This report is produced by the Durable Peace Programme Consortium.

First and foremost, thank you to all interviewees that participated in the survey. Their willingness to give their time and discuss sensitive issues made this research possible. We hope the results can contribute to a more equitable future for all communities in Kachin.

This research was also achieved through the extensive contributions and expertise from all members of the Durable Peace Programme consortium, including Kachin Baptist Convention, Karuna Myanmar Social Services, Metta Development Foundation, Nyein (Shalom) Foundation, Oxfam, SwissAid, and Trócaire, in addition to their partners for the Durable Peace Programme, Airavati, BRIDGE, Candlelight Library, Kachin Development Group, Kachin Relief and Development Committee, Kachin State Civil Society Network, Kachin Women’s Association, Kachin Women’s Peace Network, Loiyang Bum Community Development, Mingalar Development Foundation, Myitkyina Lisu Baptist Association, Namkyeo Prahita Foundation, Naushawng Development Institute, Pyoe, RANIR, Sindun Network Group, Uak Thon Local Social Development Organization and Wunpawng Ninghtoi.

Thank you to all staff and volunteers for your contributions and commitment.

**Contact:**
Oxfam (on behalf of the Durable Peace Programme)
No. 34 Corner of Aung Taw Mu Lane & Golden Hill Avenue.
Yangon, Myanmar.
Ph. (95) 01539986
www.oxfam.org.uk/myanmar

Cover photo: (c) David Hempenstall/Oxfam

This publication has been produced with the assistance of the European Union. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the Durable Peace Programme and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union.
Contents

Acronyms .................................................. 3
Key Definitions ........................................ 3
Executive Summary .................................. 4
Introduction ............................................. 6
Interpreting the Results ............................ 6
Kachin Context ......................................... 8
Survey Results ......................................... 10
  Demographic Overview ............................. 11
  Socioeconomic Situation .......................... 13
  Food Security ...................................... 16
  Gender Dynamics .................................... 18
Conflict, Security and Levels of Trust .......... 21
Peace Process: Opportunity, Participation and Influence 28
Return and Resettlement .......................... 35
Linkages to Authorities ............................. 39
Health .................................................... 41
Future Development .................................. 42
Conclusions ............................................ 43
Methodology ........................................... 45
## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Camp Management Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>Durable Peace Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-based Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCA</td>
<td>(Myanmar) Government controlled area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally-displaced person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHL</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IQR</td>
<td>Inter quartile range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRRC</td>
<td>IDP and Refugee Relief Committee (of KIO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCA</td>
<td>KIO controlled area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIO/A</td>
<td>Kachin Independence Organisation/Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>non (Myanmar) Government Controlled Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-government organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>Unexploded ordinance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Key Definitions

**KCA/NGCA and GCA**

There is contestation over the terms used to describe areas controlled by the Kachin Independence Organisation/Army (KIO/A) with some preferring 'KIO-controlled' and others preferring 'non-government-controlled.' Throughout this report, the term 'GCA' refers to (Myanmar) Government-controlled areas and 'KCA/NGCA' refers to KIO-controlled / non-government-controlled areas. Although unwieldy, KCA/NGCA is utilised for conflict sensitivity purposes.

**Non-IDP**

Non-internally-displaced person (IDP) refers to both host communities (those that are hosting IDPs) and other conflict-affected communities. The term essentially refers to communities who have not been displaced.
Executive Summary

This endline report builds upon the foundations of the Durable Peace Programme’s (DPP) baseline report with two significant years in between data collection.

The baseline data was collected over October and November 2015 – an extremely hopeful time in Myanmar’s recent history. A National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) had just been signed (albeit not by the KIO/A) and expectations of the peace process were high – as were expectations for landmark democratic elections held on 8 November 2015.

Also conducted over October and November in 2017, the context for the endline data collection was very different. In the past two years, armed conflict has escalated significantly, the peace process has largely stalled and the humanitarian situation has deteriorated for the over 100,000 IDPs in camps, including the re-displacement of over 6,000 IDPs in early-2017 and new displacement in Tanai in mid-2017. It is hoped that the comparative results of the two surveys can stimulate consideration and improved action related to these contextual changes.

The responses to each question provide many insights into the current context. The following are six headline findings but readers are encouraged to look at the complete data and analysis to help inform further understanding of Kachin.

Worsening cross-sectoral situation in KCA/NGCA:

- **Security**: KCA/NGCA IDPs report an increased sense of threat from armed conflict. Since the collection of data from the baseline report, the situation in Kachin has considerably worsened with a sharp escalation in armed conflict over the past two years. IDPs identify attacks by armed groups (particularly the Tatmadaw) as the greatest threat to their security. Increased military operations, including the use of airstrikes and heavy artillery in close proximity to IDP camps and populated areas, have increased the number of civilian casualties and injuries, impacting negatively on security.

- **Vulnerability**: The endline figures indicate increased vulnerability on a number of fronts, including loss of livelihood and worsening physical security. The most pronounced difference between the endline and baseline findings is a decline in incomes across all quartiles for KCA/NGCA IDPs. In this context, the bottom 75% remain extremely vulnerable with the bottom 25% reporting no income at all over the 12 months previous to the survey.

- **Socioeconomic**: The socioeconomic situation for IDPs in KCA/NGCA has substantially deteriorated in terms of cash incomes and savings. Although there has been some increase in food savings, IDPs are eating an increasingly narrow diet. This steep decline is worrying, and highlights an urgent need to comprehensively address restrictions on the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the limitations on peoples’ movements in and to KCA/NGCA (and any other areas facing such restrictions). This should, at least in part, alleviate some stress on the socioeconomic situation for IDPs. KCA/NGCA IDPs also have the highest levels of income inequality between quartiles even as they report the overall lowest levels of income.

- **Freedom of movement**: Freedom of movement has sharply decreased for IDPs, whereby newly erupted conflict has given way to increased restrictions on travel between locations and growing
displacements, many of which are people now unable to return to their place of origin. Restrictions on freedom of movement negatively affect the ability for IDPs to access basic services like health and education, alongside hampering access to labour markets. These restrictions further curtail the delivery of humanitarian assistance to people in need.

**Increasing reports of GBV and growing perception of its acceptability:**

Alarmingly, survey results show an increase in the number of IDPs who agree that husbands are justified in beating their wives in various situations. There was also an increase across all groups of respondents agreeing that domestic violence was a problem in their community. The impact of conflict on gender-based violence is well documented, including in the Kachin context. This requires urgent and sustained attention.

**Reduced engagement with the peace process:**

Findings indicate a decline in the belief that community/women’s priority issues are being included in the peace process. There has also been a decline in people’s knowledge about KIO-government negotiations. These findings are not surprising given the dynamics of the peace process itself. Women’s representation in the peace process discussions has been inadequate and further attention is needed to ensure that women’s voices and views are sufficiently represented in formal peace process dialogues – even as there is an urgent need for all stakeholders to make efforts to get the peace process itself back on track in Kachin.

**IDPs preference is for return:**

The results of the endline reinforce both that IDPs overwhelmingly want to return to their land of origin and that the primary barriers to their return are directly linked to the failure of the peace process in Kachin. There has also been a significant decline in the percentage of people that want to be resettled elsewhere. The three main barriers to return reported by IDPs in this endline study are:

- the presence of armed actors
- presence of landmines
- active armed conflict

If stakeholders wish to respect IDPs’ preference to return, then these issues must be comprehensively addressed – which will require a cessation of armed conflict and negotiated political settlement.

**Contrast between NGCA/KCA and GCA:**

Responses across different themes indicate that NGCA/KCA IDPs appear to often have greater confidence and trust with local authorities than GCA IDPs do, with KCA/NGCA IDPs perceiving the KIO to be more responsive to their needs than GCA IDPs perceiving the government to be.

**Non-IDP respondents are better off than IDP respondents:**

Although the small sample size of the non-IDP population compared to that of the IDP population means results must be treated with caution, this is a trend that was also found in the baseline results.
Introduction

This report presents the perceptions of conflict-affected communities, particularly IDPs, who bear the brunt of the negative impacts of armed conflict in Kachin. The intention is to provide insights into community experiences and perceptions alongside broader contextual changes. This research is intended to inform diverse actors about the current situation in Kachin, inform policy, and contribute to the development of interventions that are better tailored to community needs.

This report is not intended as an assessment of the DPP’s impact and programme beneficiaries have not been disaggregated in the data.

Interpreting the Results

The complexities of Kachin pose challenges to the analysis and presentation of data. Multiple systems of governance, geography, proximity to natural resources or armed conflict, gender, and the varying experiences of different ethnic and religious communities (amongst other issues) all influence people’s actual situation and their perceptions of it, and could be used as the basis of comparison. To enable comparison with baseline data, three categories of disaggregation are presented in this report: non-IDPs, KCA/NGCA IDPs and GCA IDPs.

An analysis of gender disaggregation was done for each question but numbers are only presented where there is more than a 5% difference in responses between male and female interviewees.

It should be noted that, as with the baseline, because the survey only took place in locations where the DPP has programme activities (even though not intended as an assessment of DPP impact), the proportion of IDPs to non-IDPs is very high (1901 to 454) and the majority of non-IDPs surveyed came from only five townships (Mogaung, Mohnyin, Momauk, Myitkyina and Waingmaw). This means that, while the non-IDP data gives a good indication of changes to the situation of these people between baseline and endline surveys, comparison between IDP and non-IDP respondents must be treated with some caution as such a small sample size is not necessarily reflective of the situation of the entire non-IDP population of Kachin state.
Before engaging with the results, the following are key guidance notes:

• Each question is included as it appeared in the survey (Jinghpaw¹ or Myanmar was used when interviewing), followed by results;
• The data should be understood as perceptions indicative of lived experience – DPP recognises the challenges and limitations of collecting such data;
• Comparisons with the baseline are generally only included where there is more than a five-percentage point difference;
• Gender comparisons are generally only included where there is more than a five-percentage point difference;
• The analysis is at a macro level of non-IDPs, KCA/NGCA IDPs and GCA IDPs, but it must be borne in mind that – as above – within Kachin there are significant variances impacting analysis;
• Total percentage is not always 100 because a) some respondents may not have answered; b) very small percentages are excluded in order to streamline presentation of large amounts of data; and c) interviewees were able to provide multiple responses for certain questions;
• While charts show percentages to one decimal place, narrative analysis rounds them off to the nearest whole number
• In some survey questions, bracketed clarifications have been added to ease comprehension.

The Durable Peace Programme

Spanning the period February 2015 to July 2018, the DPP is delivered by a consortium of 26 local, national and international organisations, to support peace, development and reconciliation in Kachin. Funded by the European Union through a 7 million Euro grant, the DPP’s intervention is framed through four specific objectives:

1. To support greater community participation and influence in peace processes, particularly for women and youth
2. To support the peace process through improving trust and reconciliation
3. To link relief with rehabilitation and development by supporting improved education and livelihoods outcomes
4. Local authorities and community structures are more receptive to community peace and development needs

¹Jinghpaw a language spoken in Kachin State and Yunnan, China.
Kachin Context

Conflict Dynamics

The KIA and Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw) have been in conflict since the 1960s. The latest iteration of armed conflict is the result of a ceasefire collapsing in 2011. This rapidly led to the displacement of over 100,000 people, nearly all of who remain displaced today. Experiences of displacement are traumatic, often involving fleeing into the jungle, losing livelihoods and property, and being subject to violence. Six years since fighting resumed, peace remains elusive – indeed, between the baseline and endline surveys, the intensity of armed conflict increased significantly, particularly in late-2016 and mid-2017. Protracted displacement perpetuates existing trauma and hardship, while new emerging issues exacerbate these realities, such as widespread fear among IDPs of losing their land of origin. The situation remains tense and volatile, with serious allegations of human rights abuses and breaches of international humanitarian law.

Social Dynamics

As elsewhere in Myanmar, ethnic identity is a complex and sensitive issue in Kachin state and is closely linked to religious and political identities. Kachin has a large population of ethnic Kachin often understood to be comprised of six 'sub-groups', with the Jinghpaw the majority within these. Most Kachin are Christian, with many either from the Kachin Baptist Convention or the Catholic Church, though there are numerous other smaller denominations as well. Kachin state also has a large, predominantly Buddhist, Bamar population; a significant majority-Buddhist Shan-Ni population; a notable Buddhist Rakhine population centred around Hpakant; and smaller communities of Muslims, Hindus and people of Chinese-descent. The KIO is often strongly associated with the Baptist Jinghpaw community, though not exclusively. Many ethnic minorities associate the Tatmadaw with the Bamar. Kachin also has multiple ethnically-based militia groups and a government-aligned Border Guard Force that draws many of its members from non-Jinghpaw Kachin ethnic groups. The complex relationship between these different identities, associated political narratives and composition of armed groups is important for contextualising this end-line data.

Natural Resources

Kachin is one of the most resource rich areas in Myanmar, with expansive mining and timber industries generating a great deal of wealth, which is inequitably shared. These industries are contributing to major environmental and social problems, and are seen as significant drivers of armed conflict. However, the Kachin conflict is largely rooted in contestation over ethnic autonomy and governance and, while control over resources is extremely important, conflict in Kachin should not be reduced to only a natural resource issue.

---

2 Jinghpaw, Lachid, Lisu, Lhaovo, Rawang, Zaiwa.
Conflict Dynamics

The KIA and Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw) have been in conflict since the 1960s. The latest iteration of armed conflict is the result of a ceasefire collapsing in 2011. This rapidly led to the displacement of over 100,000 people, nearly all of whom remain displaced today. Experiences of displacement are traumatic, often involving fleeing into the jungle, losing livelihoods and property, and being subject to violence. Six years since fighting resumed, peace remains elusive – indeed, between the baseline and endline surveys, the intensity of armed conflict increased significantly, particularly in late-2016 and mid-2017. Protracted displacement perpetuates existing trauma and hardship, while new emerging issues exacerbate these realities, such as widespread fear among IDPs of losing their land of origin. The situation remains tense and volatile, with serious allegations of human rights abuses and breaches of international humanitarian law.

Social Dynamics

As elsewhere in Myanmar, ethnic identity is a complex and sensitive issue in Kachin state and is closely linked to religious and political identities. Kachin has a large population of ethnic Kachin often understood to be comprised of six ‘sub-groups’², with the Jinghpaw the majority within these. Most Kachin are Christian, with many either from the Kachin Baptist Convention or the Catholic Church, though there are numerous other smaller denominations as well. Kachin state also has a large, predominantly Buddhist, Bamar population; a significant majority-Buddhist Shan-Ni population; a notable Buddhist Rakhine population centred around Hpakant; and smaller communities of Muslims, Hindus and people of Chinese-descent. The KIO is often strongly associated with the Baptist Jinghpaw community, though not exclusively. Many ethnic minorities associate the Tatmadaw with the Bamar. Kachin also has multiple ethnically-based militia groups and a government-aligned Border Guard Force that draws many of its members from non-Jinghpaw Kachin ethnic groups. The complex relationship between these different identities, associated political narratives and composition of armed groups is important for contextualising this end-line data³.

Natural Resources

Kachin is one of the most resource rich areas in Myanmar, with expansive mining and timber industries generating a great deal of wealth, which is inequitably shared. These industries are contributing to major environmental and social problems, and are seen as significant drivers of armed conflict. However, the Kachin conflict is largely rooted in contestation over ethnic autonomy and governance and, while control over resources is extremely important, conflict in Kachin should not be reduced to only a natural resource issue⁴.

Governance and Humanitarian Dynamics

Kachin has complex parallel governance systems. In KCA/NGCA (and even GCA), the KIO is often viewed by ethnic Kachin as a legitimate governing authority, and plays a significant role in service delivery (such as education or health) and dispute resolution. The KIO’s IDP and Refugee Relief Committee (IRRC) plays a major role in coordinating the humanitarian response in KCA/NGCA, with the IRRC also being involved in Camp Management Committees (CMCs) in these areas. In GCA, nearly all camps are managed by a CMC independent of government authorities, with civil society providing the bulk of coordination, primarily through the Joint Strategy Team, with international institutions providing support. The Myanmar government presence in IDP camps is minimal, although there have been some instances of support in 2017. For example, in Maina KBC camp in Waingmaw township, Myanmar authorities installed electric lines and light bulbs outside of each dwelling ahead of the State Counsellor’s visit.

Alongside the escalating armed conflict and in light of increasing humanitarian need, yet declining assistance, the situation for IDPs in Kachin continues to deteriorate. This is evident from many of the results emerging from interviews for this report. A cessation of violence is urgently needed but must also be matched with a broader political settlement and reconciliation if durable solutions to displacement are to be found.
Survey Findings

Location of Interviewees:

**MYANMAR: IDP Sites in Kachin and northern Shan States (Sep 2015)**

Note: interview locations are largely the same as the baseline, but with the number of interviewees increasing from 2,206 to 2,354.
Demographic Overview

Key Points on the Main Subgroups:
- The gender imbalance in the data is due to two main factors: women being more available during the day as men are often away working, and women making up the majority in camps. The overall gender balance is comparable with the baseline, which was 67% female and 33% male.
- The disproportionate amount of ethnic Kachin respondents is a reflection of ethnic Kachin making up the majority of displaced people.
- All non-IDPs interviewed are from GCA only and are nearly all located rurally. This is a reflection of DPP target areas, rather than a deliberate survey strategy.
- KCA/NGCA interviewees are concentrated in the border areas, whereas GCA interviewees are located across more than ten townships.

The percentage of people possessing national identity cards remained consistent with the baseline, highlighting a need to expand the provision of identity cards. These cards are a necessary tool for improving freedom of movement in a context of heightening militarisation and checkpoints. Identity cards are also critical for enabling access to basic services (such as health and education).

Percentage breakdown of main subgroups featured throughout the analysis:

Ethnicity:
- Jinghpaw (Kachin) 58.8%
- Lisu (Kachin) 13.6%
- Lacha (Kachin) 6.2%
- Lhaovo (Kachin) 6.3%
- Zaiwa (Kachin) 3.7%
- Shan-Bamar 1%
- Rawang 2.5%
- Bamar 2.8%
- Shan 3.8%
- Shan-Ni .7%
- Other .6%

Religion:
- Christian (Baptist) 65.1%
- Christian (Catholic) 22.4%
- Buddhist 7.8%
- Christian (other) 6.6%

Literacy:
- 89%
- 79.4%
- 81.3%

Total number:
- Non-IDPs 421
- KCA/NGCA IDPs 620
- GCA IDPs 1281
- Women IDPs 11
**Education:**

- No education
- Primary school
- Middle school
- High school Diploma
- University

% reporting highest level of completion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>30</th>
<th>35</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle school</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school Diploma</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**National Identity Card:**

% possessing national identity card

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household member^5</th>
<th>Non-IDPs</th>
<th>KCA/NGCA IDPs</th>
<th>GCA IDPs</th>
<th>Women IDPs</th>
<th>Men IDPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>You</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child one</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child two</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child three</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child four</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**For each type of media, indicate how often you get information on public issues:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media Type</th>
<th>Non-IDPs</th>
<th>KCA/NGCA IDPs</th>
<th>GCA IDPs</th>
<th>Women IDPs</th>
<th>Men IDPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Websites</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whatsapp/ Viber/etc.</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facebook</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-based organisation</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workshops/ meetings</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Word of mouth/ friends</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% accessing at least 2–3 times per month

^5 Member one indicates interviewee, with other family members usually listed from oldest to youngest.
Socioeconomic situation

Interquartile ranges (IQRs)

One of the more pronounced differences between the endline and the baseline is a decline in income amongst all respondents except upper-quartile non-IDPs – with a particularly significant decline in incomes of KCA/NGCA IDPs across all quartiles. Of special concern is the bottom-quartile of KCA/NGCA IDPs who reported no income at all over the last twelve months. This decline may be evidence of the impacts of escalating armed conflict, extensive restrictions on the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and/or a broader indication of a very suppressed cash economy for KCA/NGCA IDPs and economic disruption for non-IDPs and GCA-IDPs including difficulties in the movement of goods and labour market saturation.

Only the highest earning quartile of non-IDP respondents reported an increase in income compared to the baseline but, for all groups, there remains a high level of inequality across quartiles and particularly when it comes to upper-quartile incomes. Income inequality is most pronounced amongst IDP respondents (although noting the difficulty of comparing IDP to non-IDP responses in this data). Upper-quartile IDP incomes in both KCA/NGCA and GCA are around three times higher than the Q3 average and, in KCA/NGCA, more than fifteen times the Q2 average. The data suggests that KCA/GCA IDPs have both the lowest absolute levels of income and the greatest level of income inequality. These inequalities point to the particular vulnerability of the lowest earning 75% of IDPs, especially the lowest 50% of those in KCA/NGCA and bottom 25% of those in GCA.

Findings saw a major decline in cash savings for KCA/NGCA IDPs, which is consistent with the decline in monthly income. The results show high vulnerability for the bottom 75% and continue the trend of inequality amongst respondents highlighted in terms of incomes. Non-IDPs reported minor increases in cash savings and GCA IDPs remained relatively stable, although the lowest quartile reported a reduction in cash savings. Both the income and savings results raise major questions about restrictions on movement of people and goods, the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the differing levels of vulnerability amongst IDPs.

Distance acts as a significant barrier to generating income and accessing commodities, where prices are inflated because of transport costs. As the non-IDP respondents in this survey are mostly located rurally, their average time to walk to a market is high – nevertheless, their average walk time is still less than for KCA/NGCA IDPs. Comparatively, GCA IDPs reported significantly shorter times to walk to the nearest market. This is largely because KCA/NGCA IDPs tend to be located more remotely and rurally than GCA IDPs. These results align with KCA/NGCA IDPs reporting less cash income and savings compared to GCA IDPs, though not with non-IDPs reporting more income and savings than GCA IDPs.

Survey results show a marked improvement for non-IDPs access to items and services (particularly mobile phones, scooters and grid electricity), a significant decline for KCA/NGCA IDPs and a decline for GCA IDPs except in relation to mobile phones and bank accounts. These results, again, might raise questions relating to the impacts of escalating armed conflict and restrictions on the movement of goods and people.

For monthly income, cash savings and food savings, major outliers (where only a very small number of respondents gave answers that were very far outside the normal range of responses) were removed using a mathematical formula detailed in the methodology section. This was done to provide a more representative range of data not skewed by a small number of unusual answers. After removing these outliers, ‘quartile averages’ were calculated – i.e. the average of each quarter of the entire range of responses, from lowest to highest. In the data these are referred to as Q1 (the average of the lowest 25% of responses) through Q4 (the average of the highest 25% of responses).
**Monthly income**: Over the past 12 months, what has been your average monthly income (in Myanmar Kyat)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-IDPs</th>
<th>KCA/NGCA IDPs</th>
<th>GCA IDPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baseline</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q3</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q4</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Endline</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q3</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q4</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Savings**: Imagine that your savings and cash were all that your household had to live from. Approximately, how many days would your household be able to survive?

- **Non-IDPs**: 21.6 days
- **KCA/NGCA IDPs**: 13.7 days
- **GCA IDPs**: 13.2 days
- **Women IDPs**: 13.3 days
- **Men IDPs**: 8.9 days

---

6 Note: self-reporting of monthly income is often inaccurate, but inaccuracies are likely similar across all groups, thus making the comparative results still valid.

7 $1US = approximately 1,350 Kyat at the time of writing.
Quarterly averages:

How long does it take to walk to the nearest market? (Average in minutes)

Do you or anyone else in your household have?

- Bank account
- Mobile phone
- Radio
- Television
- Motorcycle/scooter
- Grid electricity

% possessing listed item
Food Security

In contrast to income and cash savings, KCA/NGCA IDPs’ food savings saw a substantial increase, particularly for the bottom 50%. However, 16% of respondents indicated they have 10 days or less of food supplies\(^8\). Although the extent of food supplies may not be as high as indicated, the results do suggest that KCA/NGCA IDPs have better food savings than cash savings or income. There is also less inequality between quartiles – especially for KCA/GCA IDPs – in relation to food supplies than for incomes or cash savings.

Levels and schedules of food aid in (mostly KCA/NGCA) IDP camps may distort this data. If the survey was done just after a distribution, people would have food savings and would not have had to use coping mechanisms. Nevertheless, DPP partners know from experience that there are frequently chronic food shortages and long food gaps in the winter months, often due to challenges with the humanitarian funding cycle.

Non-IDPs have seen a significant increase in food savings across all groups, while GCA IDPs have seen improvements for the bottom 50%, thus reducing inequality. There is still significant vulnerability for the bottom 25-50% of GCA IDPs.

Over the two-year period, nutritional diversity has decreased. Non-IDPs need to borrow food more often while more IDPs report having to reduce the size and number of their meals as well as borrow food. Together, these results show worrying trends regarding food security of IDPs.

Although KCA/NGCA IDPs reported higher food savings, they have the lowest nutritional diversity. This suggests their food savings are likely primarily rice, rather than a broader array of foods.

Despite non-IDPs reporting higher income, cash savings and food savings in comparison to GCA IDPs, the results are similar to GCA IDPs in terms of reducing the size and quantity of meals, and borrowing food. This may suggest different coping mechanisms. Non-IDPs have higher nutritional diversity.

Imagine that your current food supplies were all that your household had to live from. Approximately, how many days would your household be able to survive?

Overall averages:

\(^8\) The IQR based outlier process (detailed at the start of this section) significantly skews these figures. There is a consolidation of responses at 30 days, which creates a small IQR, resulting in responses under 10 days not being included because they are calculated as outliers.
Quarterly averages:

![Quarterly averages graph](image)

**Nutritional Diversity**

(8 = high diversity, 1 = low diversity)

- Year 1: 6.4, 6.4, 5.25, 6.04
- Year 2: 5, 5.7

In the past seven days, did anyone in your house have to:

- Reduce size of meals
- Reduce number of meals
- Borrow food

![Response to statements graph](image)

---

9 A major cluster of KCA IDPs have 30 days of food supplies, resulting in the IQR outlier calculation skewing the results, as figures below 10 days are excluded in the calculation. However, 16% of KCA IDPs have 10 days or less food supplies.

10 Based on reported consumption of different food groups over the past seven days, grouped by nutritional value, such as protein and vitamins.
Gender Dynamics

In order to understand issues around gender, respondents were asked a series of questions ranging from family decision making to prevalence of domestic violence. Most concerning is a significant increase since the baseline in the number of people across all respondent groups agreeing that domestic violence is a problem within their respective communities and believing a husband is justified in beating their wife under certain situations.

The number of non-IDPs reporting domestic violence as a problem rose by 60% from the baseline (to 66%), KCA/NGCA IDPs by 29% (to 50%) and GCA IDPs by 44% (to 69%). Rates of reporting were similar across male and female respondents. These dramatic increases could partly be the result of improved awareness of domestic violence leading to higher reporting but could also represent an actual increase in levels of domestic violence, perhaps linked to the stresses of protracted armed violence in Kachin. Regardless of the cause, the increases are a major concern and warrant further investigation.

Results show a widespread willingness from all groups to speak out on violence against women (between 69-78%) with similar responses between male and female respondents. A baseline comparison isn’t included because the wording of the question asked in the endline changed significantly from the baseline.

Respondents were asked for situations in which, in their opinion, it would be ‘justified’ for a husband to beat their wife. KCA/NGCA IDPs were the most likely to say that a husband was justified in beating their wife for every situation presented, with non-IDPs the least likely to say that a husband was justified in doing so in any situation. Male respondents were more likely to believe that a husband was justified in beating his wife in every situation, although in several cases only by a couple of percentage points. These figures turn the trends of the baseline on their heads: In 2015, non-IDPs surveyed were more likely to believe a husband was justified in beating his wife across all situations, as were female respondents compared to male ones.

GBV education and related activities are generally more prevalent in IDP camps than host communities which was a proposed explanation for IDPs less often believing a husband was justified in beating his wife than non-IDPs in the baseline. However, IDP attitudes have actually worsened in the endline – both in comparison to non-IDPs and also in overall percentages. One possible explanation is that a further two years of displacement has increased tensions and frustration but this seems inadequate to fully explain the change in results, especially given that the percentage of female respondents believing a husband is justified in beating his wife has increased across all situations since the baseline, even if now overtaken by male respondents.

It is immensely concerning that both men and women’s acceptance of domestic violence has increased since the baseline and this warrants further investigation. Coupled with the increased responses that domestic violence is a problem in the community, the results suggest a substantial need to address GBV in Kachin state. In analysing the gender-specific questions it is important to note that two-thirds of respondents to the endline survey were women.

Finally, when respondents were asked about who decides on the use of household expenditures, there was little change from baseline results between male and female respondents saying it was ‘men only’. However, there was a decline for both male and female respondents saying ‘women
only’ with a corresponding rise in people saying ‘both women and men.’ The increase in joint decision-making is potentially positive but must be tempered by the lack of reduction in ‘men only’ decision-making. It is also important to note that, even if joint decision-making prevails, men often control income before it comes into the house.

Within your household, who decides on the use of household expenditures?

Domestic violence against women is a problem in my community:

I am willing to speak out against violence against women in my community:

---

11 Total less than 100% because N/A and don’t know not included.
In your opinion, is a husband justified in hitting or beating his wife in the following situations:

1. If she goes out without telling him
2. If she neglects the children
3. If she argues with him
4. If she refuses to have sex with him
5. If she burns the food
6. For any reason at all, if he wants to
7. If she adopts family planning practices
Conflict, Security and Levels of Trust

Reflecting the findings from the previous section on the Disempowerment of Women, domestic violence was a form of harm reported in high numbers by all respondent groups. The number of people reporting domestic violence was highest amongst non-IDPs – who also reported suffering domestic violence more than any other type of harm. IDPs in KCA/NGCA and GCA both reported similar levels of domestic violence but these reports of domestic violence were matched in number by those of harm caused by a combination of artillery, gunfire and landmines. See also the section on gender-specific questions for further details on worrying trends related to domestic violence.

According to these endline results, IDPs – and especially those in KCA/NGCA – feel more danger or threat from armed conflict than the non-IDPs surveyed. The number of IDPs in both KCA/NGCA and GCA feeling threatened by armed conflict has also increased since the baseline, although slightly decreased in the non-IDPs surveyed.

Most respondents do not report taking any specific measures to cope with future armed conflict, although KCA/NGCA IDPs were somewhat more likely to have (around a third, compared to approximately a quarter of non-IDPs and GCA IDPs). However, only 20% of KCA/NGCA IDPs then reported feeling able to actually cope with future armed conflict, as compared to around 30% of non-IDPs and GCA IDPs. These results may indicate a relatively low level of resilience to armed violence across all groups.

The results show attacks by armed groups are consistently identified as the greatest safety and security issue across all categories of respondents. Consistent with previous topics, an escalation of fighting also ranks highly for KCA/NGCA IDPs. This is a marked difference to the non-IDPs surveyed who reported natural disasters and loss of land/resources as the next highest issues.

Although highest amongst KCA IDPs, all respondents identified the Tatmadaw as their number one source of threat, followed by government-aligned militias and then (with much less frequency) KIA troops. It is also worth noting the relatively high numbers of people who either answered ‘don’t know’ or who refused to answer – although we cannot know exactly why respondents gave these answers, it is plausible that at times it was because they were nervous about answering this question.

Although KCA/NGCA IDPs were most likely to report hearing gunshots every month or more often, they were also most likely to report feeling safe when walking alone at night with over 60% saying they felt ‘very’ or ‘quite’ safe and only 15% feeling ‘very unsafe’. This is in contrast to over 60% of non-IDPs and GCA IDPs feeling either ‘not very safe’ or ‘very unsafe’ (with nearly 40% of non-IDPs saying ‘very unsafe’). This may be because the question is focused more on respondents’ immediate surroundings rather than the threat of armed violence as in previous questions – a possibility reinforced by over 60% of KCA/NGCA IDPs describing their community as generally ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ peaceful (and only 2% as ‘very violent’). There was an increase in the number of non-IDPs describing their community as peaceful compared to the baseline, though they were also most likely (10%) to describe it as ‘very violent’. Interestingly, there was no significant difference in how male and female IDPs responded to these questions despite the previously mentioned rise in reports of domestic violence. These results on feelings of safety and their relation to domestic violence and perceptions of threat from armed conflict are worthy of further inquiry.

In identifying who respondents would turn to for safety, there were substantial differences across groups. Religious groups were consistently identified as a primary actor to turn to for safety but
non-IDPs were most likely to say they would turn to local government authorities, whereas IDPs in both KCA/NGCA and GCA reported a preference for camp management committees. KCA/NGCA IDPs showed particularly high preferences for KIO and KIA authorities compared to other groups (and particularly low for government authorities. At the other end of the spectrum, only a very small proportion of respondents from all groups indicated they would turn to either the Tatmadaw or police for safety. These results may have significant implications for actors seeking to improve community safety, security and access to justice.

There has been a slight decline in reported levels of trust for ‘in-groups’ (i.e. neighbours, community leaders) since the baseline and a slight increase in levels of trust for ‘out-groups’ (i.e. other religious or ethnic groups). These variances are not particularly striking, however, and there remains – perhaps unsurprisingly – most trust in ‘in-groups’. Levels of trust in the KIA, Tatmadaw and government are new additions to the survey since the baseline. For non-IDPs, levels of trust in the KIA and government are similar. For KCA/NGCA IDPs, trust in the KIA is even higher than for ‘in-groups’ while reported trust in the government and Tatmadaw are the lowest levels of trust reported by any respondents about any groups. For GCA IDPs, trust in the KIA is higher than that with the government but lower than amongst KCA/NGCA IDPs.

---

In the last 12 months, have you experienced physical damage to yourself or your belongings because of:

- Artillery fire
- Gun fire
- Landmines/UXO
- Inter-ethnic conflict
- Inter-religious conflict
- Land grabbing by armed actor
- Land grabbing by company
- Domestic violence

![Graph showing percentage in agreement for various types of damage](image)

During the past 12 months, how much danger have you felt from armed conflict in Kachin?

- Much danger
- Some danger
- Not much danger
- No danger at all
- Don’t know/not sure

![Graph showing percentage response to statement](image)
Please respond to the following statements: I feel a threat to myself or my belongings due to armed conflict:

Have you taken any measures in order to cope with future potential armed conflict?

Please respond to the following statement: I feel able to cope with potential future armed conflict

12 Wording changed slightly from the baseline, which was ‘I feel a threat to myself or my belongings as a result of man-made disaster’
In your opinion, what is the most serious safety and security issue that your community faces?

- Threat from inside community
- Attack by armed group
- Natural disaster
- Landmines/UXOs
- Loss of land/resources
- Escalation of fighting
- Confrontation with another community
- Gender-based violence
- Other
- Don’t know
- Refused to answer

% ranking issue number one

Referring to the previous threats, where do these threats come from? Select the MOST threatening [source] (only one)

- Government-aligned militias
- KIA troops
- Tatmadaw
- KIA-aligned militias
- Other ethnic armed group
- Border guard force
- Logging/jade companies
- Plantation companies
- Other
- Don’t know
- Refused to answer

% ranking source number one
More generally, which groups are threatening to your community? Select all that apply. (Totals >100%)

- Government-aligned militias
- KIA troops
- Tatmadaw
- KIA-aligned militias
- Other ethnic armed group
- Border guard force
- Logging/jade companies
- Plantation companies
- Other
- Don't know
- Refused to answer

Which of these groups is most threatening to your community?

How often do you hear gunshots in or near your area?
How safe do you feel to walk alone at night where you live?

In your opinion, is this community generally peaceful or marked by violence?

Who would you turn to for safety? Can select multiple

KIA
Tatmadaw
Police
Local authorities (KIO)
Local authorities (government)
Religious group
Camp management committee
Local NGOs
Border guard force
KIA-aligned militia
Tatmadaw-aligned militia
Other ethnic armed group
Other
Who would be your first choice to turn to for safety? (Only select one)

- KIO/KIA
- Tatmadaw
- Police
- Local authorities (KIO)
- Local authorities (government)
- Religious group
- Camp management committee
- Local NGOs
- Border guard force
- KIA-aligned militia
- Tatmadaw-aligned militia
- Other ethnic armed group
- Other

% response to statement

Trust (1-5 point scale developed from multiple questions, 1 = low, 5 = high)

- In-group (neighbours, community leaders)
- Out-group (other religion & ethnicity)
- Others (foreigners, businessmen, ex-combatants)
- IDPs
- KIO/KIA
- Tatmadaw
- Government

Level of trust

Baseline

Endline
Peace Process: Opportunity, Participation and Influence

Perhaps surprisingly given the results of the previous section, there has been an increase in the number of IDPs agreeing that they have confidence in the peace process resulting in lasting peace – particularly amongst KCA/NGCA IDPs. In contrast, non-IDPs surveyed are more likely to disagree with this idea. The majority of respondents either thought lasting peace in Kachin was more than five years away or (between 70-80%) didn’t know how long it would take - indicating a high degree of uncertainty over prospects for peace.

Survey results indicate an improvement in IDP feelings of being informed about the peace process. However, there was no improvement in non-IDP’s overall perception of being informed about the peace process even though they were more likely to report having information about specific peace initiatives than in the baseline. Levels of information about both KIO-government negotiations and community-level discussions have generally declined amongst all groups which is consistent with the direction of the peace process in Kachin between baseline and endline surveys. In the baseline, it was noted that local community consultations should feed into the formal peace process. However, given the KIO is not a participant in the formal peace process and that state-level consultations have not taken place in Kachin, there is cause for concern that communities do not have appropriate avenues to feed into the formal peace process.

How GCA IDPs and non-IDPs rate their opportunities to participate in activities related to the peace process has remained relatively similar between the baseline and endline with the majority saying either ‘poor’, ‘very poor’ or ‘no opportunities’. KCA/NGCA IDPs rate their opportunities more highly than in the baseline, though over 55% still say poor, very poor or no opportunity.

In terms of actual participation, there has been a significant decline in all groups reporting that they have participated in either public consultations or community meetings related to the peace process. Reports of participating in dialogue with authorities have slightly increased for KCA/NGCA and GCA IDPs and increased from 2.7% to 22.1% for non-IDPs surveyed.

When asked how respondents wanted to participate in or influence the peace process, survey results indicate many diverse interests – although the single highest response across all groups was ‘unsure / don’t know’ (and especially for IDPs). The most commonly reported preference across all groups was to act as an observer in the formal peace process, although this was much lower in KCA/NGCA areas. Generally, IDPs demonstrated preferences for community-based activities such as civic education classes or engaging in campaigning, whereas the non-IDPs surveyed were more likely to indicate a preference for engaging with the formal peace process.

A lack of time and income were the primary barriers to participation in peace process activities reported by all groups. ‘Poor participation mechanisms’ were also identified by KCA/NGCA IDPs and non-IDPs and a ‘lack of influence’ was noted most highly amongst non-IDP respondents.

Across all categories of respondents, since the baseline was conducted, there was an increase in the belief that women leaders represent respondents’ interests in the peace process, with between 60% and 75% of respondents either ‘agreeing’ or ‘completely agreeing’ that they did. There was also an
increase in IDPs feelings that youth leaders represent respondents interests in the peace process since the baseline – although non-IDPs were much more likely to disagree with this than at the time of the baseline.

For non-IDPs and GCA IDPs, the feeling that priority community issues are included in the peace process has significantly declined since the baseline with the majority of both groups now saying these issues are ‘barely’ or ‘not at all’ included. There has been less change in KCA/NGCA IDP perceptions on this issue and they are comparatively more inclined to think priority community issues are included in the peace process. All groups report less belief that women’s priority issues are being included in the peace process than at the time of the baseline with the majority of all groups (and similar between male and female respondents) believing women’s priority issues are ‘barely’ or ‘not at all’ included – an implication being that actors engaging in the peace process need to ensure sufficient attention is given to women’s priority issues.

Two years since the baseline, the results in this section are reflective of a peace process that is not showing progress in Kachin. At the time of the baseline, there were many expectations amongst IDPs that the peace process would bring improvements in the coming years but most respondents feel the issues important to them are less included now than before.

How do you feel your level of being informed (about the peace process) has changed in the past 12 months?

What peace processes do you have information about¹³?

¹³ Total percentage greater than 100, as respondents can provide more than one response.
How would you rate your current opportunities to participate in the peace process?

How [well] do you feel priority community issues are included in current peace processes?

¹⁴ Participation was explained to interviewees as any peace process related activities from the micro to the macro level, not only formal peace processes.
How do you feel women’s priority issues are included in current peace processes?

If you had the opportunity, how would you like to participate in or influence the peace process? Select all that apply:

- Directly participate in the formal processes
- Observer in the formal processes
- Participate on consultation for formal processes
- Monitor the implementation of agreements
- Engage in campaigning
- Contribute to drafting policies
- Peace and civic education classes
- Other
- Unsure/don’t know

Of these opportunities to participate in peace, what is your number one preference?
Women leaders represent my interests in the peace process.

% response to statement

Level of agreement
- Completely agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Completely disagree

During the past 12 months, what peace process activities have you participated in?¹⁵

Dialogue with authorities
Public consultation
Community meetings or discussions
Issue-based dialogue
Civic or peace education
Consultation on peace process or conflict
Civic action
Other

% response to statement

¹⁵ Percentages over 100, as respondents can provide more than one response.
In your opinion, what are the main barriers to participation in the peace process?

Selecting all that apply

- Lack of time
- Poor security
- Lack of income
- Inconvenient times
- Fear of reprisal
- Lack of influence
- Lack of interest
- Ethnicity
- Social exclusion
- Poor participation mechanisms
- Age
- Inconvenient location
- Other
Of these barriers, what is the biggest barrier to participation in the peace process?

- Lack of time
- Poor security
- Lack of income
- Lack of interest
- Inconvenient times
- Fear of reprisal
- Inconvenient location
- Ethnicity
- Social exclusion
- Lack of influence
- Poor participation mechanisms
- Other

% ranking barrier number one

Please respond to the following statement. I am confident that the current peace process will result in lasting peace.

% response to statement

Level of agreement
- Completely agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Completely disagree

How long do you think it will be until there is lasting peace in Kachin?

% response to statement

Level of agreement
- It will never happen
- 0-5 years
- Over 5 years
- Don’t know
- Refused to answer
Questions regarding return and resettlement highlight that 92% of KCA/NGCA IDPs and 83% for GCA IDPs want to return home (a reduction of about 5% and 10% respectively from the baseline) with 77% of KCA/NGCA IDPs and 69% of GCA IDPs saying they would prefer to return if they had to choose between either return or resettlement. As with the baseline, the three primary barriers to returns identified by respondents were the presence of armed actors, land mines, and armed conflict highlighting that displacement in Kachin is not only a direct consequence of armed conflict but also that the main barriers preventing durable returns are unlikely to be addressed without the cessation of violence and a sustainable political settlement.

IDP interviewees were asked when they expected to return home and nearly 90% of all respondents said they did not know, up from around 80-85% in the baseline. Ongoing armed conflict, displacement and no progress in the peace process since the baseline seem to have heightened the uncertainty of returning home for IDPs.

These results help explain motivations for return. Responses are similar to the baseline except that, amongst all IDPs, people responding that their reason for wanting to return home is an ‘end of conflict’ have halved as has the number of KCA/NGCA IDPs believing it is ‘safe for return’. Hope for the future and a desire for better economic opportunities remain the strongest reasons for wanting to return among all IDPs.

It is striking that despite two more years of displacement and escalating armed conflict that could increase the appeal of resettlement, there has been a significant decline in people wanting to resettle in locations that are not their land of origin. Considering these results alongside the clear preference for return, if various actors want to respect the preferences of IDPs, efforts must be invested into support for returns rather than resettlement. Addressing some of the reasons IDPs don’t want to resettle will also be useful but this should not be an alternative to facilitating return.

Similar to expectations on return, there are high levels of uncertainty among respondents about a timeframe for resettlement. Results regarding reasons for resettlement are similar to the reasons for wanting to return although, along with less people giving ‘end of conflict’ as a reason to resettle, there was also a reduction in people expecting ‘better economic opportunities’ from resettlement. This may perhaps be a reflection of problematic resettlement efforts to date. For the endline, an additional option was added: ‘feel return is impossible’. As a third of respondents indicated they feel return is impossible, it reinforces the need to address the barriers to return and ensure returns are based on IDP’s free, prior and informed consent.

When asking about barriers to resettlement, the option ‘prefer to return’ was added to the endline and is the primary reason 44% of KCA/NGCA IDPs and 30% of GCA IDPs do not want to resettle. If IDPs want to return then that should remain the goal so, if they choose resettlement for now, it should not be at the expense of being able to return at a later date.

When asked whether authorities were failing to effectively support return and resettlement processes, the number of non-IDPs and GCA IDPs disagreeing with the statement has increased since the baseline while the number of KCA/NGCA IDPs agreeing with the statement has increased – although still remains lower in absolute terms (35%) than GCA IDPs (51%) and non-IDPs (55%). Only about 20% of non-IDPs and GCA IDPs and 30% of KCA/NGCA IDPs disagreed that authorities were failing to effectively support return and resettlement. These results indicate a need for all authorities to improve their efforts while ensuring they are grounded in IDP preferences.
Do you want to return to your home/land?

- Yes
- No
- Don’t know
- Refused to answer

When do you expect to return?

- A couple months to years
- Never
- Don’t know
- Refused to answer

What are the reasons for wanting to return?16

- End of conflict
- Safe to return
- Better economic opportunities
- Forced return
- Lack of assistance at current location
- Hope for future
- Other

16 Respondents can provide more than one answer, hence the percentages totalling over 100 per cent. Not all respondents provided reasons.
What are the reasons for not wanting to return?

- No trust in sustained peace
- Presence of Tatmadaw
- Presence of KIA
- Presence of other armed groups
- Land mines
- Armed conflict
- No/limited livelihood opportunities
- Too remote
- Safer here
- Settled here
- Lack of social services
- Other

![](image)

% response to reason (IDPs only)

---

Do you want to be resettled?¹⁷

- Yes
- No
- Don’t know
- Refused to answer

% response to answer (IDPs only)

---

When do you expect to resettle?

- A couple months to years
- Never
- Don’t know
- Refused to answer

% response to answer (IDPs only)

---

¹⁷ ‘Resettled’ in Kachin generally refers to resettlement to a new location in Kachin state, not international resettlement.
What are the reasons for wanting to resettle?

- End of conflict
- Safe for resettlement
- Better economic opportunities
- Forced resettlement
- Lack of assistance at current location
- Feel return is impossible
- Hope for future
- Other

What are the reasons for not wanting to resettle?

- No trust in peace
- Landmines
- Unsafe
- No/limited livelihood opportunities
- Too remote
- Safer here
- Settled here
- Lack of social services
- Other
- Prefer to return
If you had to choose between return OR resettlement, what is your preference?

 Authorities (Government and non-Government) are failing to effectively support return and resettlement processes

Linkages to Authorities

Respondents were asked questions about how authorities understand and respond to community needs. In response to a statement saying that ‘my community’s needs are not understood by authorities’, there was an increase among all respondents disagreeing with the statement. This suggests that respondents generally feel their needs are better understood by authorities now in comparison to 2015. KCA/NGCA IDPs reported both the biggest increase in and highest overall percentage of people disagreeing that community needs are not understood by authorities.

There is a substantial difference between non-IDPs and IDPs on whether authorities have improved delivery of social services as a result of community requests. The number of non-IDPs that agree with this statement has declined by nearly 10% from the baseline (to 45%), whereas KCA/NGCA IDPs agreeing has increased by 7% (to 66%) and GCA IDPs agreeing has increased by 14% (to 50%). This suggests that authorities in KCA/NGCA may have – or at least are perceived to have – improved service delivery as a result of community requests.

Nearly three-quarters (73%) of KCA/NGCA IDPs feel local authorities support their community’s needs as compared to 28% of non-IDPs surveyed and 38% of GCA IDPs. Non-IDP and GCA IDP respondents are also more likely to disagree that local authorities provide adequate support for community needs as compared to KCA/NGCA IDPs (50% and 34% compared to 10%).
There has been a decrease in non-IDP respondents agreeing that authorities reflect community priorities and needs in peace processes since the baseline. Conversely, IDPs from KCA/NGCA and GCA showed both a higher level of agreement with the statement in comparison to the non-IDPs and an increase in numbers agreeing with the statement since the baseline. Consistent with other results in this section, KCA/NGCA IDPs are significantly more likely to agree that authorities reflect community priorities and needs in peace processes (and less likely to disagree) than either non-IDPs surveyed or GCA IDPs.

For all stakeholders in Kachin, the findings in this section should stimulate thinking on differing perceptions towards authorities and what that means for improving the accountability of governance actors to their constituencies or considering other development and humanitarian interventions.

**My community’s needs are not understood by authorities.**

**Authorities (Government and non-Government) have improved delivery of social services as a result of community requests.**

**I feel local authorities (Government or KIO) support my community’s needs.**

**I feel that authorities (Government and non-Government) reflect community priorities and needs in peace processes.**
Health

Survey results on health broadly indicate some health improvement for non-IDPs surveyed along with increased prevalence of, but less intense, illness for KCA/NGCA IDPs and stable results for GCA IDPs.

Health satisfaction has increased for non-IDPs and remained relatively stable for KCA/NGCA IDPs. Conversely for GCA IDPs, despite stability in prevalence and intensity of illness, there has been a significant increase in perceptions of satisfaction with health.

There is a significant decline for both KCA/NGCA and GCA IDPs in percentage of births attended by a skilled birth attendant. The reason is unclear but may be another impact of protracted displacement which, through exacerbating poverty, can reduce access to services. Additionally, women reported marginally worse health in comparison to the baseline.

In the last 3 months, have you been ill to the extent that you were unable to participate in normal daily activities? If yes, for how many days?

[Graph showing % of births attended by a skilled birth attendant and satisfaction levels]

Level of satisfaction

- Very satisfied
- Somewhat satisfied
- Neither satisfied nor unsatisfied
- Somewhat unsatisfied
- Very unsatisfied
Future Development

Respondents’ perceptions towards their household’s future development opportunities saw some positive increase across all groups, though most noticeable was the increase for non-IDPs. This highlights a tangible gap between the perceptions of IDPs and non-IDPs, reflecting the reality that IDPs are disproportionately impacted by increased conflict.

Despite a worsening household situation and external context, it is notable that both KCA/NGCA and GCA IDPs have increased levels of happiness. On the other hand, the level of happiness of non-IDPs has declined slightly from 88% to 73%.

How do you feel about your household’s future development opportunities?

Taking all things together, would you say you are very happy, somewhat happy, neither happy nor unhappy, somewhat unhappy or very unhappy?

![Chart showing percentage response to statements on future development opportunities for different groups.]

![Chart showing percentage response to statements on level of happiness for different groups.]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception</th>
<th>Non-IDPs</th>
<th>KCA/NGCA IDPs</th>
<th>GCA IDPs</th>
<th>Women IDPs</th>
<th>Men IDPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definitely improve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probably improve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probably decline</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitely decline</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of happiness</th>
<th>Very happy</th>
<th>Somewhat happy</th>
<th>Neither happy nor unhappy</th>
<th>Somewhat unhappy</th>
<th>Very unhappy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusions

The gathering of data for the baseline in October 2015 was during a generally optimistic period in Kachin with high expectations of the peace process for all, a likely incoming NLD government and prospects for imminent return and resettlement. By contrast, data gathering for the endline, in October 2017, took place during a context of intensifying armed conflict, no movement in the peace process, extremely limited returns, and a deteriorating economic situation. In different ways, the results of this endline survey reflect that different context for IDPs in Kachin between 2015 and 2017.

Worsening Situation in KCA/NGCA for Income and Savings

The dramatic decline in KCA/NGCA IDPs’ monthly income and cash savings are a major cause for concern. The bottom 25% on average reported earning nothing in the last twelve months (compared to 4,313 Kyat in 2015), the next 25% 4,822 MMK (compared to 31,444 MMK in 2015) and the next 25% 25,352 MMK (compared to 74,537 MMK in 2015), while even the top 25% are only earning on average 85,648 MMK (compared to 234,757 MMK in 2015). Inequalities between respondent quartiles are also most pronounced in KCA/NGCA IDPs.

Cash savings show similarly steep declines. Reported food savings have improved, but nutritional diversity has decreased. It is difficult to specifically attribute the exact causes of the steep declines but the socioeconomic deterioration suggests an urgent need to comprehensively address the extensive restrictions on the delivery of humanitarian assistance to KCA/NGCA and people’s movements between KCA/NGCA and GCA. Easing restrictions should at least ease socioeconomic stress.

It should be noted that while this trend was most pronounced in KCA/NGCA, all respondent groups, except for the top quartile of non-IDPs, reported a reduction in income since the baseline survey in 2015.

Dramatic Increase in Reporting of Domestic Violence

Overall, the gender dynamics in the endline survey are varied and complex. However, most striking – and concerning – are the increases in reports of GBV and numbers of IDP respondents, especially in KCA/NGCA, agreeing with various justifications for a husband beating his wife. Further attention is needed to understand these dynamics and how best to address them.

Otherwise, across many questions, the responses of women and men were similar (and thus not disaggregated in the presentation of this report). Nevertheless, there remain significant gender differences across questions on issues such as feelings of safety and participation in peace process activities. These variations suggest a need to better understand women and men’s differing needs and priorities and ensure that activities are designed to meet all of them.

Reduced Engagement with the Peace Process

This trend appears across multiple questions, particularly a major decrease in reported participation in peace process activities and a decline in the feeling that community/women’s issues are included in the peace process.
The cause of this is not self-evident from the endline data but it should be noted that, since the baseline, the formal peace process has made very limited progress, the KIO/A has been unable to participate in the political dialogue, planned state-level consultations have not happened in Kachin and armed conflict has increased in intensity to levels not seen for many years.

**IDPs’ Preference for Return over Resettlement**

IDPs continue to have a clear preference for return rather than resettlement. The three main barriers to return reported by IDPs (the presence of armed actors, active armed conflict and the presence of landmines) are all directly and intimately linked to the failures of Myanmar’s peace process in Kachin state. All stakeholders should bear in mind IDPs’ preference for return when considering resettlement initiatives – resettlement initiatives may still have value in a context of protracted armed violence but attention must still be paid to enabling IDPs to return to their land of origin wherever possible.

**Contrast Between KCA/NGCA and GCA**

The endline results reinforce findings from the baseline that highlight differences between how IDPs in KCA/NGCA and GCA relate to authorities. KCA/NGCA IDP responses to various questions – such as their levels of trust in local authorities, belief that local authorities represent their needs in the peace process, or whether local authorities have improved services in response to community requests – often suggest a higher, if far from universal, level of satisfaction than with either GCA IDPs or non-IDP respondents. All stakeholders would do well to reflect on what this means for responding to IDP needs in the most appropriate way.

**Increased Differences Between Non-IDPs and IDPs**

This endline had a representative sample size of IDP respondents to the overall population size (1901 sample size to overall population of, approximately, 100,000) but a very small sample size of non-IDP respondents (454). This means that comparison between IDPs and non-IDPs per se needs to be treated with some caution. However, within the confines of these sample sizes, there is a trend of increasing disparity between non-IDPs and IDPs between the baseline and the endline.

Despite reported incomes declining across the board since the baseline, non-IDPs report being in a better socioeconomic position than IDPs with more income, more savings and more access to goods and services.

Although non-IDPs report a similar need to reduce the size/regularity of meals as GCA IDPs, their nutritional diversity remains far higher than all IDPs.

When asked about their future household development, 68% of non-IDPs believe it will improve, compared to only 35.5% for KCA/NGCA IDPs and 40% for GCA IDPs.
Methodology

A quantitative baseline was conducted by the DPP two years ago, in 2015, followed by some qualitative data collection. Qualitative data has not been included here as even limiting the presentation of information to the large amount of quantitative data captured in the endline survey posed a challenge for the accessibility and readability of this report. However, qualitative data the DPP consortium’s extensive experience working with communities and other actors in Kachin does inform the interpretation of data in this report.

The Survey

The DPP consortium developed the endline survey modelled on the baseline survey but adapted where needed to reflect changes in context and feedback on the baseline. The baseline balanced both broad and specific questions, matched with thorough review processes focusing on gender, conflict sensitivity and evaluation standards. Changes from the baseline were somewhat limited by a need to keep questions the same if there was going to be meaningful comparisons between the baseline and endline. Considering the significant contextual changes, if a new baseline were to be conducted, there would be significant revisions. The survey was designed in English, but implemented in Jinghpaw (Kachin) and Burmese languages – with a recognition of the limitations and challenges posed by conducting perceptions surveys across multiple languages.

Interviewers

- Two workshops were held in Myitkyina and one in Bhamo for approximately 70 data collectors, covering interviewing techniques (particularly related to managing potential issues such as re-traumatising interviewees and ensuring gender-sensitivity), informed and voluntary consent of interviewees, implementation processes, and ensuring all questions and answers were thoroughly understood.
- Data collectors were staff and volunteers associated with the DPP consortium.

Interviewees

- 2354\(^{18}\) interviews were conducted in approximately 80 IDP camps and villages across 12 townships of Kachin.
- For each consortium member, the total number of interviewees were divided across towns>IDP camps in proportion to population size. Interviewees were then randomly, but systematically selected in each location. For example, if 10 interviews were required across 30 households, every third household would be interviewed.
- Locations are largely the same as the baseline to provide like-for-like comparisons but the overall number of interviews increased. A notable location change was Zai Awng IDP camp being replaced by Sha It Yang because Zai Awng was abandoned due to nearby armed conflict, with many residents establishing Sha It Yang.

Data Collection

- Locations were selected to get a balance of Kachin’s diversity, including lowland and highland areas, KCA/NGCA and GCA, rural and urban, differing proximities to conflict and so on. All locations are target areas of the DPP.
- Data was collected between late September and October 2017.
- All data was collected digitally, utilising tablet computers.

\(^{18}\) Note: discrepancies in numbers throughout the report are due to some surveys not having all questions answered. 2354 refers to the total interviews, but some questions may have been answered by less than this total.
Data Analysis

• Data cleaning was conducted to remove anomalies and inconsistent answers to make the data more reliable. For example, if an interviewee indicates four children in the household but then six attending school. In such cases, the data is either adjusted or removed.

• Major outliers were removed from questions in the socio-economic section and were defined as those that were less than $Q_1-1.5\times IQR$ and greater than $Q_3+1.5\times IQR$ – with $Q = \text{quartile}$, and $IQR = \text{inter quartile range}$.

• Data was initially compiled and disaggregated as per the baseline. The DPP consortium then collectively analysed the data over two days, which was followed by further individual analysis and review processes.

• All subgroups provide statistically significant results, due to large enough sample sizes. However, the micro contexts of Kachin require caution when generalising any results.