisms. Rather, increased support for community awareness activities was cited as an objective, and a way in which international organizations could offer support.

In addition, respondents stated that financial support—for example, funding for food, transportation and monitor's time—could help strengthen the mechanisms. Often, they explained, monitors worked several jobs and served as volunteers. Because of this, they lacked the time and funds needed to conduct their work. As noted by a male respondent in Kayin, "We cannot support the monitors, and they have to take care of their family's needs. They cannot give enough time to do the monitoring job."

"We need some kind of MOU between locals and NGOs so that we can work in more transparent and accountable way," another elaborated. "Sometimes our monitors have to come from so far—at least twenty miles—to report. But we cannot support them even for local transportation, which makes me feel so bad. The roads are bad and transportation is not good, and they have to travel with motorbike, on foot, etc. If we can support our monitors, they can work with more focus, and more effectiveness."



Opportunities for Action

The data presented here suggest that there are several actions the international community can take to improve support for Myanmar's CCM mechanisms:

1. Increase technical support and to CCM and CPM mechanisms

INGOs and LNGOs should prioritize strengthening the foundational elements of mechanisms. Areas of increased support could include:

- Defining and clarifying the scope of the CCM/CPM mandate
- Understanding the range of response actors available and develop relationships
- Improving gender representation and participation
- Developing strategies to increase legitimacy among state and armed actors

2. Support institutional capacity of CCM mechanisms

Supporting organizations could increase funding benchmarked for core funds and organizational development, thereby bolstering the capacity of mechanisms to help meet the basic needs of monitors.

3. Increase research on gender and CCM

The correlation between gender inclusion strategies and improved mechanism functionality suggests that CCM mechanisms and the organizations supporting them would benefit from further research on this topic. Such research could ask:

- How do socio-cultural dynamics influence gender dynamics with CCM mechanisms?
- How do women and men experience monitoring work differently, and what are the implications of these experiences?
- What knowledge frames do women in Myanmar bring to monitoring (and peacebuilding work more broadly), and how do these compare with other examples of international practice?
- What barriers exist between women working in different organizational spheres of peacebuilding, and how do they inform women's experiences in these environments?
- How do constructions of masculinity inform the gender dynamics of CCM?

4. Provide cross-learning opportunities

Mechanism members expressed the desire to share information, learn from each other's experiences and build practical skills. The INGO and LNGO community could bolster their work at the national level by providing opportunities across a range of topics, such as: practical tools for monitoring, reporting, and response. Taking the requests of female monitors to heart, gender dynamics in CCM/ CPM could also be prioritized. Cross-learning workshops could be designed to engage an array of participants, and include curricula challenging them to reflect on processes at play within the mechanisms.

5. Build capacity of the JMC and assist with relationship management

The international community can play a positive role in creating linkages between the mechanisms and "top down" response actors. As "outside" actors, the international community is in a unique position to help



build the capacity of the JMC and manage relationships between mechanisms and response actors. While the international community's role is not to step in and respond directly to incidents, mechanisms have asked for support in managing these new and often fragile relationships.

6. Facilitate the creation of a national-level incident database

CCM/CPM mechanisms are only beginning to document incidents that occur in their communities. Helping to collect, organize and analyze these incidents could assist monitoring mechanisms working to respond to conflict. A national level incident database capturing trends in conflict patterns could help make Myanmar's conflict landscape more legible, and empower mechanisms to develop more targeted approaches.

Limitations

This qualitative study is limited in its small sample size; thus, further research is needed to conclusively verify details of each mechanism's operations. The study is, nonetheless, intended to provide a preliminary road map for understanding some of the challenges and successes of CCM and CPM mechanisms in Myanmar.

Conclusion

This paper introduces a basic framework for analyzing the work of nascent and experienced CCM mechanisms in Myanmar. In this study, we asked: Where are CCM mechanisms operational in Myanmar and what do their structures look like? What do the mechanisms monitor and why? How do mechanisms operationalize their reporting processes and what communication challenges do they face? How do mechanisms respond to incidents as they arise? How do the dynamics of gender play a role in the above questions? What steps and actions by the INGO and LINGO community are needed in order to advance the work of Myanmar's emerging CCM mechanisms?

The findings indicate that mechanisms are active in 37 townships and 13 districts, with monitoring coverage mirroring the capacities of the mechanisms; CCM vs. CPM is an ongoing debate, with gender playing a role in influencing a mechanism's focus; reporting processes remain closed communication systems despite use of formal tools; response procedures are more effective when structured from the bottom-up rather than the top-down; mechanism functionality improves when gender inclusion strategies are in place; and support systems are in place, but could be bolstered.

In order to advance the work of CCM mechanisms and increase global understanding of the challenges they face, supporting organizations should continue to work together, finding innovative ways to meet the needs of actors within this dynamic environment. Myanmar stands at the precipice of unparalleled transformation. Collaboration is the key to supporting this process, and to improving the lives of those for whom conflict has been, and threatens to remain, a constant.



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Appendix
Interview Respondent Profiles

No.	Role in Organization	Gender	Mechanism Name	State
1	Project Manager	F	Kayah State Peace Monitoring Network-KSPMN	Kayah
2	1. Project Manager 2. General Secretary (CCM-K) 3. Working Committee member	M M M	1. Shalom Foundation 2. Civilian Ceasefire Monitoring-Kachin State (CCM-K) 3. CCM- K	Kachin
3	Assistant Secretary for CCM-Working Committee	F	CCM -K	Kachin
4.	1. Secretary (CCMT,CPTC) 2. Committee member (CPTC) 3. Assistant Secretary (CCMT)	M M M	CCMT-Chin	Chin
5	Committee member (CCMT)	F		Chin
6	Founder & Coordinator	F	Women & Peace Action Network (Shan State)	Shan
7	Organizing Leader	M	New Generation (Shan State)	Shan
8	Chairman	M	Hser Mu Htaw CSO	Karen
9	1. Monitor 2. Monitor	F F		Karen
10	Secretary (CCM Committee) Assistant Secretary (CCM Committee)	M M	(CCM-Mon state)	Mon
11	Township Coordinator	F	(CCM-Mon state)	Mon
12	Area Manager	F	Karen Women's Empowerment Group-KWEG	Karen



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About Mercy Corps

Mercy Corps is a leading global organization powered by the belief that a better world is possible. In disaster, in hardship, in more than 40 countries around the world, we partner to put bold solutions into action — helping people triumph over adversity and build stronger communities from within. Now, and for the future.



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